L Hutcheson (F) 232 c 36

AN

INQUIRY

INTO THE

Original of our IDEAS

OF

BEAUTY *and* VIRTUE.

In Two TREATISES.

I. Concerning BEAUTY, ORDER, HARMONY, DESIGN.

II. Concerning MORAL GOOD and EVIL.

The Fifth Edition, Corrected.

Itaque eorum ipſorum quæ aſpectu ſentiuntur, nullum aliud animal pulchritudinem, venuſtatem, convenientiam, partium ſentit. Quam ſimilitudinem natura ratioque ab oculis ad animum transferens, multo etiam magis pulchritudinem, conſtantiam, ordinem in conſiliis, factiſque conſervandum putat. Quibus ex rebus conflatur & efficitur id quod quærimus honeſtum: Quod eitamſi nobilitatum non ſit, tamen honeſtum ſit: quodque etiamſi à nullo laudetur, naturâ eſt laudabile. Formam quidem ipſam & tanquam faciem honeſti vides, quæ ſi oculis cerneretur, mirabiles amores excitaret ſapientiæ. *Cic. de Off. lib.* 1. *c.* 4.

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M, DCC, LIII.

TO

His EXCELLENCY

JOHN,

Lord *CARTERET,*

Lord Lieutenant of *IRELAND.*

May it pleaſe your Excellency,

WHEN I publiſh'd theſe Papers, I had ſo little Confidence of their Succeſs, that I was unwilling to own them; and what I was unwilling myſelf to own, I

durſt not preſume to inſcribe to any great Name.

YOUR Excellency's favourable Reception of them, ſoon put me out of all Fears about their Succeſs with the wiſer and better Part of the World; and ſince this has given me Aſſurance to own them, I humbly preſume to inſcribe them in this ſecond Edition to your Excellency, that I may have at once an Opportunity of expreſſing the ſincereſt Gratitude for the Notice you were pleas'd to take of me, and have the Pleaſure alſo of letting the World know, that this ſmall Work has your Excellency's Approbation.

THE

THE Praiſe beſtow'd by Perſons of real Merit and Diſcernment, is allow'd by all to give a noble and rational Pleaſure. Your Excellency firſt made me feel this in the moſt lively manner; and it will be a Pleaſure as laſting as it is great: 'twill ever be matter of the higheſt Joy and Satisfaction to me, that I am Author of a Book my LORD CARTERET approves.

I KNOW, my Lord, that much of your Commendation is to be attributed to your own Humanity: You can intirely approve the Works of thoſe alone, who can think

and ſpeak on theſe Subjects as juſtly as Yourſelf; and that is what few, if any, even of thoſe who ſpend their Lives in ſuch Contemplations, are able to do. In the Converſation, with which your Excellency has been pleas'd to honour me, I could not, I own, without the utmoſt Surprize, obſerve ſo intimate an Acquaintance with the moſt valuable Writings of contemplative Men, Antient and Modern; ſo juſt a Taſte of what is excellent in the ingenious Arts, in ſo young a Man, amidſt the Hurry of an active Life. Forgive me, my Lord, that I mention this Part of your Character: 'tis

ſo

ſo uncommon, that it deſerves the higheſt Admiration; and 'tis the only which an obſcure Philoſopher, who has receiv'd the greateſt Obligations from your Excellency, can with any Propriety take notice of.

THOSE other great Endowments which have enabled You, even in Youth, to diſcharge the moſt difficult Employments, with the higheſt Honour to Yourſelf, and Advantage to your Country, I dare not preſume to deſcribe. He who attempts to do Juſtice to ſo great and good a Character, ought himſelf to be one of uncommon

Merit and Diſtinction: And yet the ableſt Panegyriſt would find it difficult to add any thing to your Excellency's Fame. The Voices of NATIONS proclaim your Worth. I am,

May it pleaſe your Excellency,

Your moſt obliged,

Moſt obedient, and

Moſt devoted humble Servant,

Dublin,
June 19.
1725.

Francis Hutcheſon.

THE

PREFACE.

THERE is no Part of Philolophy *of more Importance, than a* juſt Knowledge *of* Human Nature, *and its various Powers and Diſpoſitions. Our late Inquiries have been very much employ'd about our* Underſtanding, *and the ſeveral Methods of obtaining* Truth. *We generally acknowledge, that the Importance of any Truth is nothing elſe than its Moment, or Efficacy to make Men happy, or to give them the greateſt and moſt laſting Pleaſure; and* Wiſdom *denotes only a Capacity of purſuing this End by the beſt Means. It muſt ſurely then be of the greateſt Importance, to have diſtinct Conceptions of this End itſelf, as well as of the Means*

Means neceſſary to obtain it; that we may find out which are the greateſt and moſt laſting Pleaſures, and not employ our Reaſon, after all our laborious Improvements of it, in trifling Purſuits. It is to be fear'd indeed, that moſt of our Studies, without this Inquiry, will be of very little Uſe to us; for they ſeem to have ſcarce any other Tendency than to lead us into ſpeculative Knowledge *itſelf. Nor are we diſtinctly told how it is that* Knowledge *or* Truth *is pleaſant to us.*

THIS Conſideration put the Author *of the following Papers upon inquiring into the various Pleaſures which* Human Nature *is capable of receiving. We ſhall generally find in our modern philoſophick Writings, nothing farther on this Head, than ſome bare Diviſion of them into* Senſible, *and* Rational, *and ſome trite Common-place Arguments to prove the* latter *more valuable than the* former. *Our* ſenſible Pleaſures *are ſlightly paſs'd*

paſs'd over, and explain'd only by ſome Inſtances in Taſtes, Smells, Sounds, *or ſuch-like, which Men of any tolerable Reflection generally look upon as very trifling Satisfactions. Our* rational Pleaſures *have had much the ſame kind of Treatment. We are ſeldom taught any other Notion of rational Pleaſure than that which we have upon reflecting on our Poſſeſſion or Claim to thoſe Objects, which may be Occaſions of Pleaſure. Such Objects we call* advantageous; *but* Advantage, *or* Intereſt, *cannot be diſtinctly conceiv'd, till we know what thoſe Pleaſures are which advantageous Objects are apt to excite; and what Senſes or Powers of Perception we have with reſpect to ſuch Objects. We may perhaps find ſuch an Inquiry of more Importance in* Morals, *to prove what we call the* Reality of Virtue, *or that it is the* ſureſt Happineſs *of the* Agent, *than one would at firſt imagine.*

IN reflecting upon our external Senſes,

Senſes, *we plainly ſee, that our Perceptions of Pleaſure or Pain do not depend directly on our* Will. *Objects do not pleaſe us, according as we incline they ſhould. The Preſence of ſome Objects neceſſarily pleaſes us, and the Preſence of others as neceſſarily diſpleaſes us. Nor can we, by our* Will, *any otherwiſe procure Pleaſure, or avoid Pain, than by procuring the former kind of Objects, and avoiding the latter. By the very* Frame *of our* Nature *the one is made the Occaſion of Delight, and the other of Diſſatisfaction.*

THE ſame Obſervation will hold in all our other Pleaſures and Pains. For there are many other ſorts of Objects, which pleaſe, or diſpleaſe us as neceſſarily, as material Objects do when they operate upon our Organs of Senſe. There are few Objects which are not thus conſtituted the neceſſary Occaſion of ſome Pleaſure or Pain. Thus we find ourſelves pleas'd with a

regular

regular Form, *a Piece of* Architecture *or* Painting, *a Compoſition of* Notes, *a* Theorem, *an* Action, *an* Affection, *a* Character. *And we are conſcious that this Pleaſure neceſſarily ariſes from the Contemplation of the Idea, which is then preſent to our Minds, with all its Circumſtances, altho' ſome of theſe Ideas have nothing of what we commonly call ſenſible Perception in them; and in thoſe which have, the Pleaſure ariſes from ſome* Uniformity, Order, Arrangement, Imitation; *and not from the ſimple Ideas of* Colour, *or* Sound, *or Mode of* Extenſion *ſeparately conſider'd.*

THESE Determinations *to be pleas'd with certain complex Forms, the* Author *chooſes to call* SENSES; *diſtinguiſhing them from the Powers which commonly go by that Name, by calling our Power of perceiving the* Beauty *of* Regularity, Order, Harmony, *an* INTERNAL SENSE; *and* that Determination *to approve* Affections, Actions,

Actions, *or* Characters *of* rational Agents, *which we call* virtuous, *he marks by the Name of a* MORAL SENSE.

HIS principal Deſign is to ſhew, " *That* Human Nature *was not left* " *quite indifferent in the Affair of* " Virtue, *to form to itſelf Obſerva-* " *tions concerning the* Advantage, *or* " Diſadvantage *of Actions, and ac-* " *cordingly to regulate its Conduct.*" *The Weakneſs of our Reaſon, and the Avocations ariſing from the Infirmities and Neceſſities of our Nature, are ſo great, that very few Men could ever have form'd thoſe long Deductions of Reaſon, which ſhew ſome Actions to be in the whole* advantageous *to the* Agent, *and their Contraries* pernicious. *The* AUTHOR *of* Nature *has much better furniſh'd us for a virtuous Conduct, than ſome* Moraliſts *ſeem to imagine, by almoſt as quick and powerful Inſtructions, as we have for the Preſervation of our Bodies. He has given us* ſtrong Affections *to be the Springs of*

of each virtuous Action; and made Virtue a lovely Form, that we might eaſily diſtinguiſh it from its Contrary, and be made happy by the Purſuit of it.

THIS Moral Senſe *of* Beauty *in* Actions *and* Affections, *may appear ſtrange at firſt View. Some of our* Moraliſts *themſelves are offended at it in my* Lord SHAFTESBURY; *ſo much are they accuſtomed to deduce every Approbation, or Averſion, from rational Views of private* Intereſt, *(except it be merely in the Simple Ideas of the external Senſes) and have ſuch a Horror at* innate Ideas, *which they imagine this borders upon. But this* moral Senſe *has no relation to innate Ideas, as will appear in the ſecond Treatiſe.*

OUR Gentlemen of good Taſte, *can tell us of a great many* Senſes, Taſtes, *and* Reliſhes *for* Beauty, Harmony, *Imitation in* Painting *and* Poetry; *and may not we find too in Mankind a* Reliſh

liſh *for a* Beauty *in* Characters, *in* Manners? *It will perhaps be found, that the greater Part of the Ingenious* Arts *are calculated to pleaſe ſome Natural Powers, pretty different either from what we commonly call* Reaſon, *or the External Senſes.*

IN the firſt Treatiſe, the Author *perhaps in ſome Inſtances has gone too far, in ſuppoſing a greater Agreement of Mankind in their* Senſe *of* Beauty, *than Experience will confirm; but all he is ſollicitous about is to ſhew,* "*That* " *there is ſome* Senſe *of* Beauty natu- " ral *to Men; that we find as great* " *an Agreement of Men in their Re-* " *liſhes of* Forms, *as in their external* " *Senſes, which all agree to be* natu- " ral; *and that Pleaſure or Pain,* " *Delight or Averſion, are* naturally " *join'd to their Perceptions.*" *If the Reader be convinc'd of this, it will be no difficult matter to apprehend another* ſuperior Senſe, natural *alſo to Men, determining them to be pleas'd with*

Actions,

Actions, Characters, Affections. *This is the* moral Senſe, *which makes the Subject of the ſecond Treatiſe.*

THE proper Occaſions of Perception by the external Senſes, occur to us as ſoon as we come into the World; whence perhaps we eaſily look upon theſe Senſes to be natural: *but the Objects of the ſuperior Senſes of* Beauty *and* Virtue *generally do not. It is probably ſome little time before Children reflect, or at leaſt let us know that they reflect upon* Proportion *and* Similitude; *upon* Affections, Characters, Tempers; *or come to know the external Actions which are Evidences of them. Hence we imagine that their* Senſe *of* Beauty, *and their* moral Sentiments *of Actions, muſt be entirely owing to* Inſtruction *and* Education; *whereas it is as eaſy to conceive, how a* Character, *a* Temper, *as ſoon as they are obſerv'd, may be conſtituted by* NATURE *the neceſſary Occaſion of Pleaſure, or an Object of Ap-*

probation, as a Taſte *or a* Sound; *tho' theſe Objects preſent themſelves to our Obſervation ſooner than the other.*

THE firſt Impreſſion of theſe Papers was ſo well receiv'd, that the Author *hopes it will be no Offence to any who are concern'd in the* Memory *of the late* Lord Viſcount MOLESWORTH, *if he lets his Readers know that he was the Noble Perſon mention'd in the Preface to the firſt Edition, and that their being publiſh'd was owing to his Approbation of them. It was from him he had that ſhrewd Objection, which the Reader may find in the* firſt Treatiſe*; *beſides many other Remarks in the frequent Converſations with which he honour'd the* Author; *by which* that Treatiſe *was very much improv'd beyond what it was in the Draught preſented to him. The* Author *retains the moſt grateful Senſe of his ſingular Civilities, and of the Pleaſure and Im-*

* *Sect.* 5. *Art.* 2. *the laſt Paragraph.*

provement

provement he receiv'd in his Converſation; and is ſtill fond of expreſſing his grateful Remembrance of him: but,

Id cinerem, & Manes credas curare ſepultos?

TO be concern'd in this Book can be no Honour to a Perſon ſo juſtly celebrated for the moſt generous Sentiments of Virtue *and* Religion, *deliver'd with the moſt manly Eloquence: yet it would not be juſt toward the World, ſhould the* Author *conceal his Obligations to the Reverend Mr.* EDWARD SYNG; *not only for reviſing theſe Papers, when they ſtood in great need of an accurate Review, but for ſuggeſting ſeveral juſt Amendments in the general Scheme of* Morality. *The* Author *was much confirm'd in his Opinion of the Juſtneſs of theſe Thoughts, upon finding that this Gentleman had fallen into the ſame way of Thinking before him; and will ever look his Friendſhip as*

one of the greateſt Advantages and Pleaſures of his Life.

TO recommend the Lord SHAFTESBURY's *Writings to the World, is a very needleſs Attempt. They will be eſteem'd while any* Reflection *remains among Men. It is indeed to be wiſh'd, that he had abſtain'd from mixing with ſuch Noble Performances, ſome Prejudices he had receiv'd againſt* Chriſtianity; *a* Religion *which gives us the trueſt Idea of* Virtue, *and recommends the* Love *of* GOD, *and of* MANKIND, *as the Sum of all* true Religion. *How would it have moved the Indignation of that* ingenious Nobleman, *to have found a diſſolute Set of Men, who reliſh nothing in Life but the loweſt and moſt ſordid Pleaſures, ſearching into his* Writings *for thoſe Inſinuations againſt* Chriſtianity, *that they might be the leſs reſtrained from their Debaucheries; when at the ſame time their low Minds are incapable of reliſhing thoſe noble Sentiments of* Virtue

and

and Honour, *which he has placed in ſo lovely a Light!*

WHATEVER Faults the Ingenious may find with this Performance, the Author *hopes no body will find any thing in it contrary to* Religion, *or* good Manners: *and he ſhall be well pleaſed, if he gives the learned World an Occaſion of examining more thoroughly theſe Subjects, which are, he preſumes, of very conſiderable Importance. The chief Ground of his Aſſurance that his Opinions in the main are juſt, is this, That as he took the firſt Hints of them from ſome of the* greateſt Writers *of Antiquity, ſo the more he has convers'd with them, he finds his Illuſtrations the more conformable to their Sentiments.*

IN the later Editions, what Alterations are made, are partly owing to the Objections of ſome Gentlemen, who wrote very keenly againſt ſeveral Principles in this Book. The Author *was*

convinc'd of ſome inaccurate Expreſſions, which are now alter'd; and ſome Arguments, he hopes, are now made clearer: but he has not yet ſeen Cauſe to renounce any of the Principles maintain'd in it. Nor is there any thing of Conſequence added, except in Sect. II. *of* Treatiſe 2d; *and the ſame Reaſoning is found in* Sect. I. *of* the Eſſay on the Paſſions.

IN this 4th Edition there are Additions interſperſed, to prevent Objections which have been publiſhed againſt this Scheme by ſeveral Authors; and ſome Mathematical Expreſſions are left out, which, upon ſecond Thoughts, appear'd uſeleſs, and were diſagreeable to ſome Readers.

THE

THE

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AN

AN

INQUIRY

INTO THE

Original of our IDEAS

OF

BEAUTY *and* VIRTUE.

TREATISE I.

Of Beauty, Order, Harmony, Deſign.

SECT. I.

Concerning ſome Powers *of* Perception, *diſtinct from what is generally underſtood by* Senſation.

TO make the following Obſervations underſtood, it may be neceſſary to premiſe ſome *Definitions*, and *Obſervations*, either univerſally acknowledg'd, or ſufficiently prov'd by many Writers both antient and modern, concerning our Perceptions called *Senſations*, and the Actions of the Mind conſequent upon them.

Art. I.

Sect. 1.

Senſation.

Art. I. THOSE *Ideas* which are rais'd in the Mind upon the Preſence of external Objects, and their acting upon our Bodies, are call'd *Senſations*. We find that the Mind in ſuch Caſes is paſſive, and has not Power directly to prevent the Perception or Idea, or to vary it at its Reception, as long as we continue our Bodies in a State fit to be acted upon by the external Object.

Different Senſes.

II. WHEN two Perceptions are intirely different from each other, or agree in nothing but the general Idea of *Senſation*, we call the Powers of receiving thoſe different Perceptions, *different Senſes*. Thus *Seeing* and *Hearing* denote the different Powers of receiving the Ideas of Colours and Sounds. And altho' Colours have great Differences among themſelves, as alſo have Sounds; yet there is a greater Agreement among the moſt oppoſite Colours, than between any Colour and a Sound: Hence we call all Colours Perceptions of the ſame Senſe. All the ſeveral Senſes ſeem to have their diſtinct Organs, except *Feeling*, which is in ſome degree diffus'd over the whole Body.

The Mind how active.

III. THE Mind has a Power of *compounding* Ideas, which were receiv'd ſeparately; of *comparing* Objects by means of the Ideas, and of obſerving their *Relations* and *Proportions*; of *enlarging* and *diminiſhing* its Ideas at

at Pleaſure, or in any certain *Ratio*, or De- Sect. 1.
gree; and of conſidering *ſeparately* each of
the ſimple Ideas, which might perhaps have
been impreſs'd jointly in the Senſation. This
a ſt Operation we commonly call *Abſtraction*.

IV. The Ideas of corporeal *Subſtances* are *Subſtances.*
compounded of the various ſimple Ideas jointly impreſs'd, when they preſented themſelves to our Senſes. We define Subſtances only by enumerating theſe ſenſible Ideas. And ſuch Definitions may raiſe a clear enough Idea of the Subſtance in the Mind of one who never immediately perceiv'd the Subſtance; provided he had ſeparately receiv'd by his Senſes all the ſimple Ideas which are in the Compoſition of the complex one of the Subſtance defin'd: But if there be any ſimple Ideas which he has not receiv'd, or if he wants any of the *Senſes* neceſſary for the Perception of them, no Definition can raiſe any ſimple Idea which has not been before perceiv'd by the *Senſes*.

V. Hence it follows, "That when *In-* *Education,*
"*ſtruction*, *Education*, or *Prejudice* of any *Inſtruction.*
"kind, raiſe any Deſire or Averſion toward
"an Object, this Deſire or Averſion muſt
"be founded upon an Opinion of ſome Per-
"fection, or of ſome Deficiency in thoſe
"*Qualities*, for Perception of which we
"have the proper Senſes." Thus, if *Beauty* be deſir'd by one who has not the Senſe of *Sight*,

Sect. 1. *Sight*, the Deſire muſt be rais'd by ſome apprehended Regularity of *Figure*, *Sweetneſs* of *Voice*, *Smoothneſs*, or *Softneſs*, or ſome other Quality perceivable by the other Senſes, without relation to the Ideas of *Colour*.

Pleaſure, Pain.

VI. MANY of our ſenſitive Perceptions are pleaſant and many painful, immediately, and that without any Knowledge of the Cauſe of this Pleaſure or Pain, or how the Objects excite it, or are the Occaſions of it; or without ſeeing to what farther Advantage or Detriment the Uſe of ſuch Objects might tend: Nor would the moſt accurate Knowledge of theſe things vary either the Pleaſure or Pain of the Perception, however it might give a rational Pleaſure diſtinct from the ſenſible; or might raiſe a diſtinct Joy, from a Proſpect of farther Advantage in the Object, or Averſion, from an Apprehenſion of Evil.

Different Ideas.

VII. THE *ſimple Ideas* rais'd in different Perſons by the ſame Object, are probably ſome way different, when they diſagree in their Approbation or Diſlike; and in the ſame Perſon, when his *Fancy* at one time differs from what it was at another. This will appear from reflecting on thoſe Objects, to which we have now an Averſion, tho' they were formerly agreeable: And we ſhall generally find that there is ſome accidental *Conjunction* of a diſagreeable Idea, which always recurs with the Object; as in thoſe Wines

to

to which Men acquire an Averſion, after they have taken them in an Emetick Preparation, we are conſcious that the *Idea* is alter'd from what it was when that Wine was agreeable, by the Conjunction of the Ideas of Loathing and Sickneſs of Stomach. The like Change of *Idea* may be inſenſibly made by the Change of our Bodies as we advance in Years, or when we are accuſtomed to any Object, which may occaſion an Indifference toward Meats we were fond of in our Childhood; and may make ſome Objects ceaſe to raiſe the diſagreeable Ideas, which they excited upon our firſt uſe of them. Many of our ſimple Perceptions are diſagreeable only thro' the too great *Intenſeneſs* of the Quality: thus moderate Light is agreeable, very ſtrong Light may be painful; moderate Bitter may be pleaſant, a higher Degree may be offenſive. A Change in our Organs will neceſſarily occaſion a Change in the *Intenſeneſs* of the Perception at leaſt; nay, ſometimes will occaſion a quite contrary Perception: Thus a warm Hand ſhall feel that Water cold, which a cold Hand ſhall feel warm. Sect. 1.

We ſhall not find it perhaps ſo eaſy to account for the Diverſity of Fancy about more *complex Ideas* of Objects, including many Ideas of different Senſes at once; as ſome Perceptions of thoſe call'd *primary Qualities*, and ſome *ſecondary*, as explain'd by Mr. Locke:

Sect. I. Locke: for inſtance, in the different Fancies about *Architecture*, *Gardening*, *Dreſs*. Of the two former we ſhall offer ſomething in Sect. VI. As to *Dreſs*, we may generally account for the Diverſity of Fancies from a like Conjunction of Ideas: Thus, if either from any thing in Nature, or from the Opinion of our Country or Acquaintance, the fancying of *glaring Colours* be look'd upon as an Evidence of Levity, or of any other evil Quality of Mind; or if any *Colour or Faſhion* be commonly us'd by Ruſticks, or by Men of any diſagreeable Profeſſion, Employment, or Temper; theſe additional Ideas may recur conſtantly with that of the *Colour* or *Faſhion*, and cauſe a conſtant Diſlike to them in thoſe who join the additional Ideas, altho' the Colour or Form be no way diſagreeable of themſelves, and actually do pleaſe others who join no ſuch Ideas to them. But there appears no Ground to believe ſuch a Diverſity in human Minds, as that the ſame ſimple Idea or Perception ſhould give Pleaſure to one and Pain to another, or to the ſame Perſon at different times; not to ſay that it ſeems a Contradiction, that the ſame ſimple Idea ſhould do ſo.

Complex Ideas.

VIII. The only Pleaſure of Senſe, which many Philoſophers ſeem to conſider, is that which accompanies the ſimple Ideas of Senſation: But there are far greater Pleaſures

in thoſe complex Ideas of Objects, which obtain the Names of *Beautiful*, *Regular*, *Harmonious*. Thus every one acknowledges he is more delighted with a fine Face, a juſt Picture, than with the View of any one Colour, were it as ſtrong and lively as poſſible; and more pleas'd with a Proſpect of the Sun ariſing among ſettled Clouds, and colouring their Edges, with a ſtarry Hemiſphere, a fine Landſkip, a regular Building, than with a clear blue Sky, a ſmooth Sea, or a large open Plain, not diverſified by Woods, Hills, Waters, Buildings: And yet even theſe latter Appearances are not quite *ſimple*. So in Muſick, the Pleaſure of *fine Compoſition* is incomparably greater than that of any one Note, how ſweet, full, or ſwelling ſoever. Sect. 1.

IX. Let it be obſerv'd, that in the following Papers, the Word *Beauty* is taken for *the Idea rais'd in us*, and a *Senſe* of Beauty for *our Power of receiving this Idea*. *Harmony* alſo denotes *our pleaſant Ideas ariſing from Compoſition of Sounds*, and a *good Ear* (as it is generally taken) a *Power of perceiving this Pleaſure*. In the following Sections, an Attempt is made to diſcover "what is the *immediate Occaſion* of theſe "pleaſant Ideas, or what real Quality in "the Objects ordinarily excites them." *Beauty.* *Harmony.*

X. It

Sect. 1.

Internal Senſe.

X. IT is of no Conſequence whether we call theſe Ideas of *Beauty* and *Harmony*, Perceptions of the *External Senſes* of Seeing and Hearing, or not. I ſhould rather chooſe to call our Power of perceiving theſe Ideas, an INTERNAL SENSE, were it only for the Convenience of diſtinguiſhing them from other Senſations of Seeing and Hearing, which Men may have without Perception of *Beauty* and *Harmony*. It is plain from Experience, that many Men have, in the common Meaning, the Senſes of Seeing and Hearing perfect enough; they perceive all the *ſimple Ideas* ſeparately, and have their Pleaſures; they diſtinguiſh them from each other, ſuch as one Colour from another, either quite different, or the ſtronger or fainter of the ſame Colour, when they are plac'd beſide each other, altho' they may often confound their *Names* when they occur apart from each other, as ſome do the Names of *Green* and *Blue*: they can tell in ſeparate Notes the *higher*, *lower*, *ſharper*, *or flatter*, when ſeparately ſounded; in Figures they diſcern the *Length*, *Breadth*, *Wideneſs* of each Line, Surface, Angle; and may be as capable of hearing and ſeeing at great Diſtances as any Men whatſoever: And yet perhaps they ſhall find no Pleaſure in Muſical Compoſitions, in Painting, Architecture, natural Landſkip; or but a very weak one in compariſon of what

others enjoy from the ſame Objects. This greater Capacity of receiving ſuch pleaſant Ideas we commonly call a *fine Genius* or *Taſte*: In Muſick we ſeem univerſally to acknowledge ſomething like a diſtinct Senſe from the External one of Hearing, and call it a *good Ear*; and the like Diſtinction we ſhould probably acknowledge in other Objects, had we alſo got diſtinct Names to denote theſe *Powers* of Perception by. Sect. 1.

XI. We generally imagine the brute Animals endowed with the ſame ſort of Powers of Perception as our *External Senſes*, and having ſometimes greater Acuteneſs in them: but we conceive few or none of them with any of theſe ſublimer Powers of Perception here call'd *Internal Senſes*; or at leaſt if ſome of them have them, it is in a Degree much inferior to ours. *Different from External.*

There will appear another Reaſon perhaps hereafter, for calling this Power of perceiving the Ideas of *Beauty*, an *Internal Senſe*, from this, that in ſome other Affairs, where our *External Senſes* are not much concern'd, we diſcern a ſort of Beauty, very like, in many Reſpects, to that obſerv'd in ſenſible Objects, and accompany'd with like Pleaſure: Such is that *Beauty* perceiv'd in *Theorems*, or univerſal Truths, in *general Cauſes*, and in ſome *extenſive Principles* of Action.

Sect. 1. XII. LET one conſider, firſt, That 'tis probable a Being may have the full Power of External Senſation, which we enjoy, ſo as to perceive each Colour, Line, Surface, as we do; yet, without the Power of *comparing*, or of diſcerning the *Similitudes* or Proportions: Again, It might diſcern theſe alſo, and yet have no *Pleaſure* or Delight accompanying theſe Perceptions. The bare Idea of the Form is ſomething ſeparable from Pleaſure, as may appear from the different *Taſtes* of Men about the Beauty of Forms, where we don't imagine that they differ in any Ideas, either of the Primary or Secundary Qualities. *Similitude*, *Proportion*, *Analogy*, or *Equality* of Proportion, are Objects of the Underſtanding, and muſt be actually known before we know the natural Cauſes of our Pleaſure. But *Pleaſure* perhaps is not neceſſarily connected with the Perception of them: and may be felt where the Proportion is not known or attended to: and may not be felt where the Proportion is obſerved. Since then there are ſuch different Powers of Perception, where what are commonly called the *External Senſes* are the ſame; ſince the moſt accurate Knowledge of what the External Senſes diſcover, may often not give the Pleaſure of Beauty or Harmony, which yet one of a *good Taſte* will enjoy at once without much *Knowledge*; we may juſty uſe another Name for theſe higher and more delightful Perceptions

tions of Beauty and Harmony, and call the *Power* of receiving ſuch Impreſſions, an *Internal Senſe:* The Difference of the Perceptions ſeems ſufficient to vindicate the Uſe of a different Name, eſpecially when we are told in what Meaning the Word is applied. Sect. 1.

THIS ſuperior Power of Perception is juſtly called *a Senſe*, becauſe of its Affinity to the other Senſes in this, that the Pleaſure is different from any *Knowledge* of Principles, Proportions, Cauſes, or of the Uſefulneſs of the Object; we are ſtruck at the firſt with the Beauty: nor does the moſt accurate *Knowledge* increaſe this Pleaſure of Beauty, however it may ſuperadd a diſtinct rational Pleaſure from Proſpects of *Advantage*, or may bring along that peculiar kind of Pleaſure, which attends the Increaſe of Knowledge *. *Its Pleaſures neceſſary and immediate.*

XIII. AND farther, the Ideas of Beauty and Harmony, like other ſenſible Ideas, are *neceſſarily* pleaſant to us, as well as immediately ſo; neither can any Reſolution of our own, nor any *Proſpect* of Advantage or Diſadvantage, vary the Beauty or Deformity of an Object: For as in the external Senſations, no View of *Intereſt* will make an Object grateful, nor View of *Detriment*, diſtinct from immediate *Pain* in the Perception, make it diſagreeable to the Senſe; ſo propoſe

* See above, *Art.* 6.

Sect. 1. the whole World as a *Reward*, or *threaten* the greateſt Evil, to make us approve a deform'd Object, or diſapprove a beautiful one; Diſſimulation may be procur'd by Rewards or Threatnings, or we may in external Conduct abſtain from any *Purſuit* of the Beautiful, and purſue the Deform'd; but our *Sentiments* of the Forms, and our *Perceptions*, would continue invariably the ſame.

This Senſe antecedent to, and diſtinct from Proſpects of Intereſt.

XIV. HENCE it plainly appears, "that "ſome Objects are *immediately* the Occaſions "of this Pleaſure of Beauty, and that we "have Senſes fitted for perceiving it; and "that it is diſtinct from that *Joy* which "ariſes upon Proſpect of Advantage." Nay, do not we often ſee Convenience and Uſe neglected to obtain Beauty, without any other Proſpect of *Advantage* in the beautiful Form, than the ſuggeſting the pleaſant Ideas of Beauty? Now this ſhews us, that however we may *purſue* beautiful Objects from Self-love, with a View to obtain the Pleaſures of Beauty, as in Architecture, Gardening, and many other Affairs; yet there muſt be a *Senſe* of Beauty, antecedent to Proſpects even of this Advantage, without which Senſe theſe Objects would not be thus *advantageous*, nor excite in us this Pleaſure which conſtitutes them advantageous. Our *Senſe* of Beauty from Objects, by which they are conſtituted good to us, is very diſtinct from our *Deſire* of them when they are thus conſtituted: Our *Deſire* of

of Beauty may be counter-balanc'd by Re- Sect. 1.
wards or Threatnings, but never our *Senſe* of it; even as Fear of Death may make us deſire a bitter Potion, or neglect thoſe Meats which the *Senſe* of Taſte would recommend as pleaſant; but cannot make that Potion agreeable to the *Senſe*, or Meat diſagreeable to it, which was not ſo antecedently to this Proſpect. The ſame holds true of the Senſe of Beauty and Harmony; that the *Purſuit* of ſuch Objects is frequently neglected, from Proſpects of Advantage, Averſion to Labour, or any other Motive of Intereſt, does not prove that we have no *Senſe* of Beauty, but only that our Deſire of it may be counter-balanc'd by a ſtronger Deſire.

XV. Had we no ſuch *Senſe* of Beauty and Harmony, Houſes, Gardens, Dreſs, Equipage, might have been recommended to us as convenient, fruitful, warm, eaſy; but never as *beautiful:* And yet nothing is more certain, than that all theſe Objects are recommended under quite different *Views* on many Occaſions: 'Tis true, what chiefly pleaſes in the Countenance, are the Indications of *Moral Diſpoſitions*; and yet were we by the longeſt Acquaintance fully convinc'd of the beſt Moral Diſpoſitions in any Perſon, with that Countenance we now think deform'd, this would never hinder our immediate Diſlike of the Form, or our liking other Forms more: And Cuſtom, Education, or Example,

Sect. 1. could never give us *Perceptions* distinct from those of the Senses which we had the Use of before, or recommend Objects under another *Conception* than grateful to * them. But of the Influence of Custom, Education, Example, upon the Sense of Beauty, we shall treat below †.

Beauty Original or Comparative.

XVI. Beauty, in Corporeal Forms, is either *Original* or *Comparative*; or, if any like the Terms better, *Absolute*, or *Relative*: Only let it be observ'd, that by *Absolute* or *Original* Beauty, is not understood any Quality suppos'd to be in the Object, which should of itself be beautiful, without relation to any Mind which perceives it: For Beauty, like other Names of sensible Ideas, properly denotes the *Perception* of some Mind; so *Cold*, *Hot*, *Sweet*, *Bitter*, denote the Sensations in our Minds, to which perhaps there is no Resemblance in the Objects, which excite these Ideas in us, however we generally imagine otherwise. The Ideas of Beauty and Harmony being excited upon our *Perception* of some *primary Quality*, and having relation to *Figure* and *Time*, may indeed have a nearer Resemblance to Objects, than these Sensations, which seem not so much any *Pictures* of Objects, as *Modifications* of the perceiving Mind; and yet were there no Mind with a *Sense* of Beauty to

* See *Art.* 5. † *Sect.* 7.

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contemplate Objects, I see not how they could be call'd *Beautiful.* We therefore by * *Absolute* Beauty understand only that Beauty which we perceive in Objects without *Comparison* to any thing external, of which the Object is suppos'd an Imitation, or Picture; such as that Beauty perceiv'd from the *Works of Nature, artificial Forms, Figures. Comparative* or *Relative* Beauty is that which we perceive in Objects commonly considered as *Imitations* or *Resemblances* of something else. These two Kinds of Beauty employ the three following Sections. Sect. 1.

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* *This Division of* Beauty *is taken from the different* Foundations *of Pleasure to our Sense of it, rather than from the Objects themselves; for most of the following Instances of relative Beauty, have also absolute Beauty; and many of the Instances of absolute Beauty, have also relative Beauty in some respect or other. But we may distinctly consider these two* Fountains *of Pleasure.* Uniformity *in the Object itself, and* Resemblance *to some Original.*

Sect. 2.

SECT. II.

Of Original *or* Abſolute Beauty.

Senſe of Men.

I. SINCE it is certain that we have *Ideas* of Beauty and Harmony, let us examine what *Quality* in Objects excites theſe Ideas, or is the Occaſion of them. And let it be here obſerv'd, that our Inquiry is only about the *Qualities* which are beautiful to *Men*; or about the Foundation of their *Senſe* of Beauty: for, as was above hinted, Beauty has always relation to the *Senſe* of ſome Mind; and when we afterwards ſhew how generally the Objects which occur to us are *beautiful*, we mean, that ſuch Objects are agreeable to the Senſe of *Men:* for there are many Objects which ſeem no way beautiful to Men, and yet other *Animals* ſeem delighted with them; they may have *Senſes* otherwiſe conſtituted than thoſe of Men, and may have the Ideas of Beauty excited by Objects of a quite different Form. We ſee Animals fitted for every Place; and what to Men appears rude and ſhapeleſs, or loathſome, may be to them a *Paradiſe*.

II. THAT we may more diſtinctly diſcover the general *Foundation* or Occaſion of the Ideas of Beauty among Men, it will be neceſ-

neceſſary to conſider it firſt in its *ſimpler* Kinds, ſuch as occurs to us in regular Figures; and we may perhaps find that the ſame Foundation extends to all the more complex Species of it. Sect. 2.

III. The Figures which excite in us the Ideas of Beauty, ſeem to be thoſe in which there is *Uniformity amidſt Variety*. There are many Conceptions of Objects which are agreeable upon other accounts, ſuch as *Grandeur*, *Novelty*, *Sanctity*, and ſome others, which ſhall be mention'd hereafter*. But what we call Beautiful in Objects, to ſpeak in the Mathematical Style, ſeems to be in a compound *Ratio* of *Uniformity* and *Variety*: ſo that where the *Uniformity* of Bodies is equal, the Beauty is as the *Variety*; and where the Variety is equal, the Beauty is as the *Uniformity*. This may ſeem probable, and hold pretty generally. *Uniformity with Variety.*

First, the *Variety* increaſes the Beauty in equal Uniformity. The Beauty of an *equilateral Triangle* is leſs than that of the *Square*; which is leſs than that of a *Pentagon*; and this again is ſurpaſs'd by the *Hexagon*. When indeed the Number of Sides is much increas'd, the Proportion of them to the *Radius*, or *Diameter* of the Figure, or of the *Circle*, to which regular *Polygons* have *Variety.*

* See *Sect.* vi. *Art.* 11, 12, 13.

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Sect. 2. an obvious Relation, is ſo much loſt to our Obſervation, that the Beauty does not always increaſe with the Number of Sides; and the want of Paralleliſm in the Sides of *Heptagons*, and other Figures of odd Numbers, may alſo diminiſh their Beauty. So in *Solids*, the *Eicoſiedron* ſurpaſſes the *Dodecaedron*, and this the *Octaedron*, which is ſtill more beautiful than the *Cube*; and this again ſurpaſſes the regular *Pyramid:* The obvious Ground of this, is greater *Variety* with equal *Uniformity*.

Uniformity THE greater *Uniformity* increaſes the *Beauty* amidſt equal *Variety*, in theſe Inſtances: An Equilateral *Triangle*, or even an *Iſoſceles*, ſurpaſſes the *Scalenum:* A *Square* ſurpaſſes the *Rhombus* or *Lozenge*, and this again the *Rhomboides*, which is ſtill more beautiful than the *Trapezium*, or any Figure with irregular curve Sides. So the *regular* Solids ſurpaſs all other Solids of equal number of plain Surfaces: And the ſame is obſervable not only in the Five perfectly *regular* Solids, but in all thoſe which have any conſiderable *Uniformity*, as *Cylinders*, *Priſms*, *Pyramids*, *Obeliſks*; which pleaſe every Eye more than any rude Figures, where there is no *Unity* or Reſemblance among the Parts.

Compound Ratio. INSTANCES of the compound *Ratio* we have in comparing *Circles* or *Spheres*, with

with *Ellipſes* or *Spheroides* not very eccentric; and in comparing the *compound* Solids, the *Exoctaedron*, and *Eicoſidodecaedron*, with the perfectly *regular* ones of which they are compounded: and we ſhall find, that the want of that moſt perfect *Uniformity* obſervable in the latter, is compenſated by the greater *Variety* in the former, ſo that the *Beauty* is nearly equal. Sect. 2.

IV. THESE Obſervations would probably hold true for the moſt part, and might be confirm'd by the Judgment of Children in the *ſimpler* Figures, where the *Variety* is not too great for their Comprehenſion. And however uncertain ſome of the particular aforeſaid Inſtances may ſeem, yet this is perpetually to be obſerv'd, that Children are fond of all *regular* Figures in their little Diverſions, altho' they be no more convenient, or uſeful for them, than the Figures of our common Pebbles: We ſee how early they diſcover a *Taſte* or Senſe of *Beauty*, in deſiring to ſee Buildings, regular Gardens, or even Repreſentations of them in Pictures of any kind.

V. THE ſame Foundation we have for our Senſe of *Beauty*, in the Works of NATURE. In every Part of the World which we call *Beautiful*, there is a ſurprizing *Uniformity* amidſt an almoſt infinite *Variety*. Many Parts of the Univerſe ſeem not at *Beauty of* Nature.

Sect. 2. at all design'd for the Use of Man; nay, it is but a very small Spot with which we have any Acquaintance. The *Figures* and *Motions* of the great Bodies are not obvious to our Senses, but found out by Reasoning and Reflection, upon many long Observations: and yet as far as we can by Sense discover, or by *Reasoning* enlarge our Knowledge, and extend our Imagination, we generally find their Structure, Order, and Motion, agreeable to our Sense of *Beauty*. Every particular Object in *Nature* does not indeed appear *beautiful* to us; but there is a great Profusion of *Beauty* over most of the Objects which occur either to our Senses, or Reasonings upon Observation: For, not to mention the apparent Situation of the heavenly Bodies in the Circumference of a great Sphere, which is wholly occasion'd by the Imperfection of our Sight in discerning Distances; the Forms of all the great Bodies in the Universe are nearly *Spherical*; the *Orbits* of their Revolutions generally *Elliptick*, and without great Eccentricity, in those which continually occur to our Observation: now these are Figures of great *Uniformity*, and therefore pleasing to us.

Further, to pass by the less obvious *Uniformity* in the Proportion of their *Quantities* of Matter, *Distances*, *Times*, of revolving, to each other; what can exhibit a greater Instance of *Uniformity*, *amidst Va-*

riety, than the conſtant Tenour of Revolutions in nearly equal Times, in each *Planet*, around its Axis, and the central Fire or Sun, thro' all the Ages of which we have any Records, and in nearly the ſame Orbit? Thus after certain Periods, all the ſame Appearances are again renew'd; the alternate Succeſſions of *Light* and *Shade*, or *Day* and *Night*, conſtantly purſuing each other around each *Planet*, with an agreeable and regular Diverſity in the Times they poſſeſs the ſeveral Hemiſpheres, in the *Summer*, *Harveſt*, *Winter*, and *Spring*; and the various *Phaſes*, *Aſpects*, and *Situations*, of the *Planets* to each other, their *Conjunctions* and *Oppoſitions*, in which they ſuddenly darken each other with their Conick Shades in Eclipſes, are repeated to us at their fixed Periods with invariable Conſtancy: Theſe are the *Beauties* which charm the *Aſtronomer*, and make his tedious Caculations pleaſant, Sect. 2.

Molliter auſterum ſtudio fallente laborem. *

VI. Again, as to the dry Part of the Surface of our Globe, a great Part of which is cover'd with a very pleaſant inoffenſive Colour, how *beautifully* is it diverſify'd with various Degrees of *Light* and *Shade*, ac- *Earth.*

* Hor. Lib. 2. Sat. 2. v. 12.

cording

Sect. 2. cording to the different Situations of the Parts of its Surface, in *Mountains*, *Valleys*, *Hills*, and open *Plains*, which are variouſly inclin'd toward the great LUMINARY!

Plants. VII. IF we deſcend to the minuter Works of NATURE, what great *Uniformity* among all the Species of *Plants* and *Vegetables* in the manner of their Growth and Propagation! how near the Reſemblance among all the Plants of the ſame Species, whoſe Numbers ſurpaſs our Imagination! And this *Uniformity* is not only obſervable in the Form in groſs; (nay, in this it is not ſo very exact in all Inſtances) but in the Structure of their minuter Parts, even of thoſe which no Eye unaſſiſted with Glaſſes can diſcern. In the almoſt infinite Multitude of *Leaves*, *Fruit*, *Seed*, *Flowers* of any one Species, we often ſee a very great *Uniformity* in the Structure and Situation of the ſmalleſt Fibres. This is the *Beauty* which charms an ingenious *Botaniſt*. Nay, what great *Uniformity* and Regularity of Figure is found in each particular *Plant*, *Leaf*, or *Flower!* In all Trees and moſt of the ſmaller Plants, the Stalks or Trunks are either *Cylinders* nearly, or regular *Priſms*; the Branches ſimilar to their ſeveral Trunks, ariſing at nearly regular Diſtances, when no Accidents retard their natural Growth: In one *Species* the Branches ariſe in Pairs on the oppoſite Sides; the perpendicular Plain of Direction of the immediately ſuperior Pair, inter-

interſecting the Plain of Direction of the inferior, nearly at right Angles: In another *Species*, the Branches ſpring ſingly, and alternately, all around in nearly equal Diſtances: And the Branches in other *Species* ſprout all in Knots around the Trunk, one for each Year. And in each *Species*, all the Branches in the firſt Shoots preſerve the ſame Angles with their Trunk; and they again ſprout out into ſmaller Branches exactly after the Manner of their Trunks. Nor ought we to paſs over that great *Unity* of Colours which we often ſee in all the Flowers of the ſame Plant or Tree, and often of a whole Species; and their exact Agreement in many ſhaded Tranſitions into oppoſite Colours, in which all the Flowers of the ſame Plant generally agree, nay, often all the Flowers of a Species. Sect. 2.

VIII. AGAIN, as to the *Beauty* of *Animals*, either in their inward Structure, which we come to the Knowledge of by Experiment and long Obſervation, or their outward Form, we ſhall find ſurprizing *Uniformity* among all the Species which are known to us, in the Structure of thoſe Parts, upon which Life depends more immediately. And how amazing is the *Unity* of Mechaniſm, when we ſhall find an almoſt infinite Diverſity of Motions, all their Actions in *walking*, *running*, *flying*, *ſwimming*; all their ſerious Efforts for *Self-preſervation*, all their *Animals.*

Sect. 2.

their freakiſh *Contortions* when they are gay and ſportful, in all their various Limbs, perform'd by one ſimple Contrivance of a contracting *Muſcle*, apply'd with inconceivable Diverſities to anſwer all theſe Ends! Various Engines might have obtain'd the ſame Ends; but then there had been leſs *Uniformity*, and the *Beauty* of our Animal Syſtems, and of particular Animals, had been much leſs, when this ſurprizing *Unity* of Mechaniſm had been remov'd from them.

IX. Among Animals of the ſame Species, the *Unity* is very obvious, and this Reſemblance is the very Ground of our ranking them in ſuch *Claſſes* or *Species*, notwithſtanding the great Diverſities in Bulk, Colour, Shape, which are obſerv'd even in thoſe call'd of the ſame Species. And then in each Individual, how univerſal is that *Beauty* which ariſes from the exact Reſemblance of all the external double Members to each other, which ſeems the univerſal Intention of Nature, when no Accident prevents it! We ſee the Want of this Reſemblance never fails to paſs for an Imperfection, and Want of *Beauty*, tho' no other Inconvenience enſues; as when the Eyes are not exactly like, or one Arm or Leg is a little ſhorter or ſmaller than its fellow.

As to that moſt powerful Beauty in *Countenances*, *Airs*, *Geſtures*, *Motion*, we ſhall ſhew

ſhew in the ſecond Treatiſe *, that it ariſes from ſome imagin'd *Indication* of morally good Diſpoſitions of Mind. In Motion there is alſo a natural Beauty, when at fixed Periods like Geſtures and Steps are regularly repeated, ſuiting the Time and Air of Muſic, which is obſerved in regular Dancing. Sect. 2.

X. THERE is a farther *Beauty* in Animals, ariſing from a certain *Proportion* of the various Parts to each other, which ſtill pleaſes the Senſe of Spectators, tho' they cannot calculate it with the Accuracy of a *Statuary*. The *Statuary* knows what Proportion of each Part of the *Face* to the whole *Face* is moſt agreeable, and can tell us the ſame of the Proportion of the *Face* to the *Body*, or any Parts of it; and between the *Diameters* and *Lengths* of each Limb: When this Proportion of the Head to the Body is remarkably alter'd, we ſhall have a *Giant* or a *Dwarf*. And hence it is, that either the one or the other may be repreſented to us even in *Miniature*, without relation to any external Object, by obſerving how the Body ſurpaſſes the Proportion it ſhould have to the Head in *Giants*, and falls below it in *Dwarfs*. There is a farther *Beauty* ariſing from that Figure, which is a natural Indication of *Strength*; but this may *Proportion*

* *Sect.* vi. *Art.* 3.

Sect. 2. be paſs'd over, becauſe probably it may be alledg'd, that our Approbation of this Shape flows from an Opinion of *Advantage*, and not from the Form it ſelf.

THE *Beauty* ariſing from Mechaniſm, apparently adapted to the Neceſſities and Advantages of any Animal; which pleaſes us, even tho' there be no Advantage to our ſelves enſuing from it; will be conſider'd under the Head of *Relative Beauty*, or *Deſign* *.

Fowls. XI. THE peculiar *Beauty* of *Fowls* can ſcarce be omitted, which ariſes from the great *Variety* of Feathers, a curious Sort of Machines adapted to many admirable Uſes, which retain a conſiderable Reſemblance in their Structure among all the Species; and frequently a perfect *Uniformity* in thoſe of the ſame Species in the correſponding Parts, and in the two Sides of each Individual; beſides all the *Beauty* of lively Colours and gradual Shades, not only in the external Appearance of the Fowl, reſulting from an artful Combination of ſhaded Feathers, but often viſible even in one Feather ſeparately.

Fluids. XII. IF our Reaſonings about the *Nature* of *Fluids* be juſt, the vaſt Stores of *Water* will give us an Inſtance of *Uniformity* in *Nature* above Imagination, when we reflect

* See *Sect.* iv. *Art.* 7.

upon

upon the almoſt infinite Multitude of ſmall, poliſh'd, ſmooth Spheres, which muſt be ſuppos'd form'd in all the Parts of this Globe. The ſame *Uniformity* there is probably among the Parts of other *Fluids* as well as Water; and the like muſt be obſerv'd in ſeveral other natural Bodies, as *Salts*, *Sulphurs*, and ſuch like; whoſe uniform Properties do probably depend upon an *Uniformity* in the Figures of their Parts. Sect. 2.

XIII. Under *Original Beauty* we may include *Harmony*, or *Beauty of Sound*, if that Expreſſion can be allow'd, becauſe *Harmony* is not uſually conceiv'd as an Imitation of any thing elſe. *Harmony* often raiſes Pleaſure in thoſe who know not what is the Occaſion of it: And yet the Foundation of this Pleaſure is known to be a ſort of *Uniformity*. When the ſeveral Vibrations of one Note regularly coincide with the Vibrations of another, they make an agreeable Compoſition; and ſuch Notes are call'd *Concords*. Thus the Vibrations of any one Note coincide in *Time* with two Vibrations of its *Octave*; and two Vibrations of any Note coincide with three of its *Fifth*; and ſo on in the reſt of the *Concords*. Now no *Compoſition* can be harmonious, in which the Notes are not, for the moſt part, diſpos'd according to theſe natural Proportions. Beſides which, a due Regard muſt be had to the *Key*, which governs the whole, and to the *Time* *Harmony.*

Sect. 2. and *Humour*, in which the Compoſition is begun: a frequent and inartifical *Change* of any of which will produce the greateſt, and moſt unnatural *Diſcord*. This will appear, by obſerving the *Diſſonance* which would ariſe from tacking Parts of different Tunes together as one, altho' both were ſeparately agreeable. A like *Uniformity* is alſo obſervable among the *Baſes*, *Tenors*, *Trebles* of the ſame Tune.

THERE is indeed obſervable, in the beſt Compoſitions, a myſterious Effect of *Diſcords:* They often give as great Pleaſure as continu'd Harmony; whether by refreſhing the Ear with *Variety*, or by awakening the Attention, and enlivening the Reliſh for the ſucceeding Harmony of Concords, as Shades enliven and beautify Pictures, or by ſome other means not yet known: Certain it is, however, that they have their Place, and ſome good Effect in our beſt Compoſitions. Some other Powers of *Muſick* may be conſider'd hereafter *.

XIV. BUT in all theſe inſtances of † *Beauty* let it be obſerv'd, That the Pleaſure is

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* See *Sect.* vi. *Art.* 12.

† *There is nothing ſingular in applying the Word* Beauty *to Sounds. The Antients obſerve the peculiar Dignity of the Senſes of Seeing and Hearing, that in their Objects we diſcern the* Καλὸν, *which we don't aſcribe to the Objects of the other Senſes.*

com-

communicated to thoſe who never reflected on this general Foundation; and that all here alledg'd is this, " That the pleaſant " Senſation ariſes only from Objects, in " which there is *Uniformity amidſt Variety:*" We may have the Senſation without knowing what is the Occaſion of it; as a Man's *Taſte* may ſuggeſt Ideas of Sweets, Acids, Bitters, tho' he be ignorant of the *Forms* of the ſmall Bodies, or their Motions, which excite theſe Perceptions in him. Sect. 2.

SECT. III.

Of the Beauty *of* Theorems.

Theorems I. THE Beauty of *Theorems*, or univerſal Truths demonſtrated, deſerves a diſtinct Conſideration, being of a Nature pretty different from the former kinds of *Beauty*; and yet there is none in which we ſhall ſee ſuch an amazing *Variety* with *Uniformity*: and hence ariſes a very great Pleaſure diſtinct from Proſpects of any farther Advantage.

II. FOR in one *Theorem* we may find included, with the moſt exact Agreement, an infinite Multitude of particular Truths; nay, often a Multitude of Infinites: ſo that altho' the Neceſſity of forming abſtract Ideas, and univerſal *Theorems*, ariſes perhaps from the Limitation of our Minds, which cannot admit an infinite Multitude of ſingular Ideas or Judgments at once, yet this Power gives us an Evidence of the Largeneſs of the human Capacity above our Imagination. Thus, for inſtance, the 47*th* Propoſition of the firſt *Book* of EUCLID's *Elements* contains an infinite Multitude of Truths, concerning the infinite poſſible *Sizes* of right-angled *Triangles*, as you make the *Area* greater or leſs; and in each of theſe *Sizes* you may find an infinite Multitude of diſſimilar *Triangles*, as

you vary the Proportion of the *Baſe* to the *Perpendicular*; all which Infinites agree in the general *Theorem*. In *Algebraick*, and *Fluxional Calculations*, we ſhall find a like *Variety* of particular *Truths* included in general *Theorems*; not only in general *Equations* applicable to all Kinds of *Quantity*, but in more particular Inveſtigations of *Areas* and *Tangents:* In which one Manner of Operation ſhall diſcover *Theorems* applicable to many *Orders* or *Species* of *Curves*, to the infinite *Sizes* of each Species, and to the infinite *Points* of the innumerable *Individuals* of each Size. Sect. 3.

III. THAT we may the better diſcern this Agreement, or *Unity* of an Infinity of Objects, in the general *Theorem*, to be the Foundation of the *Beauty* or *Pleaſure* attending their Diſcovery, let us compare our Satisfaction in ſuch Diſcoveries, with the uneaſy State of Mind when we can only meaſure Lines, or Surfaces, by a Scale, or are making Experiments which we can reduce to no general *Canon*, but are only heaping up a Multitude of particular incoherent Obſervations. Now each of theſe Trials diſcovers a new Truth, but with no Pleaſure or *Beauty*, notwithſtanding the *Variety*, till we can diſcover ſome ſort of *Unity*, or reduce them to ſome general Canon. *Foundation of their Beauty.*

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Little Beauty in Axioms.

IV. Again, Let us take a Metaphyſical Axiom, ſuch as this, *Every Whole is greater than its Part*; and we ſhall find no *Beauty* in the Contemplation. For tho' this Propoſition contains many Infinities of particular Truths; yet the *Unity* is inconſiderable, ſince they all agree only in a vague, undetermin'd Conception of *Whole* and *Part*, and in an indefinite Exceſs of the former above the latter, which is ſometimes great and ſometimes ſmall. So, ſhould we hear that the *Cylinder* is greater than the inſcrib'd *Sphere*, and this again greater than the *Cone* of the ſame Altitude, and Diameter of the Baſe, we ſhall find no Pleaſure in this Knowledge of a general Relation of greater and leſs, without any preciſe Difference or Proportion. But when we ſee the univerſal exact Agreement of all poſſible Sizes of ſuch Syſtems of Solids, that they preſerve to each other the conſtant *Ratio* of 3, 2, 1; how beautiful is the *Theorem*, and how are we raviſh'd with its firſt Diſcovery!

Eaſy Theorems.

We may likewiſe obſerve, that *eaſy* or *obvious* Propoſitions, even where the *Unity* is ſufficiently diſtinct and determinate, do not pleaſe us ſo much as thoſe, which being leſs *obvious*, give us ſome *Surprize* in the Diſcovery: Thus we find little Pleaſure in diſcovering, that *a Line biſecting the vertical Angle of an Iſoſceles Triangle, biſects the Baſe*,

Baſe, or the *Reverſe*; or, that *Equilateral* Sect. 3.
Triangles are Equiangular. Theſe Truths we almoſt know *Intuitively*, without Demonſtration: They are like common *Goods*, or thoſe which Men have long poſſeſſed, which do not give ſuch ſenſible Joys as much ſmaller new *Additions* may give us. But let none hence imagine, that the ſole Pleaſure of Theorems is from *Surprize*; for the ſame *Novelty* of a ſingle Experiment does not pleaſe us much: nor ought we to conclude from the greater Pleaſure accompanying a *new*, or *unexpected* Advantage, that *Surprize*, or *Novelty*, is the only Pleaſure of Life, or the only Ground of Delight in *Truth*. Another kind of Surprize in certain Theorems increaſes our Pleaſure above that we have in Theorems of greater Extent; when we diſcover a *general Truth*, which upon ſome confuſed Notion we had reputed falſe: as that *Aſymptotes always approaching ſhould never meet the Curve*. This is like the Joy of unexpected Advantage where we dreaded Evil. But ſtill the *Unity* of many Particulars in the general Theorem is neceſſary to give Pleaſure in any Theorem.

V. THERE is another *Beauty* in Propoſi- *Corollaries*
tions, when one *Theorem* contains a great Multitude of Corollaries eaſily deducible from it. Thus there are ſome leading, or fundamental Properties, upon which a long Series of Theorems can be naturally built: Such

Sect. 3. Such a *Theorem* is the 35th of the 1ſt *Book* of EUCLID, from which the whole Art of meaſuring right-lin'd Areas is deduced, by Reſolution into *Triangles*, which are the Halfs of ſo many *Parallelograms*; and theſe are each reſpectively equal to ſo many *Rectangles* of the *Baſe* into the perpendicular *Altitude*: The 47th of the 1ſt *Book* is another of like *Beauty*, and ſo are many others, in higher Parts of Geometry. In the Search of *Nature* there is the like *Beauty* in the Knowledge of ſome great *Principles*, or univerſal *Forces*, from which innumerable Effects do flow. Such is *Gravitation*, in Sir ISAAC NEWTON's Scheme. What is the Aim of our ingenious Geometers? A continual Inlargement of Theorems, or making them extenſive, ſhewing how what was formerly known of one Figure extends to many others, to Figures very unlike the former in Appearance.

IT is eaſy to ſee how Men are charm'd with the *Beauty* of ſuch Knowledge, beſides its Uſefulneſs; and how this ſets them upon deducing the Properties of each Figure from one *Geneſis*, and demonſtrating the mechanick Forces from one *Theorem* of the Compoſition of Motion; even after they have ſufficient Knowledge and Certainty in all theſe Truths from diſtinct independent Demonſtrations. And this Pleaſure we enjoy even when we have no Proſpect of obtaining

ing any other *Advantage* from ſuch Manner of Deduction, than the immediate Pleaſure of contemplating the *Beauty:* nor could Love of *Fame* excite us to ſuch regular Methods of Deduction, were we not conſcious that Mankind are pleas'd with them immediately, by this *internal Senſe* of their *Beauty.* Sect. 3.

Fantaſtick Beauty.

It is no leſs eaſy to ſee into what abſurd Attempts Men have been led by this Senſe of *Beauty*, and an Affectation of obtaining it in the other Sciences as well as the *Mathematicks.* 'Twas this probably which ſet Descartes on that hopeful Project of deducing all human Knowledge from one Propoſition, *viz. Cogito, ergo ſum*; while others pleaded, that *Impoſſibile eſt idem ſimul eſſe & non eſſe*, had much fairer Pretenſions to the Style and Title of *Principium humanæ Cognitionis abſolutè primum.* Mr. Leibnitz had an equal Affection for his favourite Principle of a *ſufficient Reaſon* for every thing in *Nature*, and boaſts of the Wonders he had wrought in the intellectual World by its Aſſiſtance. If we look into particular Sciences, we ſee the Inconveniences of this Love of *Uniformity.* How aukwardly does Puffendorf deduce the ſeveral Duties of Men to *God*, *themſelves*, and their *Neighbours*, from his ſingle fundamental Principle of *Sociableneſs to the whole Race of Mankind?* This Obſervation is a ſtrong Proof, that Men perceive the *Beauty of Uniformity* in the Sciences,

Sect. 3. ences, ſince they are led into unnatural Deductions by purſuing it too far.

VI. THIS Delight which accompanies Sciences, or univerſal *Theorems*, may really be call'd a kind of *Senſation*; ſince it neceſſarily accompanies the Diſcovery of any Propoſition, and is diſtinct from bare Knowledge itſelf *, being moſt violent at firſt, whereas the Knowledge is uniformly the ſame. And however Knowledge inlarges the *Mind*, and makes us more capable of comprehenſive Views and Projects in ſome kinds of Buſineſs, whence *Advantage* may alſo ariſe to us; yet we may leave it in the Breaſt of every Student to determine, whether he has not often felt this Pleaſure without any ſuch Proſpect of Advantage from the Diſcovery of his *Theorem*. All which can thence be inferr'd is only this, that as in our external Senſes, ſo in our *internal* ones, the pleaſant Senſations generally ariſe from thoſe Objects which calm Reaſon would have recommended, had we underſtood their Uſe, and which might have engag'd our Purſuits from *Self-intereſt*.

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*Ariſtotle (Ethic. Nicom. l. 10. c. 3.) *juſtly obſerves, that we have certain natural Propenſities to certain Actions, or to the Exerciſe of certain natural Powers, without a View to, or Intention of obtaining thoſe Pleaſures which naturally accompany them.* Περὶ πολλὰ σπουδὴν ποιησαίμεθα ἄν, κ᾽ εἰ μηδεμίαν ἐπιφέροι ἡδονὴν, οἷον ὁρᾶν, μνημονεύειν, εἰδέναι, τὰς ἀρετὰς ἔχειν· εἰ δ᾽ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἕπονται τούτοις ἡδοναὶ, οὐδὲν διαφέρει. ἑλοίμεθα γὰρ ἂν ταῦτα, κ᾽ εἰ μὴ γένοιτ᾽ ἂν ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν ἡδονή.

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Works of Art.

VII. As to the Works of ART, were we to run thro' the various artifical Contrivances or Structures, we ſhould conſtantly find the Foundation of the *Beauty* which appears in them, to be ſome kind of *Uniformity*, or *Unity* of Proportion among the Parts, and of each Part to the Whole. As there is a great Diverſity of Proportions poſſible, and different Kinds of *Uniformity*, ſo there is room enough for that Diverſity of Fancies obſervable in *Architecture*, *Gardening*, and ſuch-like Arts in different *Nations*; they all may have *Uniformity*, tho' the Parts in one may differ from thoſe in another. The *Chineſe* or *Perſian* Buildings are not like the *Grecian* and *Roman*, and yet the former has its *Uniformity* of the various Parts to each other, and to the Whole, as well as the latter. In that kind of Architecture which the EUROPEANS call *Regular*, the *Uniformity* of Parts is very obvious, the ſeveral Parts are *regular Figures*, and either *equal* or *ſimilar* at leaſt in the ſame Range; the Pedeſtals are *Parallelopipedons*, or ſquare *Priſms*; the Pillars, *Cylinders* nearly; the Arches *circular*, and all thoſe in the ſame Row *equal*; there is the ſame Proportion every where obſerv'd in the ſame Range between the *Diameters* of Pillars and their *Heights*, their *Capitals*, the *Diameters* of *Arches*, the *Heights* of the *Pedeſtals*, the *Projections* of the *Cornice*, and all the Ornaments in each of our *five Orders*.

And

Sect. 3. And tho' other Countries do not follow the *Grecian* or *Roman* Proportions; yet there is even among them a Proportion retain'd, a *Uniformity*, and Reſemblance of correſponding Figures; and every Deviation in one Part from the Proportion which is obſerv'd in the reſt of the Building, is diſpleaſing to every Eye, and deſtroys or diminiſhes at leaſt the *Beauty* of the Whole.

VIII. The ſame might be obſerv'd thro' all other Works of *Art*, even to the meaneſt *Utenſil*; the *Beauty* of every one of which we ſhall always find to have the ſame Foundation of *Uniformity amidſt Variety*, without which they appear mean, irregular and deform'd.

SECT.

SECT. IV.

Of Relative *or* Comparative Beauty.

I. IF the preceding Thoughts concerning the Foundation of *abſolute Beauty* be juſt, we may eaſily underſtand wherein *relative Beauty* conſiſts. All *Beauty* is relative to the Senſe of ſome Mind perceiving it; but what we call *relative* is that which is apprehended in any *Object*, commonly conſider'd as an *Imitation* of ſome Original: And this *Beauty* is founded on a *Conformity*, or a kind of *Unity* between the Original and the Copy. The Original may be either ſome Object in *Nature*, or ſome *eſtabliſh'd Idea*; for if there be any known *Idea* as a Standard, and Rules to fix this Image or *Idea* by, we may make a *beautiful Imitation*. Thus a *Statuary*, *Painter*, or *Poet*, may pleaſe us with an HERCULES, if his Piece retains that *Grandeur*, and thoſe Marks of *Strength* and *Courage*, which we imagine in that Hero. *Comparative Beauty.*

AND farther, to obtain *comparative Beauty* alone, it is not neceſſary that there be any Beauty in the Original; the Imitation of *abſolute Beauty* may indeed in the whole make a more lovely Piece, and yet an exact Imitation ſhall ſtill be *beautiful*, though the Origi-

Sect. 4. Original were intirely void of it: Thus the *Deformities* of old Age in a Picture, the *rudeſt Rocks* or *Mountains* in a *Landſkip*, if well repreſented, ſhall have abundant *Beauty*, tho' perhaps not ſo great as if the Original were *abſolutely beautiful*, and as well repreſented: Nay, perhaps the *Novelty* may make us prefer the Repreſentation of Irregularity.

Deſcription in Poetry. II. The ſame Obſervation holds true in the Deſcriptions of the Poets either of *natural* Objects or Perſons; and this *relative Beauty* is what they ſhould principally endeavour to obtain, as the peculiar *Beauty* of their Works. By the *Moratæ Fabulæ*, or the ἠθη of Aristotle, we are not to underſtand *virtuous Manners*, but a *juſt Repreſentation* of Manners or Characters as they are in *Nature*; and that the *Actions* and *Sentiments* be ſuited to the Characters of the *Perſons* to whom they are aſcrib'd in *Epick* and *Dramatick* Poetry. Perhaps very good Reaſons may be ſuggeſted from the Nature of our *Paſſions*, to prove that a Poet ſhould not draw his *Characters* perfectly *Virtuous*; theſe Characters indeed, abſtractly conſider'd, might give more Pleaſure, and have more *Beauty* than the *imperfect* ones which occur in Life with a Mixture of Good and Evil: But it may ſuffice at preſent to ſuggeſt againſt this Choice, that we have more lively Ideas of *imperfect Men* with all their Paſſions, than of *morally perfect Heroes*, ſuch as really

really never occur to our Obſervation; and of which conſequently we cannot judge exactly as to their Agreement with the Copy. And farther, thro' Conſciouſneſs of our own State, we are more nearly touch'd and affected by the *imperfect Characters*; ſince in them we ſee repreſented, in the Perſons of others, the *Contraſts* of Inclinations, and the *Struggles* between the Paſſions of *Self-Love* and thoſe of *Honour* and *Virtue*, which we often feel in our own Breaſts. This is the Perfection of *Beauty* for which HOMER is juſtly admir'd, as well as for the *Variety* of his *Characters*. Sect. 4.

III. MANY other Beauties of Poetry may be reduc'd under this Claſs of *relative Beauty*; The *Probability* is abſolutely neceſſary to make us imagine *Reſemblance*; it is by Reſemblance that the *Similitudes*, *Metaphors* and *Allegories* are made *beautiful*, whether either the Subject or the Thing compar'd to it have *Beauty* or not; the *Beauty* indeed is greater, when both have ſome *original Beauty* or Dignity as well as *Reſemblance:* and this is the Foundation of the Rule of ſtudying *Decency* in *Metaphors* and *Similes* as well as *Likeneſs*. The *Meaſures* and *Cadence* are Inſtances of *Harmony*, and come under the Head of *abſolute Beauty*. *Probability, Simile, Metaphor.*

IV. WE may here obſerve a ſtrange Proneneſs in our Minds to make *perpetual Compa-* *Proneneſs to compare.*

Sect. 4. *riſons* of all things which occur to our Obſervation, even of thoſe which are very different from each other. There are certain *Reſemblances* in the Motions of all Animals upon like Paſſions, which eaſily found a *Compariſon*; but this does not ſerve to entertain our Fancy: *Inanimate Objects* have often ſuch Poſitions as reſemble thoſe of the *human Body* in various Circumſtances; theſe Airs or Geſtures of the *Body* are Indications of certain Diſpoſitions in the *Mind*, ſo that our very *Paſſions* and *Affections*, as well as other Circumſtances, obtain a Reſemblance to *natural inanimate Objects*. Thus a *Tempeſt* at Sea is often an Emblem of *Wrath*; a *Plant* or *Tree* drooping under the Rain, of a Perſon in *Sorrow*; a *Poppy* bending its Stalk, or a *Flower* withering when cut by the Plow, reſembles the Death of a *blooming Hero*; an *aged Oak* in the Mountains ſhall repreſent an *old Empire*, a *Flame* ſeizing a Wood ſhall repreſent a *War*. In ſhort, every thing in *Nature*, by our ſtrange Inclination to *Reſemblance*, ſhall be brought to repreſent other things, even the moſt remote, eſpecially the Paſſions and Circumſtances of human Nature in which we are more nearly concern'd; and to confirm this, and furniſh Inſtances of it, one need only look into HOMER or VIRGIL. A fruitful Fancy would find in a *Grove* or a *Wood*, an Emblem of every *Character in a Common-wealth*;

wealth, and every Turn of *Temper*, or *Station in Life*. Sect. 4.

V. Concerning that kind of *comparative Beauty* which has a neceſſary relation to ſome eſtabliſh'd Idea, we may obſerve, that ſome Works of *Art* acquire a *diſtinct Beauty* by their Correſpondence to ſome univerſally ſuppos'd *Intention* in the Artificer, or the Perſons who employ'd him: And to obtain this *Beauty*, ſometimes they do not form their Works ſo as to attain the higheſt Perfection of *original Beauty* ſeparately conſider'd; becauſe a Compoſition of this *relative Beauty*, along with ſome Degree of the *original* Kind, may give more Pleaſure, than a more *perfect original Beauty* ſeparately. Thus we ſee, that ſtrict *Regularity* in laying out of Gardens in *Parterres*, *Viſtas*, *parallel Walks*, is often neglected, to obtain an Imitation of *Nature* even in ſome of its *Wilderneſſes*. And we are more pleas'd with this *Imitation*, eſpecially when the Scene is large and ſpacious, than with the more confin'd Exactneſs of *regular Works*. So likewiſe in the *Monuments* erected in Honour of deceaſed *Heroes*, altho' a *Cylinder*, or *Priſm* or *regular Solid*, may have more *original Beauty* than a very acute *Pyramid* or *Obeliſk*, yet the latter pleaſes more, by anſwering better the ſuppos'd Intentions of *Stability*, and being *conſpicuous*. For the ſame reaſon *Cubes*, or ſquare *Priſms*, are generally choſen for *Intention.*

Sect. 4. the *Pedeſtals* or *Statues*, and not any of the more *beautiful Solids*, which do not ſeem ſo ſecure from rolling. This may be the Reaſon too, why *Columns* or *Pillars* look beſt when made a little taper from the middle or a third from the bottom, that they may not ſeem top-heavy, and in danger of falling.

VI. THE like Reaſon may influence Artiſts, in many other Inſtances, to depart from the Rules of *original Beauty*, as above laid down. And yet this is no Argument againſt our Senſe of *Beauty* being founded, as was above explain'd, on *Uniformity amidſt Variety*, but only an Evidence, that our Senſe of *Beauty* of the *Original* Kind may be vary'd and over-balanc'd by another kind of *Beauty*.

VII. THIS *Beauty* ariſing from Correſpondence to *Intention*, would open to curious Obſervers a new Scene of *Beauty* in the Works of NATURE, by conſidering how the *Mechaniſm* of the various Parts known to us, ſeems adapted to the Perfection of that Part, and yet in Subordination to the Good of ſome *Syſtem* or *Whole*. We generally ſuppoſe the Good of the *greateſt Whole*, or of *all Beings*, to have been the *Intention* of the AUTHOR of *Nature*; and cannot avoid being pleas'd when we ſee any Part of this *Deſign* executed in the *Syſtems* we are acquainted with. The Obſervations already made

made on this Subject are in every one's Hand, in the Treatiſes of our late Improvers of *mechanical Philoſophy*. We ſhall only obſerve here, that every one has a certain Pleaſure in ſeeing any Deſign well executed by curious *Mechaniſm*, even when his own Advantage is no way concern'd; and alſo in diſcovering the Deſign to which any complex *Machine* is adapted, when he has perhaps had a general Knowledge of the *Machine* before, without ſeeing its Correſpondence or Aptneſs to execute any Deſign *. Sect. 4.

* *'Tis ſurpriſing to ſee the ingenious Author of* Alciphron *alledging, that all Beauty obſerved is ſolely ſome* Uſe *perceived or imagined; for no other Reaſon than this, that the Apprehenſion of the Uſe intended, occurs continually, when we are judging of the Forms of Chairs, Doors, Tables, and ſome other Things of obvious Uſe; and that we like thoſe Forms moſt, which are* fitteſt for the Uſe. *Whereas we ſee, that in theſe very Things* Similitude *of Parts is regarded, where unlike Parts would be equally uſeful: Thus the Feet of a Chair would be of the ſame Uſe, tho' unlike, were they equally long; tho' one were ſtrait, and the other bended; or one bending outwards, and the other inwards: A Coffin-ſhape for a Door would bear a more manifeſt Aptitude to the human Shape, than that which Artiſts require. And then, what is the* Uſe *of theſe* Imitations of Nature, *or of its Works, in* Architecture? *Why ſhould a Pillar pleaſe which has ſome of the Human Proportions? Is the* End *or* Uſe *of a Pillar the ſame as of a Man? Why the Imitation of other natural or well-proportioned Things in the Entablature? Is there then a* Senſe of Imitation, *reliſhing it where there is no other Uſe than this, that it naturally pleaſes? Again; Is no Man pleaſed with the Shapes of any Animals, but thoſe which he expects Uſe from? The Shapes of the Horſe or the Ox may promiſe Uſe to the Owner; but is he the only Perſon who reliſhes the Beauty? And is there no Beauty diſcerned in Plants, in Flowers, in Animals, whoſe Uſe is to us unknown?*

But

Sect. 4.

THE Arguments by which we prove *Reaſon* and *Deſign* in any *Cauſe* from the *Beauty* of the *Effects*, are ſo frequently us'd in ſome of the higheſt Subjects, that it may be neceſſary to inquire a little more particularly into them, to ſee how far they will hold, and with what degree of Evidence.

But what is ſtill more ſurpriſing, is his repreſenting Ariſtotle *as giving the* ἐπαινετὸν, *for the Notion of the* καλὸν: *when he has ſo often told us,* "*that the* καλὸν, *is prior to it; that we* "*love Praiſe from others, as it gives Teſtimony to, and con-*"*firms our Opinion of, our being poſſeſſed of Virtue, or the* "καλὸν; *and that the ſuperior Excellency of this, which we* "*antecedently perceive, is the Reaſon why we love Praiſe.*" See Ethic. ad Nicom. Lib. i. c. 5. *and often elſewhere. 'Tis true, that the* καλὸν *is laudable, and, as* Plato *aſſerts, all-wiſe,* ἡδὺ, καὶ ὠφέλιμον, *at laſt; and ſo does every one maintain who aſſerts a* Moral Senſe, *in that very Aſſertion. And yet the Doctor has found out the Art of making this an Objection to a* Moral Senſe.

SECT.

SECT. V.

Concerning our Reaſonings about Deſign *and* Wiſdom *in the* Cauſe, *from the* Beauty *or* Regularity *of* Effects.

I. THERE ſeems to be no neceſſary Connection of our pleaſing Ideas of *Beauty* with the *Uniformity* or *Regularity* of the Objects, from the *Nature* of Things, antecedent to ſome *Conſtitution* of the AUTHOR of our Nature, which has made ſuch Forms pleaſant to us. Other *Minds* may be ſo fram'd as to receive no Pleaſure from *Uniformity*; and we actually find, that the ſame regular Forms ſeem not equally to pleaſe all the Animals known to us, as ſhall probably appear hereafter. Therefore let us make what is the moſt unfavourable Suppoſition to the preſent Argument, *viz.* That the Conſtitution of our Senſe ſo as to approve *Uniformity*, is merely arbitrary in the AUTHOR of our Nature; and that there are an Infinity of *Taſtes* or *Reliſhes* of *Beauty* poſſible; ſo that it would be impoſſible to throw together fifty or a hundred Pebbles, which ſhould not make an agreeable Habitation for ſome Animal or other, and appear *beautiful* to it. And then it is plain, *Senſe, arbitrary in its Author.*

Sect. 5. that from the Perception of *Beauty* in any one Effect, we ſhould have no Reaſon to conclude *Deſign* in the *Cauſe:* for a Senſe might be ſo conſtituted as to be pleas'd with ſuch *Irregularity* as may be the Effect of an *undirected Force**. But then, as there are an Infinity of *Forms* poſſible into which any Syſtem may be reduc'd, an Infinity of *Places* in which Animals may be ſituated, and an Infinity of *Reliſhes* or *Senſes* in theſe Animals is ſuppos'd poſſible: that in the immenſe Spaces any one Animal ſhould by Chance be plac'd in a Syſtem agreeable to its Taſte, muſt be improbable as *infinite* to *one* at leaſt: And much more unreaſonable is it to expect from Chance, that a Multitude of Animals agreeing in their Senſe of *Beauty* ſhould obtain *agreeable Places.*

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* *By* undirected Force, *or* undeſigning Force, *is to be underſtood,* That Force with which an Agent may put Matter into Motion, without having any Deſign or Intention to produce any particular Form. *The* Conatus ad motum, *without an actual Line of* Direction, *ſeems ſuch a groſs Abſurdity in the* Carteſian Scheme, *that it is below our Notice. But Men have ſo many confus'd Notions of ſome* Nature, *or* Chance *impreſſing Motions without any Deſign or Intention of producing any particular Effect, that it may be uſeful to ſhew, that even this very abſurd* Poſtulatum, *tho' it were granted them, is inſufficient to anſwer the Appearances in the* Regularity *of the World: and this is what is attempted in the firſt fourteen Articles of this Section. Theſe Arguments would really be uſeleſs, if all Men were perſuaded of what, to a Man of juſt Thought, will appear pretty obvious, that there can be no* Thoughtleſs Agent; *and that* Chance *and* Nature *are mere empty Names, as they are us'd on this Occaſion, relative only to our Ignorance.*

II. THERE is alſo the ſame Probability, that in any one Syſtem of Matter an *undirected Force* will produce a *regular Form*, as any one given *irregular* one, of the ſame degree of Complication: But ſtill the *irregular Forms* into which any Syſtem may be rang'd, ſurpaſs in Multitude the *Regular*, as *Infinite* does *Unity*; for what holds in *one* ſmall Syſtem, will hold in a *Thouſand*, a *Million*, a *Univerſe*, with more Advantage, *viz.* that the *irregular Forms* poſſible infinitely ſurpaſs the *Regular*. For Inſtance, the *Area* of an Inch *Square* is capable of an Infinity of *regular Forms*, the *Equilateral Triangle*, the *Square*, the *Pentagon*, *Hexagon*, *Heptagon*, &c. but for each one regular Form, there are an Infinity of irregular, as an Infinity of *Scalena* for the one equilateral Triangle, an Infinity of *Trapezia* for the one Square, of irregular *Pentagons* for the one Regular, and ſo on: and therefore ſuppoſing any one Syſtem agitated by *undeſigning Force*, it is infinitely more probable that it will reſolve itſelf into an *irregular Form*, than a *regular*. Thus, that a Syſtem of *ſix* Parts upon Agitation ſhall not obtain the Form of a regular *Hexagon*, is at leaſt *infinite* to *Unity*; and the more complex we make the Syſtem, the greater is the Hazard, from a very obvious Reaſon.

Sect. 5. *Undirected Force.*

WE ſee this confirm'd by our conſtant Experience, that *Regularity* never ariſes from any

Sect. 5. any *undeſign'd Force* of ours; and from this we conclude, that wherever there is any *Regularity* in the Diſpoſition of a Syſtem capable of many other Diſpoſitions, there muſt have been *Deſign* in the *Cauſe*; and the Force of this Evidence increaſes, according to the Multiplicity of Parts imploy'd.

But this Concluſion is too raſh, unleſs ſome farther Proof be introduc'd; and what leads us into it is this. Men, who have a Senſe of *Beauty* in *Regularity*, are led generally in all their Arrangements of Bodies to ſtudy ſome kind of *Regularity*, and ſeldom ever deſign *Irregularity:* hence we judge the ſame of other Beings too, *viz.* that they ſtudy *Regularity*; and preſume upon *Intention* in the *Cauſe* wherever we ſee it, making *Irregularity* always a Preſumption of want of *Deſign:* whereas if other Agents have different Senſes of *Beauty*, or if they have no Senſe of it at all, *Irregularity* may as well be deſign'd as *Regularity*. And then let it be obſerv'd, that in this Caſe there is juſt the ſame Reaſon to conclude *Deſign* in the Cauſe from any one irregular Effect, as from a regular one: for ſince there are an Infinity of other *Forms* poſſible as well as this irregular one produc'd; and ſince to ſuch a Being* void

* *There is a great Difference between ſuch a Being as is here mention'd, and a* Being *which has no* Intention *for any Reaſon whatſoever to produce one Form more than another.*

This

void of a Senſe of *Beauty*, all Forms are as to its own Reliſh indifferent, and all agitated Matter meeting muſt make ſome Form or other, and all Forms, upon Suppoſition that the Force is apply'd by an Agent void of a Senſe of *Beauty*, would equally prove *Deſign*; it is plain that no one Form proves it more than another, or can prove it at all; except from a general metaphyſical Conſideration, that there is no proper Agent without *Deſign* and *Intention*, and that every *Effect* flows from the *Intention* of ſome *Cauſe*. Sect. 5.

III. THIS however follows from the above-mention'd Conſiderations, that ſuppoſing a Maſs of Matter ſurpaſſing a *cubick* Inch, as *infinite* of the *firſt* Power does *Unity*, and that this whole Maſs were ſome way determin'd from its own Nature with- *Similar Forms by Chance, impoſſible.*

This latter ſort of Being, *as to the preſent Argument, would be the ſame with* Chance, *but not the former. For tho' a Being has no Senſe of* Beauty, *he may notwithſtanding be capable of* Deſign, *and of* Intention *to produce* regular Forms; *and the Obſervation of greater* Regularity *in any Number of Effects, than could be expected from undirected* Force, *is a Preſumption of* Deſign *and* Intention *in the* Cauſe, *even where the* Cauſe *is ſuppos'd to have no Senſe of* Beauty *in ſuch Forms, ſince perhaps he may have other Reaſons moving him to chuſe ſuch Forms. Thus, ſuppoſing the* DEITY *not immediately pleas'd with* Regularity, Uniformity, *or* Similarity *in Bodies, yet there may be Reaſons moving him to produce ſuch Objects, ſuch as the pleaſing his Creatures, having given them a Senſe of* Beauty *founded on theſe* Qualities. *See the two laſt Paragraphs of the laſt Section.*

out

Sect. 5. out any *Design* in a *Cause* (which perhaps is scarce possible) to resolve itself into Parts whose solid Contents were each a *cubick* Inch, and into a *prismatick* Form whose *Base* should always be $\frac{1}{2}$ of a *square* Inch; suppose these Conditions determin'd, and all others left to *undirected Force*; all which we could expect from *undirected Force* in this Case would be one equilateral *Prism*, or two perhaps: because there are an Infinity of Irregular *Prisms* possible of the same *Base*, and *solid Content*; and when we met with many such *Prisms*, we must probably conclude them produc'd by *Design*, since they are more than could have been expected by the Laws of *Hazard*.

IV. But if this *infinite* Mass was not determin'd to a *prismatick* Form, we could only expect from its *casual Concourse* one *Prism* of any Kind, since there is an Infinity of other Solids into which the Mass might be resolv'd; and if we found any great Number of *Prisms*, we should have reason to presume *Design*: So that in a Mass of Matter as infinite of the *first* Power, we could not from any *Concourse* or *Agitation* expect with any good ground a Body of any given Dimensions or Size, and of any given Form; since of any Dimension there are infinite Forms possible, and of any Form there are an Infinity of Dimensions; and if we found several Bodies of the same Dimension and Form,

Form, we ſhould have ſo much Preſumption for *Deſign*. Sect. 5.

V. THERE is one trifling Objection which may perhaps ariſe from the *cryſtallizing* of certain Bodies, when the Fluid is evaporated in which they were ſwimming: for in this we frequently ſee *regular Forms* ariſing, tho' there is nothing ſuppos'd in this Affair but an *undirected Force of Attraction*. But to remove this Objection, we need only conſider, that we have good Reaſon to believe, that the ſmalleſt Particles of *Cryſtalliz'd* Bodies have fix'd *regular Forms* given them in the Conſtitution of *Nature*; and then it is eaſy to conceive how their *Attractions* may produce *regular Forms*: but unleſs we ſuppoſe ſome preceding *Regularity* in the Figures of *attracting* Bodies, they can never form any regular Body at all. And hence we ſee how improbable it is, that the whole Maſs of *Matter*, not only in this Globe, but in all the fixed Stars known to us by our Eyes or Glaſſes, were they a thouſand times larger than our Aſtronomers ſuppoſe, could in any *Concourſe* have produc'd any Number of *ſimilar* Bodies *Regular* or *Irregular*.

VI. AND let it be here obſerv'd, that there are many Compoſitions of Bodies which the ſmalleſt Degree of *Deſign* could eaſily effect, which yet we would in vain expect from all the Powers of *Chance* or *undeſigned* *Combinations by Chance, impoſſible.*

Sect. 5. *Force*, after an *Infinity* of Rencounters; even ſuppoſing a Diſſolution of every Form except the *regular one*, that the Parts might be prepar'd for a new Agitation. Thus ſuppoſing we could expect *one* equilateral *Priſm* of any *given* Dimenſions ſhould be form'd from *undirected Force*, in an Infinity of Matter ſome way determin'd to reſolve itſelf into Bodies of a *given* ſolid Content, (which is all we could expect, ſince it is *infinite* to *one* after the *ſolid Content* is obtain'd, that the Body ſhall not be *Priſmatical*; and allowing it *Priſmatical*, it is *infinite* to *one* that it ſhall not be *Equilateral:*) And again, ſuppoſing another Infinity of Matter determin'd to reſolve it ſelf into *Tubes*, of *Orifices* exactly equal to the *Baſes* of the former *Priſms*, it is again at leaſt as the *ſecond* Power of *Infinite* to *Unity*, that not one of theſe *Tubes* ſhall be both *Priſmatick* and *Equiangular*; and then if the *Tube* were thus form'd, ſo as to be exactly capable of receiving one of the *Priſms*, and no more, it is *infinite* to *one* that they ſhall never meet in *infinite Space*; and ſhould they meet, it is *infinite* to *one* that the *Axes* of the *Priſm* and *Tube* ſhall never happen in the ſame ſtrait *Line*; and ſuppoſing they did, it is again as *infinite* to *three*, that *Angle* ſhall not meet *Angle*, ſo as to enter. We ſee then how infinitely improbable it is, " That all the " Powers of *Chance* in *infinite Matter*, agita- " ted thro' *infinite Ages*, could ever effect " this

" this ſmall Compoſition of a *Priſm* enter- Sect. 5.
" ing a *Priſmatick Bore*; and, that all our
" Hazard for it would at moſt be but as
" *Three* is to the *third* Power of *Infinite*." And yet the ſmalleſt *Deſign* could eaſily effect it.

VII. MAY we not then juſtly count it altogether abſurd, and next to an abſolute ſtrict *Impoſſibility*, " That all the Powers of
" *undirected Force* ſhould ever effect ſuch a
" complex Machine as the moſt imperfect
" *Plant*, or the meaneſt *Animal*, even in
" *one* Inſtance?" For the *Improbability* juſt increaſes, as the Complication of Mechaniſm in theſe *natural* Bodies ſurpaſſes that *ſimple* Combination above-mention'd.

VIII. LET it be here obſerv'd, " That
" the preceding Reaſoning from the *Fre-*
" *quency* of *regular Bodies* of one Form in
" the *Univerſe*, and from the *Combinations*
" of various Bodies, is intirely independent
" on any Perception of *Beauty*; and would
" equally prove *Deſign* in the *Cauſe*, altho'
" there were no *Being* which perceiv'd
" *Beauty* in any Form whatſoever:" for it is in ſhort this, " *That the recurring of any*
" *Effect oftener than the Laws of Hazard*
" *determine, gives Preſumption of Deſign*;
" *and, That Combinations which no unde-*
" *ſign'd Force could give us Reaſon to expect,*
" *muſt neceſſarily prove the ſame; and that*

Sect. 5. " *with ſuperior Probability, as the Multitude* " *of Caſes in which the contrary might hap-* " *pen, ſurpaſs all the Caſes in which this could* " *happen:*" which appears to be in the ſimpleſt Caſes at leaſt as *Infinite* does to *Unity*. And the Frequency of *ſimilar irregular Forms*, or *exact Combinations* of them, is an equal Argument of *Deſign* in the *Cauſe*, ſince the *Similarity*, or exact *Combinations* of *irregular Forms*, are as little to be expected from all the Powers of *undirected Force*, as any ſort whatſoever.

IX. To bring this nearer to ſomething like a *Theorem*, altho' the *Idea* of *Infinite* be troubleſome enough to manage in Reaſoning: The Powers of *Chance*, with *infinite Matter* in *infinite Ages*, may anſwer *Hazards* as the *fifth* Power of *Infinite*, and no more: thus the *Quantity* of Matter may be conceiv'd as the third Power of *Infinite*, and no more, the *various Degrees* of Force may make *another* Power of *Infinite*, and the *Number* of Rencounters may make the *fifth*. But this laſt only holds on Suppoſition, that after every Rencounter there is no *Coheſion*, but all is diſſolv'd again for a new Concourſe, except in *ſimilar Forms* or *exact Combinations*; which Suppoſition is entirely groundleſs, ſince we ſee *diſſimilar Bodies* cohering as ſtrongly as any, and *rude Maſſes* more than any Combinations. Now to produce any *given* Body, in a *given* Place or Situation, and of

of *given* Dimenſions, or Shape, the Hazards of the contrary are, *one* Power of *Infinite* at leaſt to obtain the *Place* or Situation; when the *Situation* is obtain'd, the *Solid Content* requires *another* Power of *Infinite* to obtain it; the *Situation* and *Solidity* obtain'd require, for accompliſhing the *ſimpleſt given* Shape, at leaſt the other *three* Powers of *Infinite*. For inſtance, let the Shape be a four-ſided *Priſm* or *Parallelopiped*; that the *Surfaces* ſhould be *Planes* requires *one* Power; that they ſhould be *Parallel* in this Caſe, or *inclin'd* in any *given Angle* in any other Caſe, requires *another* Power of *Infinite*; and that they ſhould be in any given *Ratio* to each other, requires at leaſt the *third* Power: for in each of theſe Heads there is ſtill an *Infinity* at leaſt of other Caſes poſſible beſide the one *given*. So that all the Powers of *Chance* could only produce perhaps *one* Body of every ſimpler Shape or Size *at moſt*, and this is all we could expect: we might expect one *Pyramid*, or *Cube*, or *Priſm* perhaps; but when we increaſe the Conditions requir'd, the Proſpect muſt grow more improbable, as in more *complex Figures*, and in all *Combinations* of Bodies, and in *ſimilar Species*, which we never could reaſonably hope from *Chance*; and therefore where we ſee them, we muſt certainly aſcribe them to *Deſign*. Sect. 5.

Sect. 5.

Combinations of irregular Forms, equally impoſſible.

X. THE Combinations of *regular Forms*, or of *irregular ones* exactly adapted to each other, require ſuch *vaſt* Powers of *Infinite* to effect them, and the Hazards of the *contrary* Forms are ſo *infinitely* numerous, that all *Probability* or *Poſſibility* of their being accompliſh'd by *Chance* ſeems quite to vaniſh. Let us apply the Caſes in *Art.* vi. in this *Section* about the *Priſm* and *Tube*, to our ſimpleſt Machines, ſuch as *a Pair of Wheels* of our ordinary Carriages; each *Circular*, *Spokes* equal in *Length*, *Thickneſs*, *Shape*; the *Wheels* ſet *parallel*, the *Axle-tree* fix'd in the *Nave* of both, and ſecured from coming out at either End; Now the Caſes in which the contrary might have happen'd from *undirected Concourſes*, were there no more requir'd than what is juſt now mention'd, muſt amount in Multitude to a Power of *Infinites equal* to every Circumſtance requir'd. What ſhall we ſay then of a *Plant*, a *Tree*, an *Animal*, a *Man*, with *ſuch Multitudes* of adapted Veſſels, *ſuch Articulations*, *Inſertions* of *Muſcles*, *Diffuſion* of *Veins*, *Arteries*, *Nerves*? The *Improbability* that ſuch Machines ariſing daily in ſuch Numbers in all Parts of the Earth with ſuch Similarity of Structure, ſhould be the Effect of Chance, is beyond all Conception or Expreſſion.

XI. FURTHER, were all the former Reaſoning from *Similarity* of Forms and Combina-

binations groundleſs, and could *Chance* give us ground to expect ſuch Forms, with exact Combination, yet we could only promiſe ourſelves *one* of theſe Forms among an *Infinity* of others. When we ſee then ſuch a *Multitude* of Individuals of a Species, *ſimilar* to each other in a great number of Parts; and when we ſee in each *Individual*, the correſponding Members ſo exactly like each other, what poſſible room is there left for queſtioning *Deſign* in the *Univerſe?* None but the bareſt *Poſſibility* againſt an inconceiveably great *Probability*, ſurpaſſing every thing which is not *ſtrict Demonſtration*. Sect. 5.

XII. THIS Argument, as has been already obſerv'd *, is quite abſtracted from any Senſe of *Beauty* in any particular Form; for the *exact Similarity* of a hundred or a thouſand *Trapezia*, proves *Deſign* as well as the *Similarity* of *Squares*, ſince both are equally above all the Powers of *undirected Force* or *Chance*; and what is above the Powers of *Chance*, muſt give us proportionable Preſumption for *Deſign*.

THUS, allowing that a *Leg*, or *Arm*, or *Eye*, might have been the Effect of *Chance*, (which was ſhewn to be *moſt abſurd*, and next to abſolutely *impoſſile)* that it ſhould

* See above, *Art.* viii.

Sect. 5. not have a correſponding *Leg*, *Arm*, *Eye*, exactly *ſimilar*, muſt be a Hazard of a Power of *Infinite* proportion'd to the Complication of Parts; for in Proportion to this is the Multitude of Caſes increas'd, in which it would not have a correſponding Member *ſimilar*: ſo that allowing twenty or thirty Parts in ſuch a Structure, it would be as the *twentieth* or *thirtieth* Power of *Infinite* to *Unity*, that the correſponding Part ſhould not be *ſimilar*. What ſhall we ſay then of the *ſimilar Forms* of a whole *Species*?

Groſs Similarity by Chance, impoſſible.

XIII. If it be objected, "That *natural* "Bodies are not *exactly ſimilar*, but only "*groſly ſo* to our Senſes; as that a *Vein*, an "*Artery*, a *Bone* is not perhaps exactly "*ſimilar* to its Correſpondent in the ſame "Animal, tho' it appears ſo to our Senſes, "which judge only of the Bulk, and do "not diſcern the ſmall conſtituent Parts; "and that in the ſeveral Individuals of a "Species the *Diſſimilarity* is always ſenſible, "often in the internal Structure, and always "in the external Appearance:" To remove this Objection it will be ſufficient to ſhew, "That the Multitude of Caſes wherein *ſen-*"*ſible Diſſimilitude* could have happen'd, "are ſtill infinitely more than all the Caſes "in which *ſenſible Similitude* might be re-"tained:" So that the ſame Reaſoning holds from *ſenſible Similarity*, as from the *mathematically exact*: And again, "That "the

" the Caſes of *groſs Diſſimilarity* do in the Sect. 5.
" ſame manner ſurpaſs the Caſes of *groſs*
" *Similarity* poſſible, as *infinite* does *one*.

XIV. To prove both theſe Aſſertions, let us conſider a ſimple Inſtance. Suppoſe a *Trapezium* of a foot Square in *Area* ſhould appear groſly *ſimilar* to another, while no one *Side* differs, by $\frac{1}{10}$ of an Inch; or no *Angle* in one ſurpaſſes the correſponding one in the other above ten Minutes: now this tenth of an Inch is *infinitely* diviſible, as are alſo the ten Minutes, ſo that the Caſes of *inſenſible Diſſimilarity* under *apparent Similarity* are really *Infinite*. But then it is alſo plain that there are an *Infinity* of different ſenſibly diſſimilar *Trapezia*, even of the ſame *Area*, according as we vary a *Side* by one Tenth, two Tenths, three Tenths, and ſo on, and vary the *Angles* and another *Side* ſo as to keep the *Area* equal. Now in each of theſe infinite Degrees of *ſenſible Diſſimilitude* the ſeveral Tenths are *infinitely* diviſible as well as in the firſt Caſe; ſo that the Multitude of *ſenſible Diſſimilarities* are to the Multitude of *inſenſible Diſſimilarities* under apparent Reſemblance, ſtill as the *ſecond* Power of *Infinite* to the *firſt*, or as *Infinite* to *Unity*. And then how vaſtly greater muſt the Multitude be, of all poſſible *ſenſible Diſſimilarities* in ſuch complex Bodies as *Legs*, *Arms*, *Eyes*, *Arteries*, *Veins*, *Skeletons*?

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XV. As to the *Diſſimilarities* of Animals of the ſame Species, it is in the ſame manner plain, that the poſſible Caſes of *groſs Diſſimilarity* are Infinite; and then every Caſe of groſs *Diſſimilarity* contains alſo all the Caſes of *inſenſible Diſſimilarity*. Thus, if we would count all Animals of a Species *groſly ſimilar*, while there was no Limb which in Length or Diameter did exceed the ordinary Shape by above a Third of the Head; it is plain that there are an Infinity of ſenſibly different *groſs Diſſimilarities* poſſible, and then in each of theſe Caſes of *groſs Diſſimilarity*, there are an Infinity of Caſes of *nicer Diſſimilarity*, ſince $\frac{1}{3}$ of the Head may be infinitely divided. To take a low but eaſy Inſtance; two *Cockle Shells* which fitted each other naturally, may have an Infinity of *inſenſible Differences*, but ſtill there are an Infinity of poſſible *ſenſible Differences*; and then in any one of the *ſenſibly different* Forms, there may be the ſame Infinity of *inſenſible Differences* beſide the *ſenſible one*: So that ſtill the Hazard for even *groſs Similarity* from *Chance* is *Infinite* to *one*, and this always increaſes by a Power of Infinite for every diſtinct Member of the Animal, in which even *groſs Similarity* is retain'd; ſince the Addition of every Member or Part to a complex Machine, makes a new Infinity of Caſes, in which *ſenſible Diſſimilarity* may happen; and this Infinity

combin'd

combin'd with the infinite Caſes of the former Parts, raiſes the Hazard by a Power of Infinite. Sect. 5.

Now this may ſufficiently ſhew us the Abſurdity of the *Carteſian* or *Epicurean Hypotheſis*, even granting their *Poſtulatum* of *undirected Force* impreſs'd on *Infinite Matter*; and ſeems almoſt a Demonſtration of *Deſign* in the *Univerſe*.

XVI. One Objection more remains to be remov'd, *viz.* "That ſome imagine, this "Argument may hold better *à Priori* than "*à Poſteriori*; that is, we have better Rea- "ſon to believe, when we ſee a *Cauſe* a- "bout to act, without Knowledge, that "he will not attain any given, or deſir'd "*End*; than we have on the other hand to "believe, when we ſee the *End* actually at- "tain'd, that he acted with Knowledge: "Thus, ſay they, when a particular Per- "ſon is about to draw a Ticket in a *Lot-* "*tery*, where there is but one *Prize* to a "thouſand *Blanks*, it is highly probable "that he ſhall draw a *Blank*; but ſuppoſe "we have ſeen him actually draw for him- "ſelf the *Prize*, we have no ground to "conclude that he had *Knowledge* or *Art* "to accompliſh this End." But the Anſwer is obvious: In ſuch Contrivances we generally have, from the very Circumſtances of the Lottery, very ſtrong moral Argu-

Sect. 5. ments, which almoſt demonſtrate that *Art* can have no Place; ſo that a Probability of a *thouſand* to *one*, may not ſurmount thoſe Arguments: But let the Probability be increas'd, and it will ſoon ſurmount all Arguments to the contrary. For inſtance, If we ſaw a Man ten times ſucceſſively draw Prizes, in a Lottery where there were but ten Prizes to ten thouſand Blanks, I fancy few would queſtion whether he us'd *Art* or not: much leſs would we imagine it were *Chance*, if we ſaw a Man draw for his own Gain ſucceſſively a hundred, or a thouſand Prizes, from among a proportionably greater Number of Blanks. Now in the Works of *Nature* the Caſe is intirely different: we have not the leaſt Argument againſt *Art* or *Deſign*. An *Intelligent Cauſe* is ſurely at leaſt as probable a Notion as *Chance*, *general Force*, *Conatus ad Motum*, or the *Clinamen Principiorum*, to account for any Effect whatſoever: And then all the *Regularity*, *Combinations*, *Similarities* of Species, are ſo many Demonſtrations that there was *Deſign* and *Intelligence* in the CAUSE of this Univerſe: Whereas in fair Lotteries, all *Art* in drawing is made, if not actually impoſſible, at leaſt highly improbable.

Irregularity does not prove want of Deſign.

XVII. LET it be here obſerv'd alſo, "That a *rational Agent* may be capable of "impreſſing Force without intending to "produce any particular Form, and of de-

"ſignedly

" ſignedly producing *irregular* or *diſſimilar* Sect. 5.
" *Forms*, as well as *regular* and *ſimilar*:"
And hence it follows, " That altho' all the
" *Regularity*, *Combination* and *Similarity* in
" the *Univerſe*, are Preſumptions of *Deſign*,
" yet *Irregularity* is no Preſumption of the
" contrary; unleſs we ſuppoſe that the *A-*
" *gent* is determin'd from a Senſe of *Beau-*
" *ty* always to act *regularly*, and delight in
" *Similarity*; and that he can have no other
" inconſiſtent Motive of Action:" Which laſt is plainly abſurd. We do not want in the *Univerſe* many Effects which ſeem to have been left to the general *Laws* of *Motion* upon ſome great *Impulſe*, and have many Inſtances where *Similarity* has been plainly deſign'd in ſome reſpects, and probably neglected in others; or even *Diſſimilarity* deſign'd. Thus we ſee the *general exact Reſemblance* between the two *Eyes* of moſt Perſons; and yet perhaps no other third *Eye* in the World is *exactly* like them. We ſee a *groſs Conformity* of Shape in all Perſons in innumerable Parts, and yet no two *Individuals* of any Species are undiſtinguiſhable; which perhaps is intended for valuable Purpoſes to the whole Species.

XVIII. HITHERTO the Proof amounts only to *Deſign* or *Intention*, barely, in Oppoſition to *blind Force* or *Chance*; and we ſee the Proof of this is independent on *the arbitrary Conſtitution of our internal Senſe of Beauty*. *Wiſdom, Prudence.*

Sect. 5. *Beauty*. *Beauty* is often ſuppos'd an Argument of more than *Deſign*, to wit, *Wiſdom* and *Prudence* in the *Cauſe*. Let us inquire alſo into this.

WISDOM denotes *the purſuing of the beſt Ends by the beſt Means*; and therefore, before we can from any Effect prove the *Cauſe* to be *wiſe*, we muſt know what is *beſt* to the *Cauſe or Agent*. Among Men who have Pleaſure in contemplating *Uniformity*, the *Beauty* of Effects is an Argument of Wiſdom, becauſe this is good to them; but the ſame Argument would not hold as to a *Being void* of this *Senſe* of *Beauty*. And therefore the *Beauty* apparent to us in *Nature*, will not of itſelf prove *Wiſdom* in the *Cauſe*, unleſs this *Cauſe* or AUTHOR of *Nature*, be ſuppos'd BENEVOLENT; and then indeed the Happineſs of Mankind is deſirable or *Good* to the SUPREME CAUSE; and that Form which pleaſes us, is an Argument of his *Wiſdom*. And the Strength of this Argument is increaſed always in proportion to the Degree of *Beauty* produc'd in *Nature*, and expos'd to the View of any *rational Agents*; ſince upon Suppoſition of a *Benevolent* DEITY, all the apparent *Beauty* produc'd is an Evidence of the Execution of a *Benevolent Deſign*, to give them the Pleaſures of *Beauty*.

BUT what more immediately proves *Wiſdom* is this; When we ſee any Machine with

a

a great Complication of Parts actually obtaining an *End*, we juſtly conclude, " That " ſince this could not have been the Effect " of *Chance*, it muſt have been *intended* " for that *End*, which is obtain'd by it;" and then the *Ends* or *Intentions* being in part known, the Complication of Organs, and their nice Diſpoſition adapted to this *End*, is an Evidence " of a *comprehenſive large Un-* " *derſtanding* in the *Cauſe*, according to the " Multiplicity of Parts, and the Appoſite- " neſs of their Structure, even when we " do not know the *Intention* of the *Whole*." Sect. 5.

XIX. THERE is another kind of *Beauty* from which we conclude Wiſdom in the Cauſe, as well as Deſign, *when we ſee many uſeful or beautiful Effects flowing from one general Cauſe.* There is a very good Reaſon for this Concluſion among Men. *Intereſt* muſt lead *Beings* of limited Powers, who are uncapable of a great Diverſity of Operations, and diſtracted by them, to chooſe this *frugal Oeconomy* of their Forces, and to look upon ſuch Management as an Evidence of *Wiſdom* in other *Beings* like themſelves. Nor is this ſpeculative Reaſon all which influences them; for even beſide this Conſideration of *Intereſt*, they are determin'd by a *Senſe of Beauty*, where that Reaſon does not hold; as when we are judging of the Productions of other *Agents* about whoſe Oeconomy we are not ſolicitous. Thus, who does *General Cauſes.*

Sect. 5. not approve of it as a Perfection in *Clock-work*, that three or four Motions of the *Hour*, *Minute*, and *ſecond Hands*, and *monthly Plate* ſhould ariſe from *one Spring* or *Weight*, rather than from three or four *Springs* or *Weights*, in a very compound Machine, which ſhould perform the ſame Effects, and anſwer all the ſame Purpoſes with equal Exactneſs? Now the Foundation of this *Beauty* plainly appears to be an *Uniformity*, or *Unity* of *Cauſe* amidſt *Diverſity* of Effects.

General Laws.

XX. We ſhall * hereafter offer ſome Reaſons, why the Author *of Nature* may chooſe to operate in this manner by *General Laws* and *Univerſal extenſive Cauſes*, altho' the Reaſon juſt now mention'd does not hold with an *Almighty Being*. This is certain, That we have ſome of the moſt delightful Inſtances of *Univerſal Cauſes* in the *Works of Nature*, and that the moſt ſtudious Men in theſe Subjects are ſo delighted with the Obſervation of them, that they always look upon them as Evidences of *Wiſdom* in the Adminiſtration of *Nature*, from a Sense of Beauty.

XXI. The wonderfully ſimple *Mechaniſm* which performs all Animal Motions, has been mention'd † already; nor is *that* of the inani-

* See the laſt *Section*. † See above, *Sect.* ii. *Art.* 8.

mate

mate Parts of *Nature*, leſs admirable. How innumerable are the Effects of that one Principle of *Heat*, deriv'd to us from the *Sun*, which is not only delightful to our Sight and Feeling, and the Means of diſcerning Objects, but is the Cauſe of *Rains*, *Springs*, *Rivers*, *Winds*, and the univerſal Cauſe of *Vegetation!* The *uniform Principle of Gravity* preſerves at once the *Planets* in their *Orbits*, gives *Cohesion* to the Parts of each *Globe*, and *Stability* to *Mountains*, *Hills*, and *artificial Structures*; it raiſes the *Sea* in Tides, and ſinks them again, and reſtrains them in their Channels; it drains the *Earth* of its ſuperfluous Moiſture, by *Rivers*; it raiſes the *Vapours* by its Influence on the *Air*, and brings them down again in *Rains*; it gives an *uniform Preſſure* to our *Atmoſphere*, neceſſary to our Bodies in general, and more eſpecially to *Inſpiration* in *Breathing*; and furniſhes us with an *univerſal Movement*, capable of being apply'd in innumerable Engines. How incomparably more *beautiful* is this Structure, than if we ſuppos'd ſo many *diſtinct Volitions* in the DEITY, producing every particular Effect, and preventing ſome of the accidental Evils which caſually flow from the *general Law!* We may raſhly imagine that this latter manner of Operation might have been more uſeful to us; and it would have been no Diſtraction to *Omnipotence:* But then the great *Beauty* had been loſt, and there had been no more Pleaſure in the Contemplation

Sect. 5.

Sect. 5. plation of this Scene, which is now so delightful. One would rather choose to run the Hazard of its *casual Evils*, than part with that *harmonious Form*, which has been an unexhausted Source of Delight to the successive Spectators in all Ages.

Miracles. XXII. HENCE we see, " That however " *Miracles* may prove the Superintendency " of a *voluntary Agent*, and that the *Uni-* " *verse* is not guided by *Necessity* or *Fate*, " yet that *Mind* must be *weak* and *inad-* " *vertent*, which needs them to confirm the " Belief of a *Wise* and Good DEITY; since " the Deviation from *general Laws*, unless " upon very extraordinary Occasions, must " be a Presumption of *Inconstancy* and *Weak-* " *ness*, rather than of *steady Wisdom* and " *Power*, and must weaken the best Argu- " ments we can have for the *Sagacity* and " *Power* of the *universal* MIND.'

SECT.

SECT. VI.

Of the Univerſality *of the* Senſe *of* Beauty *among Men.*

I. WE before * inſinuated, " That all " *Beauty* has a relation to ſome " *perceiving Power*;" and conſequently ſince we know not how great a *Variety* of Senſes there may be among Animals, there is no Form in *Nature* concerning which we can pronounce, " That it has no *Beauty*;" for it may ſtill pleaſe ſome *perceiving Power*. But our *Inquiry* is confin'd to Men; and before we examine the *Univerſality* of this *Senſe of Beauty*, or their Agreement in approving *Uniformity*, it may be proper to conſider, " Whether, as the other *Senſes* which " give us Pleaſure, do alſo give us Pain, ſo " this *Senſe of Beauty* does make ſome Ob- " jects diſagreeable to us, and the Occaſion " of Pain."

Internal Senſe not an immediate Source of Pain.

THAT many Objects give no pleaſure to our *Senſe* is obvious; many are certainly void of *Beauty*: But then there is no Form which ſeems neceſſarily diſagreeable of itſelf, when we dread no other Evil from it, and com-

* See above *Sect.* i. *Art.* 17. *Sect.* iv. *Art.* 1.

pare

Sect. 6. pare it with nothing better of the Kind. Many Objects are naturally diſpleaſing, and diſtaſteful to our *eternal Senſes*, as well as others pleaſing and agreeable; as *Smells*, *Taſtes*, and ſome ſeparate *Sounds*: but as to our *Senſe of Beauty*, no Compoſition of Objects which give not unpleaſant ſimple Ideas, ſeems poſitively unpleaſant or painful of itſelf, had we never obſerv'd any thing better of the Kind. *Deformity* is only *the Abſence of Beauty*, or *Deficiency in the Beauty expected in any Species*: Thus *bad Muſick* pleaſes *Ruſticks* who never heard any better, and the *fineſt Ear* is not offended with *tuning* of Inſtruments, if it be not too tedious, where no *Harmony* is expected; and yet much ſmaller *Diſſonancy* ſhall offend amidſt the Performance, where *Harmony* is expected. A *rude Heap* of Stones is no way offenſive to one who ſhall be diſpleas'd with *Irregularity* in *Architecture*, where *Beauty* was expected. And had there been a Species of that Form which we now call *ugly* or *deform'd*, and had we never ſeen or expected greater *Beauty*, we ſhould have receiv'd no Diſguſt from it, altho' the Pleaſure would not have been ſo great in this Form as in thoſe we now admire. Our *Senſe of Beauty* ſeems deſign'd to give us poſitive Pleaſure, but not a poſitive Pain or Diſguſt, any farther than what ariſes from Diſappointment.

II. There

II. THERE are indeed many Faces which at firſt View are apt to raiſe Diſlike; but this is generally not from any Deformity which of itſelf is poſitively diſpleaſing, but either from want of *expected Beauty*, or much more from their carrying ſome natural Indications of *morally bad Diſpoſitions*, which we all acquire a Faculty of diſcerning in *Countenances*, *Airs*, and *Geſtures*. That this is not occaſion'd by any Form poſitively diſguſting, will appear from this, That if upon long Acquaintance we are ſure of finding *Sweetneſs of Temper*, *Humanity and Chearfulneſs*, altho' the bodily Form continues, it ſhall give us no Diſguſt or Diſpleaſure; whereas, if any thing were naturally diſagreeable, or the Occaſion of Pain, or poſitive Diſtaſte, it would always continue ſo, even altho' the Averſion we might have toward it were counterbalanc'd by other Conſiderations. There are Horrors rais'd by ſome Objects, which are only the Effect of *Fear* for ourſelves, or *Compaſſion* towards others, when either *Reaſon*, or ſome fooliſh *Aſſociation of Ideas*, makes us apprehend Danger, and not the Effect of any thing in the Form itſelf: for we find that moſt of thoſe Objects which excite Horror at firſt, when Experience or Reaſon has remov'd the Fear, may become the Occaſions of Pleaſure; as *ravenous Beaſts*, a *tempeſtuous Sea*, a *craggy Precipice*, a *dark ſhady Valley*.

Sect. 6. *Approbation and Diſlike from Aſſociations of Ideas.*

Sect. 6. *Associations.*

III. We ſhall ſee * hereafter, " That " *Aſſociations of Ideas* make Objects pleaſant " and delightful, which are not naturally " apt to give any ſuch Pleaſures; and the " ſame way, the *caſual Conjunctions of Ideas* " may give a Diſguſt, where there is no- " thing diſagreeable in the Form itſelf." And this is the Occaſion of many fantaſtick Averſions to Figures of ſome Animals, and to ſome other Forms: Thus *Swine*, *Serpents* of all Kinds, and ſome *Inſects* really beautiful enough, are beheld with Averſion by many People, who have got *ſome accidental Ideas aſſociated* to them. And for *Diſtaſtes* of this Kind, no other Account can be given.

Univerſality of this Senſe.

IV. But as to the *univerſal Agreement* of Mankind in their *Senſe of Beauty* from *Uniformity amidſt Variety*, we muſt conſult Experience: and as we allow all Men Reaſon, ſince all Men are capable of underſtanding ſimple Arguments, tho' few are capable of complex Demonſtrations; ſo in this Caſe it muſt be ſufficient to prove *this Senſe of Beauty univerſal*, " if all Men are better " pleas'd with *Uniformity* in the ſimpler " Inſtances than *the contrary*, even when " there is no Advantage obſerv'd attending " it; and likewiſe if all Men, according as

* See below *Art.* 11, 12. of this *Section.*

" their

" their Capacity inlarges, ſo as to receive Sect. 6.
" and compare more complex Ideas, have
" a greater Delight in *Uniformity*, and are
" pleas'd with its more complex Kinds, both
" *Original* and *Relative*.

Now let us conſider if ever any Perſon was void of *this Senſe* in the ſimpler Inſtances. Few Trials have been made in the ſimpleſt Inſtances of *Harmony*, becauſe, as ſoon as we find an *Ear* incapable of reliſhing complex Compoſitions, ſuch as our *Tunes* are, no farther Pains are employ'd about ſuch. But in *Figures*, did ever any Man make choice of a *Trapezium*, or any irregular *Curve*, for the *Ichnography* or Plan of his Houſe, without Neceſſity, or ſome great Motive of Convenience? or to make the oppoſite Walls *not parallel*, or *unequal* in Height? Were ever *Trapeziums*, irregular *Polygons* or *Curves* choſen for the Forms of *Doors* or *Windows*, tho' theſe Figures might have anſwer'd the Uſes as well, and would have often ſav'd a great Part of the Time, Labour and Expence to Workmen, which is now employ'd in ſuiting the Stones and Timber to the *regular* Forms? Among all the fantaſtick Modes of *Dreſs*, none was ever quite void of *Uniformity*, if it were only in *the Reſemblance* of the two Sides of the ſame *Robe*, and in *ſome general Aptitude* to the human Form. The *Pictiſh Painting* had always *relative Beauty*, by Reſemblance

Sect. 6. to other Objects, and often those Objects were *originally beautiful:* however justly we might here apply HORACE's Censure of impertinent Descriptions in *Poetry*,

Sed non erat his locus——*.

But never were any so extravagant as to affect such Figures as are made by *the casual spilling* of liquid Colours. Who was ever pleas'd with an *Inequality* of Heights in *Windows* of the same Range, or *dissimilar Shapes* of them? with *unequal Legs* or *Arms*, *Eyes* or *Cheeks* in a *Mistress?* It must however be acknowledg'd, "That *Interest* may "often counterbalance our *Sense of Beauty*, "in this Affair as well as in others, and su- "perior good Qualities may make us over- "look such Imperfections."

Real Beauty alone pleases.

V. NAY farther, it may perhaps appear, "That *Regularity* and *Uniformity* are so co- "piously diffus'd thro' the *Universe*, and we "are so readily determin'd to pursue *this* as "the Foundation of *Beauty* in *Works* of *Art*, "that there is scarcely any thing ever fan- "cy'd as *Beautiful*, where there is not really "something of this *Uniformity* and *Regula- "rity*." We are indeed often mistaken in imagining that there is the greatest possible *Beauty*, where it is but very imperfect; but

* Hor. de Arte Poet. v. 19.

still

ſtill it is ſome Degree of *Beauty* which pleaſes, altho' there may be higher Degrees which we do not obſerve; and our *Senſe* acts with full Regularity when we are pleas'd, altho' we are kept by a falſe Prejudice from purſuing Objects which would pleaſe us more. Sect. 6.

A GOTH, for inſtance, is miſtaken, when from Education he imagines the *Architecture* of his Country to be the moſt perfect: and a *Conjunction* of ſome *hoſtile Ideas*, may make him have an Averſion to *Roman Buildings*, and ſtudy to demoliſh them, as ſome of our *Reformers* did the *Popiſh Buildings*, not being able to ſeparate the Ideas of the ſuperſtitious Worſhip from the Forms of the Buildings where it was practiſed: and yet it is ſtill *real Beauty* which pleaſes the GOTH, founded upon *Uniformity amidſt Variety*. For the *Gothick Pillars* are *uniform* to each other, not only in their *Sections*, which are *Lozenge-form'd*; but alſo in their *Heights* and *Ornaments*: Their *Arches* are not one *uniform Curve*, but yet they are *Segments* of *ſimilar Curves*, and generally equal in the ſame Ranges. The very *Indian Buildings* have ſome kind of *Uniformity*, and many of the EASTERN NATIONS, tho' they differ much from us, yet have great *Regularity* in their Manner, as well as the ROMANS in theirs. Our *Indian Screens*, which wonderfully ſupply our Imaginations with Ideas of

Sect. 6. Deformity, in which *Nature* is very churliſh and ſparing, do want indeed all the *Beauty* ariſing from Proportion of Parts, and Conformity to *Nature*; and yet they cannot diveſt themſelves of all *Beauty* and *Uniformity* in the ſeparate Parts: And this diverſifying the human Body into various Contortions, may give ſome wild Pleaſure from *Variety*, ſince ſome *Uniformity* to the human Shape is ſtill retained.

Hiſtory pleaſes in like manner.

VI. THERE is one ſort of *Beauty* which might perhaps have been better mention'd before, but will not be impertinent here, becauſe the Taſte or Reliſh of it is *univerſal* in all Nations, and with the Young as well as the Old, and that is the *Beauty* of *Hiſtory*. Every one knows how dull a Study it is to read over a Collection of *Gazettes*, which ſhall perhaps relate all the ſame Events with the *Hiſtorian*: The ſuperior Pleaſure then of *Hiſtory* muſt ariſe, like that of *Poetry*, from the *Manners*; when we ſee a *Character* well drawn, wherein we find the ſecret Cauſes of a great Diverſity of ſeemingly inconſiſtent Actions; or an *Intereſt of State* laid open, or an *artful View* nicely unfolded, the Execution of which influences very different and oppoſite Actions as the Circumſtances may alter. Now this reduces the whole to an *Unity* of Deſign at leaſt: And this may be obſerv'd in the very Fables which entertain Children, otherwiſe we cannot make them reliſh them.

VII.

Sect. 6.

VII. WHAT has been ſaid will probably be aſſented to, if we always remember in our Inquiries into the *Univerſality* of the *Senſe of Beauty*, " That there may be *real* " *Beauty*, where there is not the *greateſt*; " and that there are an Infinity of different " Forms which may all have ſome *Unity*, " and yet differ from each other." So that Men may have different Fancies of *Beauty*, and yet *Uniformity* be the *univerſal Foundation* of our Approbation of any Form whatſoever as *Beautiful*. And we ſhall find that it is ſo in the *Architecture*, *Gardening*, *Dreſs*, *Equipage*, and *Furniture* of Houſes, even among the moſt uncultivated Nations; where *Uniformity* ſtill pleaſes, without any other Advantage than the Pleaſure of the Contemplation of it.

Diverſity of Judgments concerning our Senſes.

VIII. IT will deſerve our Conſideration on this Subject, how, in like Caſes, we form very different Judgments concerning the *internal* and *external Senſes*. Nothing is more ordinary among thoſe, who after Mr. LOCKE have rejected *innate Ideas*, than to alledge, " That all our Reliſh for *Beauty* and *Or-* " *der*, is either from Proſpect of *Advantage*, " *Cuſtom*, or *Education*," for no other Reaſon but the *Variety* of *Fancies* in the World: and from this they conclude, " That our " *Fancies* do not ariſe from any *natural Pow-* " *er of Perception*, or *Senſe*." And yet all

Sect. 6. allow our *external Senſes* to be *Natural*, and that the Pleaſures or Pains of their Senſations, however they may be increas'd or diminiſh'd by *Cuſtom* or *Education*, and counterbalanc'd by *Intereſt*, yet are really antecedent to *Cuſtom*, *Habit*, *Education*, or Proſpect of *Intereſt*. Now it is certain, "That there is "at leaſt as great a Variety of Fancies about "their Objects, as the Objects of *Beauty*:" Nay, it is much more difficult, and perhaps impoſſible, to bring the Fancies or Reliſhes of the *external Senſes* to any general Foundation at all, or to find any Rule for the *Agreeable* or *Diſagreeable*: and yet we all allow, "that theſe are *natural* Powers of *Per-* "*ception*."

The Reaſon of it. IX. THE Reaſon of this different Judgment can be no other than this, That we have got diſtinct Names for the *external Senſes*, and none, or very few, for the *Internal*; and by this are led, as in many other Caſes, to look upon the former as ſome way more *fix'd*, and *real*, and *natural*, than the latter. The *Senſe* of *Harmony* has got its Name, *viz.* a *good Ear*; and we are generally brought to acknowledge this a *natural* Power of *Perception*, or *a Senſe* ſome way diſtinct from *Hearing*: now it is certain, "That there is as neceſſary a Perception "of *Beauty* upon the Preſence of *regular* "*Objects*, as of *Harmony* upon hearing cer- "tain *Sounds*."

X. BUT

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X. But let it be obſerv'd here once for all, "That an *internal Senſe* no more pre-"ſuppoſes an *innate Idea*, or Principle of "Knowledge, than the *external*." Both are *natural* Powers of *Perception*, or *Determinations* of *the Mind* to receive neceſſarily certain Ideas from the Preſence of Objects. The *Internal Senſe* is, a *paſſive Power of receiving Ideas of Beauty from all Objects in which there is Uniformity amidſt Variety*. Nor does there ſeem any thing more difficult in this matter, than that the Mind ſhould be always determin'd to receive the Idea of *Sweet*, when Particles of ſuch a Form enter the Pores of the Tongue; or to have the Idea of *Sound* upon any quick Undulation of the Air. The one ſeems to have as little Connection with its Idea, as the other: And the *ſame Power* could with equal Eaſe conſtitute the former the Occaſion of Ideas, as the latter.

An internal Senſe does not preſuppoſe innate Ideas.

XI. The *Aſſociation* of Ideas * above hinted at, is one great Cauſe of the apparent Diverſity of Fancies in the *Senſe of Beauty*, as well as in the *external Senſes*; and often makes Men have an Averſion to Objects of *Beauty*, and a Liking to others void of it, but under different Conceptions than thoſe of *Beauty* or *Deformity*. And here it may not be improper to give ſome Inſtances of ſome

Aſſociations Cauſe of Diſagreement.

* See above *Art.* 3. of this Section.

Sect. 6. of theſe *Aſſociations*. The *Beauty* of *Trees*, their *cool Shades*, and their *Aptneſs* to conceal from Obſervation, have made *Groves* and *Woods* the uſual Retreat to thoſe who love *Solitude*, eſpecially to the *Religious*, the *Penſive*, the *Melancholy*, and the *Amorous*. And do not we find that we have ſo join'd the Ideas of theſe Diſpoſitions of Mind with thoſe external Objects, that they always recur to us along with them? The Cunning of the *Heathen Prieſts* might make ſuch obſcure Places the Scene of the fictitious Appearances of their *Deities*; and hence we join Ideas of ſomething *Divine* to them. We know the like Effect in the Ideas of our *Churches*, from the perpetual Uſe of them only in *religious Exerciſes*. The faint Light in *Gothick Buildings* has had the ſame Aſſociation of a very foreign Idea, which our *Poet* ſhews in his *Epithet*.

——*A dim religious Light* *.

In like manner it is known, That often all the Circumſtances of *Actions*, or *Places*, or *Dreſſes* of Perſons, or *Voice*, or *Song*, which have occurr'd at any time together, when we were ſtrongly affected by any Paſſion, will be ſo connected that any one of theſe will make all the reſt recur. And this is often the occaſion both of great Pleaſure

* Milt. Il Penſeroſo.

and

and Pain, Delight and Averſion to many Objects, which of themſelves might have been perfectly indifferent to us: but theſe *Approbations*, or *Diſtaſtes*, are remote from the Ideas of *Beauty*, being plainly different Ideas. Sect. 6.

XII. THERE is alſo another Charm in *Muſick* to various Perſons, which is diſtinct from the *Harmony*, and is occaſion'd by its raiſing agreeable Paſſions. The *human Voice* is obviouſly vary'd by all the ſtronger Paſſions; now, when our *Ear* diſcerns any Reſemblance between the *Air* of a *Tune*, whether ſung or play'd upon an Inſtrument, either in its *Time*, or *Modulation*, or any other Circumſtance, to the Sound of the *human Voice*, in any Paſſion, we ſhall be touch'd by it in a very ſenſible manner, and have *Melancholy*, *Joy*, *Gravity*, *Thoughtfulneſs*, excited in us by a ſort of *Sympathy* or *Contagion*. The ſame Connexion is obſervable between the very *Air* of a *Tune*, and the *Words* expreſſing any Paſſion which we have heard it fitted to, ſo that they ſhall both recur to us together, tho' but one of them affects our *Senſes*. *Muſick, how it pleaſes differently.*

NOW in ſuch a Diverſity of pleaſing or diſpleaſing Ideas, which may be join'd with Forms of *Bodies*, or *Tunes*, when Men are of ſuch different Diſpoſitions, and prone to ſuch a Variety of Paſſions, it is no Wonder, "that "they ſhould often diſagree in their Fancies

"of

Sect. 6. " of Objects, even altho' their *Senſe of Beau-*
" *ty* and *Harmony* were *perfectly uniform*;"
becauſe many other Ideas may either pleaſe or diſpleaſe, according to Perſons Tempers, and paſt Circumſtances. We know how agreeable a very *wild Country* may be to any Perſon who has ſpent the chearful Days of his Youth in it, and how diſagreeable very *beautiful Places* may be, if they were the Scenes of his Miſery. And this may help us in many Caſes to account for the Diverſities of Fancy, without denying the *Uniformity* of our *internal Senſe of Beauty*.

XIII. GRANDEUR and *Novelty* are two Ideas different from *Beauty*, which often recommend Objects to us. The Reaſon of this is foreign to the preſent Subject. See *Spectator*, N° 412.

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SECT. VII.

Of the Power of Cuſtom, Education, *and* Example, *as to our* internal Senſes.

I. CUSTOM, *Education*, and *Example* are ſo often alledg'd in this Affair, as the Occaſion of our Reliſh for *beautiful Objects*, and for our Approbation of, or Delight in, a certain *Conduct in Life* in a *moral* Species, that it is neceſſary to examine theſe three particularly, to make it appear, "that there is a *natural* Power of *Perception*, or *Senſe of Beauty* in Objects, antecedent to all *Cuſtom*, *Education*, or *Example*."

Cuſtom gives no new Senſe.

II. CUSTOM, as diſtinct from the other two, operates in this manner. As to Actions, it only gives a Diſpoſition to the Mind or Body more eaſily to perform thoſe Actions which have been frequently repeated; but never leads us to apprehend them under any other View, than what we were capable of apprehending them under at firſt; nor gives us any new Power of Perception about them. We are naturally capable of Sentiments of *Fear*, and *Dread* of any powerful *Preſence*; and ſo *Cuſtom* may connect the Ideas of religious

Sect. 7. gious *Horror* to certain Buildings: but *Cuſtom* could never have made a *Being* naturally incapable of *Fear*, receive ſuch Ideas. So, had we no other Power of perceiving, or forming Ideas of Actions, but as they were *advantageous* or *diſadvantageous*, *Cuſtom* could only have made us more ready at perceiving the *Advantage* or *Diſadvantage* of Actions. But this is not to our preſent Purpoſe.

As to our Approbation of, or Delight in external Objects; When the *Blood* or *Spirits*, of which *Anatomiſts* talk, are rous'd, quicken'd, or fermented as they call it, in any agreeable manner, by Medicine or Nutriment; or any *Glands* frequently ſtimulated to Secretion; it is certain, that to preſerve the Body eaſy, we ſhall delight in Objects of Taſte, which of themſelves are not immediately pleaſant to it, if they promote that agreeable State, which the Body had been *accuſtom'd* to. Farther, *Cuſtom* will ſo alter the State of the Body, that what at firſt rais'd uneaſy Senſations, will ceaſe to do ſo, or perhaps raiſe another agreeable Idea of the ſame Senſe; but *Cuſtom* can never give us any Idea of a Senſe different from thoſe we had antecedent to it: It will never make the *Blind* approve Objects as *coloured*, or thoſe who have no *Taſte* approve Meats as *delicious*, however they might approve them as *ſtrengthning* or *exhilarating*. Were our *Glands* and the Parts about them, void of Feeling, did we

perceive no Pleaſure from certain briſker Motions in the *Blood*, *Cuſtom* could never make ſtimulating or intoxicating Fluids or Medicines agreeable, when they were not ſo to the Taſte: So, by like Reaſoning, had we no *natural Senſe* of *Beauty* from *Uniformity*, *Cuſtom* could never have made us imagine any *Beauty* in Objects; if we had had no Ear, Cuſtom could never have given us the Pleaſures of *Harmony*. When we have theſe *natural Senſes* antecedently, *Cuſtom* may make us capable of extending our Views farther, and of receiving more complex Ideas of *Beauty* in Bodies, or *Harmony* in Sounds, by increaſing our Attention, and Quickneſs of Perception. But however *Cuſtom* may increaſe our Power of receiving or comparing complex Ideas, yet it ſeems rather to weaken than ſtrengthen the Ideas of *Beauty*, or the Impreſſions of Pleaſure from regular Objects; elſe how is it poſſible that any Perſon could go into the open Air on a ſunny Day, or clear Evening, without the moſt extravagant Raptures, ſuch as MILTON * repreſents our *Anceſtor* in, upon his firſt Creation? For ſuch any Perſon would certainly fall into, upon the firſt Repreſentation of ſuch a Scene. Sect. 7.

CUSTOM in like manner may make it eaſier for any Perſon to diſcern the Uſe of

* See *Paradiſe Loſt*, Book 8.

Sect. 7. a complex Machine, and approve it as *advantageous*; but he would never have imagin'd it *beautiful*, had he no *natural Senſe* of *Beauty*. *Cuſtom* may make us quicker in apprehending the Truth of complex *Theorems*, but we all find the Pleaſure or *Beauty* of *Theorems* as ſtrong at firſt as ever. *Cuſtom* makes us more capable of retaining and comparing complex Ideas, ſo as to diſcern more complicated *Uniformity*, which eſcapes the Obſervation of *Novices* in any Art; but all this preſuppoſes a *natural Senſe* of *Beauty* in *Uniformity*: for, had there been nothing in Forms, which was conſtituted the neceſſary Occaſion of Pleaſure to our Senſes, no Repetition of indifferent Ideas as to Pleaſure or Pain, *Beauty* or *Deformity*, could ever have made them grow pleaſing or diſpleaſing.

Nor Education.

III. The Effect of Education is this, that thereby we receive many ſpeculative Opinions, which are ſometimes true, and ſometimes falſe; and are often led to believe, that Objects may be naturally apt to give Pleaſure or Pain to our external Senſes, which in reality have no ſuch Qualities. And farther, by *Education* there are ſome ſtrong Aſſociations of Ideas without any Reaſon, by mere Accident ſometimes, as well as by Deſign, which it is very hard for us ever after to break aſunder. Thus Averſions are rais'd to Darkneſs, and to many kinds of Meat, and to certain innocent Actions: Approbations

probations without Ground are rais'd in like manner. But in all theſe Inſtances, *Education* never makes us apprehend any Qualities in Objects, which we have not *naturally* Senſes capable of perceiving. We know what Sickneſs of the Stomach is, and may without Ground believe, that very healthful Meats will raiſe this; we by our Sight and Smell receive diſagreeable Ideas of the Food of Swine, and their Styes, and perhaps cannot prevent the recurring of theſe Ideas at Table: but never were Men naturally *blind* prejudic'd againſt Objects as of a diſagreeable Colour, or in favour of others as of a beautiful Colour; they perhaps hear Men diſpraiſe one Colour, and may imagine this Colour to be ſome quite different ſenſible Quality of the other Senſes, but that is all. And the ſame way, a Man naturally void of *Taſte* could by no *Education* receive the Ideas of Taſte, or be prejudic'd in favour of Meats as delicious: So, had we no *natural Senſe* of *Beauty* and *Harmony*, we could never be prejudic'd in favour of Objects or Sounds as *beautiful* or *harmonious*. *Education* may make an unattentive GOTH imagine that his *Countrymen* have attain'd the Perfection of *Architecture*; and an Averſion to their Enemies the ROMANS, may have join'd ſome diſagreeable Ideas to their very Buildings, and excited them to their Demolition; but he had never form'd theſe Prejudices, had he been void of a *Senſe* of *Beauty*. Did ever Sect. 7.

Sect. 7. *blind Men* debate whether *Purple* or *Scarlet* were the finer *Colour?* or could any *Education* prejudice them in favour of either as *Colours?*

THUS *Education* and *Cuſtom* may influence our *internal Senſes*, where they are antecedently, by inlarging the Capacity of our Minds to retain and compare the Parts of complex Compoſitions: And then, if the fineſt Objects are preſented to us, we grow conſcious of a Pleaſure far ſuperior to what common Performances excite. But all this preſuppoſes our *Senſe* of *Beauty* to be *natural.* Inſtruction in *Anatomy*, Obſervation of *Nature*, and of thoſe *Airs* of the Countenance, and *Attitudes* of Body, which accompany any *Sentiment*, *Action*, or *Paſſion*, may enable us to know where there is a juſt Imitation: but why ſhould an exact Imitation pleaſe upon Obſervation, if we had not *naturally* a *Senſe* of *Beauty* in it, more than the obſerving the Situation of fifty or a hundred Pebbles thrown at random? and ſhould we obſerve them ever ſo often, we ſhould never dream of their growing *beautiful.*

Prejudices how removed.

IV. THERE is ſomething worth our Obſervation as to the manner of rooting out the *Prejudices* of *Education*, not quite foreign to the preſent Purpoſe. When the *Prejudice* ariſes from Aſſociations of Ideas without any natural Connection, we muſt frequently force

ourſelves to bear Repreſentations of thoſe Objects, or the Uſe of them when ſeparated from the diſagreeable Idea; and this may at laſt disjoin the unreaſonable Aſſociation, eſpecially if we can join new agreeable Ideas to them: Thus, Opinions of *Superſtition* are beſt remov'd by pleaſant Converſation of Perſons we eſteem for their *Virtue*, or by obſerving that they deſpiſe ſuch Opinions. But when the *Prejudice* ariſes from an Apprehenſion or Opinion of *natural Evil*, as the Attendant, or Conſequent of any Object or Action; if the *Evil* be apprehended to be the conſtant and immediate Attendant, a few Trials, without receiving any Damage, will remove the *Prejudice*, as in that againſt *Meats:* But where the *Evil* is not repreſented as the perpetual Concomitant, but as what may poſſibly or probably at ſome time or other accompany the Uſe of the Object, there muſt be frequent Reaſoning with ourſelves, or a long Series of Trials without any Detriment, to remove the *Prejudice*; ſuch is the Caſe of our Fear of *Spirits* in the *Dark*, and in *Church-yards*. And when the *Evil* is repreſented as the Conſequence perhaps a long time after, or in a *future State*, it is then hardeſt of all to remove the *Prejudice*; and this is only to be effected by ſlow Proceſſes of Reaſon, becauſe in this Caſe there can be no Trials made: and this is the Caſe of *ſuperſtitious Prejudices* againſt Actions apprehended as offenſive to the DEITY; and Sect. 7.

Sect. 7. hence it is that they are ſo hard to be rooted out.

Example not the Cauſe of internal Senſe.

V. EXAMPLE ſeems to operate in this manner. We are conſcious that we act very much for *Pleaſure*, or *private Good*; and are thereby led to imagine that others do ſo too: hence we conclude there muſt be ſome *Perfection* in the Objects which we ſee others purſue, and *Evil* in thoſe which we obſerve them conſtantly ſhunning. Or, the *Example* of others may ſerve to us as ſo many Trials to remove the Apprehenſion of *Evil* in Objects to which we had an Averſion. But all this is done upon an Apprehenſion of Qualities perceivable by the Senſes which we have; for no *Example* will induce the *Blind* or *Deaf* to purſue Objects as *colour'd* or *ſonorous*; nor could *Example* any more engage us to purſue Objects as *beautiful* or *harmonious*, had we no *natural Senſe* of *Beauty* or *Harmony*.

EXAMPLE may make us conclude without Examination, that our Countrymen have obtain'd the Perfection of *Beauty* in their *Works*, or that there is leſs *Beauty* in the Orders of *Architecture* or *Painting*, us'd in other *Nations*, and ſo content ourſelves with very imperfect Forms. And Fear of Contempt as void of *Taſte* or *Genius*, often makes us join in approving the Performances of the reputed Maſters in our Country, and reſtrains thoſe

thoſe who have *naturally* a fine *Genius*, or the *internal Senſes* very acute, from ſtudying to obtain the greateſt Perfection; it makes alſo thoſe of a bad *Taſte* pretend to a livelier Perception of *Beauty* than in reality they have: But all this preſuppoſes ſome *natural Power* of receiving Ideas of *Beauty* and *Harmony*. Nor can *Example* effect any thing farther, unleſs it be to lead Men to purſue Objects by implicit Faith, for ſome Perfection which the Purſuer is conſcious he does not know, or which perhaps is ſome very different Quality from the Idea perceiv'd by thoſe of a good *Taſte* in ſuch Affairs. Sect. 7.

SECT. VIII.

Of the Importance *of the* internal Senſes *in Life, and the* final Cauſes *of them.*

Importance of the internal Senſes.

I. THE buſy part of Mankind may look upon theſe things as airy Dreams of an inflam'd Imagination, which a wiſe Man ſhould deſpiſe, who rationally purſues more ſolid Poſſeſſions independent on Fancy: but a little Reflection will convince us, "That the Gratifications of our *internal* "*Senſes* are as *natural*, *real*, and *ſatisfying* "Enjoyments as any ſenſible Pleaſure what-"ſoever; and that they are the chief Ends "for which we commonly purſue *Wealth* "and *Power*." For how is *Wealth* or *Power advantageous?* How do they make us *happy*, or prove *good* to us? No otherwiſe than as they ſupply Gratifications to our *Senſes*, or Faculties of perceiving Pleaſure. Now, are theſe *Senſes* or Faculties only the *external ones?* No: Every body ſees, that a ſmall portion of *Wealth* or *Power* will ſupply more Pleaſures of the *external Senſes* than we can enjoy; we know that Scarcity often heightens theſe Perceptions more than Abundance, which cloys that Appetite which is neceſſary to all Pleaſure in Enjoyment: and hence

hence the *Poet*'s Advice is perfectly juſt; Sect. 8.

——*Tu pulmentaria quære*
Sudando—— *

In ſhort, the only Uſe of a great Fortune above a very ſmall one (except in *good Offices*, and *moral Pleaſures*) muſt be to ſupply us with the Pleaſures of *Beauty*, *Order*, and *Harmony*.

It is true indeed, that the nobleſt Pleaſures of the *internal Senſes*, in the Contemplation of the Works of *Nature*, are expos'd to every one without Expence; the *Poor* and the *Low*, may have as free Uſe of theſe Objects, in this way, as the *Wealthy* or *Powerful*. And even in Objects which may be appropriated, the *Property* is of little Conſequence to the Enjoyment of their Beauty, which is often enjoy'd by others beſide the *Proprietor*. But then there are other Objects of theſe *internal Senſes*, which require *Wealth* or *Power* to procure the Uſe of them as frequently as we deſire; as appears in *Architecture*, *Muſick*, *Gardening*, *Painting*, *Dreſs*, *Equipage*, *Furniture*; of which we cannot have the full Enjoyment without *Property*. And there are ſome confus'd *Imaginations*, which often lead us to purſue

* Hor. Lib. 2. Sat. 2. v. 20.

Sect. 8. *Property*, even in Objects where it is not neceſſary to the true Enjoyment of them. Theſe are the *ultimate Motives* of our purſuing the greater Degrees of *Wealth*, where there are no generous Intentions of virtuous Actions.

THIS is confirm'd by the conſtant Practice of the very Enemies to theſe *Senſes*. As ſoon as they think they are got above the *World*, or extricated from the Hurries of *Avarice* and *Ambition*; baniſh'd *Nature* will return upon them, and ſet them upon Purſuits of *Beauty* and *Order* in their *Houſes*, *Gardens*, *Dreſs*, *Table*, *Equipage*. They are never eaſy without ſome Degree of this; and were their Hearts open to our View, we ſhould ſee *Regularity*, *Decency*, *Beauty*, as what their Wiſhes terminate upon, either to themſelves or to their Poſterity; and what their Imagination is always preſenting to them as the poſſible Effects of their Labours. Nor without this could they ever juſtify their Purſuits to themſelves.

THERE may perhaps be ſome Inſtances of human Nature perverted into a thorow *Miſer*, who loves nothing but Money, and whoſe Fancy ariſes no higher than the cold dull Thought of Poſſeſſion; but ſuch an Inſtance in an Age, muſt not be made the Standard of Mankind againſt the whole Body.

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IF we examine the Purſuits of the *Luxurious*, who is imagin'd wholly devoted to his Belly; we ſhall generally find that the far greater part of his Expence is employ'd to procure other Senſations than thoſe of Taſte; ſuch as *fine Attendants*, *regular Apartments*, *Services of Plate*, and the like. Beſides, a large Share of the Preparation muſt be ſuppos'd deſign'd for ſome ſort of generous friendly Purpoſes, to pleaſe *Acquaintance*, *Strangers*, *Paraſites*. How few would be contented to enjoy the ſame Senſations alone, in a Cottage, or out of earthen Pitchers? To conclude this Point, however theſe *internal Senſations* may be overlook'd in our Philoſophical Inquiries about the human Faculties, we ſhall find in Fact, "That they "employ us more, and are more efficacious "in *Life*, either to our *Pleaſure* or *Uneaſineſs*, than all our *external Senſes* taken "together."

II. As to the *final Cauſes* of this *internal Senſe*, we need not inquire, "Whether, to "an *Almighty*, and *All-knowing Being*, there "be any real Excellence in *regular Forms*, "in acting by *general Laws*, in knowing by "*Theorems?*" We ſeem ſcarce capable of anſwering ſuch Queſtions any way; nor need we inquire, "Whether other Animals may "not diſcern *Uniformity* and *Regularity* in "Objects which eſcape our Obſervation, and "may

Final Cauſe of the internal Senſes.

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" tuted ſo as to perceive *Beauty* from the
" ſame Foundation which we do, in Objects
" which our Senſes are not fit to examine
" or compare?" We ſhall confine ourſelves to a Subject where we have ſome certain Foundation to go upon, and only inquire, " if we can find any Reaſons worthy of the " great AUTHOR of *Nature*, for making " ſuch a Connection between regular Ob- " jects, and the Pleaſure which accompanies " our Perceptions of them; or, what Rea- " ſons might poſſibly influence him to create " the *World*, as it at preſent is, as far as we " can obſerve, every-where full of *Regularity* " and *Uniformity*."

LET it be here obſerv'd, that as far as we know concerning any of the great Bodies of the *Univerſe* we ſee Forms and Motions really *beautiful* to our Senſes; and if we were plac'd in any *Planet*, the *apparent Courſes* would ſtill be *regular* and *uniform*, and conſequently *beautiful* to us. Now this gives us no ſmall Ground to imagine, that if the Senſes of their Inhabitants are in the ſame manner adapted to their Habitations, and the Objects occurring to their View, as ours are here, their Senſes muſt be upon the ſame general Foundation with ours.

BUT to return to the Queſtions: What occurs to reſolve them, may be contain'd in the following Propoſitions. 1. THE

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1. The Manner of Knowledge by *univerſal Theorems*, and of Operation by *univerſal Cauſes*, as far as we can attain it, muſt be moſt convenient for *Beings* of limited Underſtanding and Power; ſince this prevents Diſtraction in their Underſtandings thro' the Multiplicity of Propoſitions, and Toil and Wearineſs to their Powers of Action: and conſequently their *Reaſon*, without any *Senſe* of *Beauty*, muſt approve of ſuch Methods when they reflect upon their apparent *Advantage*.

2. Thoſe Objects of Contemplation in which there is *Uniformity amidſt Variety*, are more diſtinctly and eaſily comprehended and retain'd, than *irregular Objects*; becauſe the accurate Obſervation of one or two Parts often leads to the Knowledge of the Whole: Thus we can from a *Pillar* or two, with an intermediate *Arch*, and *Cornice*, form a diſtinct Idea of a whole *regular Building*, if we know of what Species it is, and have its Length and Breadth: From a *Side* and *ſolid Angle*, we have the whole *regular Solid*; the meaſuring one *Side*, gives the whole *Square*; one *Radius*, the whole *Circle*; two *Diameters*, an *Oval*; one *Ordinate* and *Abſciſſa*, the *Parabola*; thus alſo other Figures, if they have any Regularity, are in every Point determin'd from a few *Data*: Whereas it muſt be a long Attention to a vaſt Multiplicity

Sect. 8. tiplicity of Parts, which can aſcertain or fix the Idea of any *irregular Form*, or give any diſtinct Idea of it, or make us capable of retaining it; as appears in the Forms of *rude Rocks*, and *Pebbles*, and *confus'd Heaps*, even when the Multitude of ſenſible Parts is not ſo great as in the *regular Forms*: for ſuch *irregular Objects* diſtract the *Mind* with *Variety*, ſince for every ſenſible Part we muſt have a quite different Idea.

3. FROM theſe two Propoſitions it follows, "That *Beings* of limited Underſtanding and Power, if they act rationally for their own *Intereſt*, muſt chooſe to operate by the *ſimpleſt Means*, to invent *general Theorems*, and to ſtudy *regular Objects*, if they be as uſeful as *irregular ones*; that they may avoid the endleſs Toil of producing each Effect by a ſeparate Operation, of ſearching out each different Truth by a different Inquiry, and of imprinting the endleſs *Variety* of diſſimilar Ideas in *irregular Objects*."

4. BUT then, beſide this Conſideration of *Intereſt*, there does not appear to be any neceſſary Connection, antecedent to the Conſtitution of the AUTHOR of *Nature*, between *regular Forms*, *Actions*, *Theorems*, and that ſudden ſenſible *Pleaſure* excited in us upon Obſervation of them, even when we do not reflect upon the Advantage mention'd in

in the former Propoſition. And poſſibly, the DEITY could have form'd us ſo as to have receiv'd no immediate Pleaſure from ſuch Object, or connected Pleaſure to thoſe of a quite contrary Nature. We have a tolerable Preſumption of this in the *Beauties* of various Animals; they give ſome ſmall Pleaſure indeed to every one who views them; but then every one ſeems far more delighted with the peculiar *Beauties* of its own *Species*, than with thoſe of a different one, which ſeldom raiſe any Deſire *. This makes it probable, that the *Pleaſure* is not the neceſſary Reſult of the *Form* itſelf, otherwiſe it would equally affect all Apprehenſions in what Species ſoever; but depends upon a voluntary *Conſtitution*, adapted to preſerve the *Regularity* of the *Univerſe*, and is probably not the Effect of *Neceſſity*, but *Choice*, in the SUPREME AGENT, who conſtituted our *Senſes*. Sect. 8.

5. NOW from the whole we may conclude, "That ſuppoſing the DEITY ſo *kind* "as to connect *ſenſible Pleaſure* with certain "Actions or Contemplations, beſide the "*rational Advantage* perceivable in them; "there is a great *moral Neceſſity*, from his "*Goodneſs*, that the *internal Senſe* of Men "ſhould be conſtituted as it is at preſent, ſo *From the divine Goodneſs.*

* See *Cicero de Nat. Deor.* lib. i. c. 27.

"as

Sect. 8. " as to make *Uniformity amidſt Variety* the " Occaſion of Pleaſure." For were it not ſo, but on the contrary, if *irregular Objects*, *particular Truths* and *Operations* pleaſed us, beſide the endleſs Toil this would involve us in, there muſt ariſe a perpetual Diſſatisfaction in all rational Agents with themſelves; ſince *Reaſon* and *Intereſt* would lead us to ſimple *general Cauſes*, while a *contrary Senſe* of *Beauty* would make us diſapprove them: *Univerſal Theorems* would appear to our Underſtanding the beſt Means of increaſing our Knowledge of what might be uſeful; while a *contrary Senſe* would ſet us on the ſearch after *particular Truths*: *Thought* and *Reflection* would recommend Objects with *Uniformity amidſt Variety*, and yet this *perverſe Inſtinct* would involve us in Labyrinths of *Confuſion* and *Diſſimilitude*. And hence we ſee " how ſuitable it is to the *ſagacious Boun-* " *ty*, which we ſuppoſe in the DEITY, to " conſtitute our *internal Senſes* in the manner " in which they are; by which Pleaſure is " join'd to the Contemplation of *thoſe Objects* " which a finite *Mind* can beſt imprint and " retain the Ideas of with the leaſt Diſtrac- " tion; to *thoſe Actions* which are moſt effi- " cacious, and fruitful in uſeful Effects; and " to *thoſe Theorems* which moſt inlarge our " *Minds*."

Reaſon of general Laws.

III. As to the other Queſtion, " What " Reaſon might influence the DEITY, whom " no

" no Diverſity of Operation could diſtract or Sect. 8.
" weary, to chooſe to operate by *ſimpleſt*
" *Means*, and *general Laws*, and to diffuſe
" *Uniformity*, *Proportion*, and *Similitude*
" thro' all the Parts of *Nature* which we
" can obſerve?" Perhaps there may be ſome real Excellence in this Manner of Operation, and in theſe Forms, which we know not: but this we may probably ſay, that ſince the *divine Goodneſs*, for the Reaſons above-mention'd, has conſtituted our *Senſe* of *Beauty* as it is at preſent, the ſame *Goodneſs* might have determined the *Great* ARCHITECT to adorn this ſtupendous *Theatre* in a manner agreeable to the Spectators, and that Part which is expos'd to the Obſervation of Men, ſo as to be pleaſant to them; eſpecially if we ſuppoſe, that he deſign'd to diſcover himſelf to them as *Wiſe* and *Good*, as well as *Powerful*: for thus he has given them greater Evidences, thro' the whole *Earth*, of his *Art*, *Wiſdom*, *Deſign*, and *Bounty*, than they can poſſibly have for the *Reaſon*, *Counſel*, and *Good-will* of their Fellow-Creatures, with whom they converſe, with full Perſuaſion of theſe Qualities in them, about their common Affairs.

As to the Operations of the DEITY by *general Laws*, there is ſtill a farther Reaſon from a *Senſe* ſuperior to theſe already conſider'd, even that of VIRTUE, or the *Beauty* of *Action*, which is the Foundation of our greateſt

Sect. 8. greateſt Happineſs. For were there no *general Laws* fix'd in the Courſe of *Nature*, there could be no *Prudence* or *Deſign* in Men, no *rational Expectation* of Effects from Cauſes, no *Schemes* of Action projected, or any *regular Execution*. If then, according to the *Frame* of our *Nature*, our greateſt Happineſs muſt depend upon our Actions, as it may perhaps be made appear it does, "the *Univerſe* muſt be govern'd, not by "*particular Wills*, but by *general Laws*, "upon which we can found our Expecta-"tions, and project our Schemes of Action." Nay farther, tho' *general Laws* did ordinarily obtain, yet if the DEITY uſually ſtopp'd their Effects whenever it was neceſſary to prevent any particular Evils; this would effectually and juſtly ſuperſede all human *Prudence* and *Care* about Actions; ſince a ſuperior *Mind* did thus relieve Men from their Charge.

TREA-

TREATISE II.

AN

INQUIRY

CONCERNING

MORAL GOOD *and* EVIL.

INTRODUCTION.

THE Word MORAL GOODNESS, in this Treatiſe, denotes our Idea of *ſome Quality apprehended in Actions, which procures Approbation, attended with Deſire of the Agent's Happineſs.* MORAL EVIL denotes our Idea of *a contrary Quality, which excites Condemnation or Diſlike.* Approbation and Condemnation are probably ſimple Ideas, which cannot be farther explained. We muſt be contented with theſe imperfect Deſcriptions, until we diſcover whether we really have ſuch Ideas, and what general *Foundation* there is in Nature for this Difference of Actions, as *morally Good* or *Evil.* *Moral Good and Evil.*

THESE Deſcriptions ſeem to contain an univerſally acknowledg'd Difference of *Moral*

ral Good and *Evil*, from *Natural*. All Men who ſpeak of *moral Good*, acknowledge that it procures *Approbation* and *Good-will* toward thoſe we apprehend poſſeſs'd of it; whereas *natural Good* does not. In this matter Men muſt conſult their own Breaſts. How differently are they affected toward thoſe they ſuppoſe poſſeſs'd of *Honeſty*, *Faith*, *Generoſity*, *Kindneſs*; and thoſe who are poſſeſs'd of the *natural Goods*, ſuch as *Houſes*, *Lands*, *Gardens*, *Vineyards*, *Health*, *Strength*, *Sagacity*? We ſhall find that we neceſſarily love and approve the Poſſeſſors of the former; but the Poſſeſſion of the latter procures no *Approbation* or *Good-will* at all toward the Poſſeſſor, but often contrary Affections of *Envy* and *Hatred*. In the ſame manner, whatever Quality we apprehend to be *morally evil*, raiſes our Diſlike toward the Perſon in whom we obſerve it, ſuch as *Treachery*, *Cruelty*, *Ingratitude*; whereas we heartily love, eſteem, and pity many who are expos'd to *natural Evils*, ſuch as *Pain*, *Poverty*, *Hunger*, *Sickneſs*, *Death*.

Now the firſt Queſtion on this Subject is, "Whence ariſe theſe different Ideas of "Actions?

Intereſt, Advantage.

Because we ſhall afterwards frequently uſe the Words *Intereſt*, *Advantage*, *natural Good*, it is neceſſary here to fix their Ideas. The Pleaſure in our ſenſible Perceptions of

any kind, gives us our firſt Idea of *natural Good* or *Happineſs*; and then all Objects which are apt to excite this Pleaſure are call'd *immediately good.* Thoſe Objects which may procure others immediately pleaſant, are call'd *Advantageous:* and we purſue both Kinds from a View of *Intereſt*, or from *Self-Love.*

OUR *Senſe* of Pleaſure is antecedent to *Advantage* or *Intereſt*, and is the Foundation of it. We do not perceive Pleaſure in Objects, becauſe it is our *Intereſt* to do ſo; but Objects or Actions are *advantageous*, and are purſu'd or undertaken from *Intereſt*, becauſe we receive *Pleaſure* from them. Our Perception of Pleaſure is neceſſary, and nothing is *advantageous* or *naturally good* to us, but what is apt to raiſe Pleaſure *mediately*, or *immediately.* Such Objects as we know either from Experience of Senſe, or Reaſon, to be *immediately* or *mediately advantageous*, or apt to miniſter Pleaſure, we are ſaid to purſue from *Self-Intereſt*, when our Intention is only to enjoy this Pleaſure, which they have the Power of exciting. Thus *Meats*, *Drink*, *Harmony*, *fine Proſpects*, *Painting*, *Statues*, are perceiv'd by our Senſes to be *immediately good*; and our Reaſon ſhews *Riches* and *Power* to be *mediately ſo*, that is, apt to furniſh us with Objects of immediate Pleaſure: and both Kinds of theſe *natural Goods* are purſu'd from *Intereſt*, or *Self-Love.*

Opinions about our Senſe of moral Good and Evil.

Now the greateſt Part of our latter *Moraliſts* eſtabliſh it as undeniable, " That all " *moral Qualities* have neceſſarily ſome Re- " lation to the *Law* of a *Superior*, of ſuffici- " ent Power to make us *happy* or *miſerable*;" and ſince all *Laws* operate only by Sanctions of *Rewards*, or *Puniſhments*, which determine us to Obedience by Motives of *Self-Intereſt*, they ſuppoſe, " that it is thus that " *Laws* do conſtitute ſome Actions *mediate-* " *ly Good*, or *Advantageous*, and others the " ſame way *diſadvantageous*." They ſay indeed, " That a *benevolent Legiſlator* con- " ſtitutes no Actions *advantageous* to the " Agent by Law, but ſuch as in their own " Nature tend to the *natural Good* of the " *Whole*, or, at leaſt, are not inconſiſtent " with it; and that therefore we approve " the *Virtue* of others, becauſe it has ſome " ſmall Tendency to our *Happineſs*, either " from its own Nature, or from this gene- " ral Conſideration, That Obedience to a " *benevolent Legiſlator* is in general *advan-* " *tageous* to the *Whole*, and to us in particu- " lar; and that for the contrary Reaſons a- " lone, we diſapprove the *Vice* of others, " that is, the prohibited Action, as tending " to our particular *Detriment* in ſome de- " gree." And then they maintain, " That " we are determin'd to Obedience to *Laws*, " or deterr'd from Diſobedience, merely by " Motives

" Motives of *Self-Intereſt*, to obtain either " the *natural Good* ariſing from the com- " manded Action, or the *Rewards* promiſed " by the Sanction: or to avoid the *natural* " *evil* Conſequences of Diſobedience, or at " leaſt the *Penalties* of the *Law*."

Some other Moraliſts ſuppoſe " an *im-* " *mediate natural Good* in the Actions call'd " *virtuous*; that is, That we are determin'd " to perceive ſome *Beauty* in the Actions of " others, and to love the Agent, even with- " out reflecting upon any *Advantage* which " can any way redound to us from the Ac- " tion; that we have alſo a ſecret Senſe of " Pleaſure ariſing from Reflection upon ſuch " of our own Actions as we call *virtuous*, " even when we expect no other *Advantage* " from them." But they alledge at the ſame time, " That we are excited to perform theſe " Actions, even as we purſue, or purchaſe " *Pictures*, *Statues*, *Landſkips*, from *Self-* " *Intereſt*, to obtain this Pleaſure which a- " riſes from Reflection upon the Action, or " ſome other future Advantage." The De- ſign of the following Sections is to inquire into this Matter; and perhaps the Reaſons to be offered may prove,

I. " That ſome Actions have to Men " an *immediate Goodneſs*; or, that by a *ſu-* " *perior Senſe*, which I call a *Moral one*, " we *approve* the Actions of others, and

" perceive them to be their Perfection and " Dignity, and are determin'd to love the " Agent; a like Perception we have in re- " flecting on such Actions of our own, with- " out any View of *natural Advantage* from " them."

II. It may perhaps also appear, " That " the *Affection*, *Desire*, or *Intention*, which " gains *Approbation* to the Actions flowing " from it, is not an Intention to obtain even " this *pleasant Self-Approbation*; much less " the *future Rewards* from Sanctions of " Laws, or any other *natural Good*, which " may be the Consequence of the *virtuous* " Action; but an intirely different Principle " of Action from *Self-Love*, or Desire of " private Good."

SECT.

SECT. I.

Of the Moral Senſe *by which we perceive* Virtue *and* Vice, *and approve or diſapprove them in others.*

Different Ideas of Moral *and* Natural Good.

I. THAT the Perceptions of *moral Good* and *Evil* are perfectly different from thoſe of *natural Good* or *Advantage*, every one muſt convince himſelf, by reflecting upon the different Manner in which he finds himſelf affected when theſe Objects occur to him. Had we no *Senſe* of *Good* diſtinct from the *Advantage* or *Intereſt* ariſing from the external Senſes, and the Perceptions of *Beauty* and *Harmony*; the Senſations and Affections toward a *fruitful Field*, or *commodious Habitation*, would be much the ſame with what we have toward a *generous Friend*, or any *noble Character*; for both are or may be *advantageous* to us: And we ſhould no more admire any Action, or love any Perſon in a diſtant *Country*, or *Age*, whoſe Influence could not extend to us, than we love the *Mountains* of PERU, while we are unconcern'd in the *Spaniſh Trade*. We ſhould have the ſame Sentiments and Affections toward *inanimate Beings*, which we have toward *rational Agents*, which yet every one knows to be falſe. Upon Com-

Sect. 1. pariſon, we ſay, " Why ſhould we approve " or love *inanimate Beings?* They have " no Intention of *Good* to us, or to any o- " ther Perſon; their *Nature* makes them " fit for our Uſes, which they neither know " nor ſtudy to ſerve. But it is not ſo with " *rational Agents:* they ſtudy the *Intereſt*, " and deſire the *Happineſs* of other Beings " with whom they converſe."

We are all then conſcious of the Difference between that *Approbation* or Perception of *moral Excellence*, which *Benevolence* excites toward the Perſon in whom we obſerve it, and that Opinion of *natural Goodneſs*, which only raiſes *Deſire* of Poſſeſſion toward the good Object. Now " what " ſhould make this Difference, if all Appro- " bation, or *Senſe* of *Good* be from Proſpect " of *Advantage?* Do not *inanimate Objects* " promote our *Advantage* as well as *bene-* " *volent Perſons*, who do us Offices of *Kind-* " *neſs* and *Friendſhip?* ſhould we not then " have the ſame endearing Approbation of " both? or only the ſame cold Opinion of " *Advantage* in both?" The Reaſon why it is not ſo, muſt be this, " That we have a " diſtinct Perception of *Beauty* or *Excellence* " in the kind Affections of *rational Agents*; " whence we are determin'd to admire and " love ſuch *Characters* and *Perſons.*"

Sup-

Sect. 1.

In Actions done to ourſelves.

SUPPOSE we reap the ſame *Advantage* from two Men, one of whom ſerves us from an *ultimate Deſire* of our Happineſs, or Good-will toward us; the other from Views of *Self-Intereſt*, or by *Conſtraint:* both are in this Caſe equally beneficial or *advantageous* to us, and yet we ſhall have quite different Sentiments of them. We muſt then certainly have other Perceptions of *moral Actions*, than thoſe of *Advantage:* And that Power of receiving theſe Perceptions may be call'd a MORAL SENSE, ſince the Definition agrees to it, *viz.* a *Determination of the Mind, to receive any Idea from the Preſence of an Object which occurs to us, independent on our Will* *.

Of Evil, Moral and Natural.

THIS perhaps will be equally evident from our Ideas of *Evil*, done to us deſignedly by a *rational Agent*. Our Senſes of *natural Good* and *Evil* would make us receive, with equal Serenity and Compoſure, an *Aſſault*, a *Buffet*, an *Affront* from a *Neighbour*, a *Cheat* from a *Partner*, or *Truſtee*, as we would an equal Damage from the Fall of a *Beam*, a *Tile*, or a *Tempeſt*; and we ſhould have the ſame Affections and Sentiments on both Occaſions. *Villainy*, *Treachery*, *Cruelty*, would be as meekly reſented as a *Blaſt*, or *Mildew*, or an

* *See the Preface, Page* 6.

over-

Sect. 1. *overflowing Stream.* But I fancy every one is very differently affected on theſe Occaſions, tho' there may be equal *natural Evil* in both. Nay, Actions no way detrimental may occaſion the ſtrongeſt Anger and Indignation, if they evidence only impotent Hatred or Contempt. And, on the other hand, the Intervention of *moral Ideas* may prevent our *Condemnation* of the Agent, or bad moral Apprehenſion of that Action, which cauſes to us the greateſt *natural Evil.* Thus the Opinion of *Juſtice* in any Sentence, will prevent all Ideas of *moral Evil* in the Execution, or Hatred toward the *Magiſtrate*, who is the immediate Cauſe of our greateſt Sufferings.

In Actions toward others.

II. In our Sentiments of Actions which affect ourſelves, there is indeed a Mixture of the Ideas of *natural* and *moral Good*, which require ſome Attention to ſeparate them. But when we reflect upon the Actions which affect other Perſons only, we may obſerve the *moral Ideas* unmix'd with thoſe of *natural Good* or *Evil.* For let it be here obſerv'd, that thoſe Senſes by which we perceive Pleaſure in natural Objects, whence they are conſtituted *Advantageous*, could never raiſe in us any Deſire of *publick Good*, but only of what was good to ourſelves in particular. Nor could they ever make us approve an Action merely becauſe of its promoting the Happineſs of others. And yet, as ſoon as any Action is repreſented to us as flowing from

from *Love*, *Humanity*, *Gratitude*, *Compaſſion*, a *Study* of the Good of others, and an ultimate Deſire of their Happineſs, altho' it were in the moſt diſtant Part of the World, or in ſome paſt Age, we feel Joy within us, admire the lovely Action, and praiſe its Author. And on the contrary, every Action repreſented as flowing from Ill-will, Deſire of the Miſery of others without View to any prevalent Good to the Publick, or *Ingratitude*, raiſes Abhorrence and Averſion. Sect. 1.

It is true indeed, that the Actions we approve in others, are generally imagin'd to tend to the *natural Good* of *Mankind*, or of ſome *Parts* of it. But whence this *ſecret Chain* between *each Perſon* and *Mankind?* How is my *Intereſt* connected with the moſt diſtant *Parts* of it? And yet I muſt admire Actions which ſhew Good-will toward them, and love the Author. Whence this *Love*, *Compaſſion*, *Indignation* and *Hatred* toward even *feign'd Characters*, in the moſt diſtant Ages, and Nations, according as they appear *kind*, *faithful*, *compaſſionate*, or of the *oppoſite Diſpoſitions*, toward their imaginary Contemporaries? If there is no *moral Senſe*, which makes benevolent Actions appear *Beautiful*; if all Approbation be from the *Intereſt* of the Approver.

What's Hecuba *to us, or we to* Hecuba? *

* *Tragedy of* Hamlet.

III. Some

Sect. 1.

Moral Ideas not from Intereſt.

III. SOME refin'd Explainers of *Self-Love* may tell us, "That we approve or condemn "*Characters*, according as we apprehend we "ſhould have been ſupported, or injur'd by "them, had we liv'd in their Days." But how obvious is the Anſwer, if we only obſerve, that had we no Senſe of *moral Good* in *Humanity*, *Mercy*, *Faithfulneſs*, why ſhould not *Self-Love*, and our Senſe of *natural Good* engage us always to the victorious Side, and make us admire and love the ſucceſsful *Tyrant*, or *Traitor?* Why do not we love SINON or PYRRHUS, in the *Æneid?* for had we been GREEKS, theſe two would have been very *advantageous Characters*. Why are we affected with the Fortunes of PRIAMUS, POLITES, CHOROEBUS or ÆNEAS? Would not the *Parſimony* of a Miſer be as advantageous to his Heir, as the *Generoſity* of a worthy Man is to his Friend? And cannot we as eaſily imagine ourſelves Heirs to Miſers, as the Favourites of Heroes? Why don't we then approve both alike? It is plain we have ſome *ſecret Senſe* which determines our Approbation without regard to *Self-Intereſt*; otherwiſe we ſhould always favour the *fortunate* Side without regard to *Virtue*, and ſuppoſe ourſelves engaged with that Party.

As Mr. *Hobbes* explains all the Senſations of *Pity* by our Fear of the like Evils, when by Imagination we place ourſelves in the Caſe of the Sufferers; ſo others explain all Appro-

Approbation and Condemnation of Actions in distant Ages or Nations, by a like Effort of Imagination: We place ourselves in the Case of others, and then discern an *imaginary private Advantage or Disadvantage* in these Actions. But as his Account of Pity will never explain how the Sensation increases, according to the apprehended *Worth* of the Sufferer, or according to the *Affection* we formerly had to him; since the Sufferings of any Stranger may suggest the same Possibility of our suffering the like; So this Explication will never account for our high Approbation of brave unsuccessful Attempts, which we see prove detrimental both to the Agent, and to those for whose Service they were intended; here there is no private Advantage to be imagined. Nor will it account for our Abhorrence of such Injuries as we are incapable of suffering. Sure, when a Man abhors the Attempt of the young *Tarquin*, he does not imagine that he has chang'd his Sex like *Cæneus*. And then, when one corrects his Imagination, by remembring his own Situation, and Circumstances, we find the moral Approbation and Condemnation continues as lively as it was before, tho' the Imagination of Advantage is gone. Sect. 1.

Suppose any great Destruction occasion'd by mere *Accident*, without any Design, or Negligence of the Person who casually was the Author of it: This Action might have

Sect. 1. been as *diſadvantageous* to us as deſign'd *Cruelty*, or *Malice*; but who will ſay he has the ſame Idea of both Actions, or Sentiments of the Agents? Thus alſo an eaſy, indolent *Simplicity*, which expoſes a Man of Wealth as a Prey to others, may be as advantageous a Diſpoſition as the moſt *prudent Generoſity*, to thoſe he converſes with; and yet our Sentiments of this latter Temper are far nobler than of the former. "Whence then this Difference?"

And farther, Let us make a Suppoſition, which perhaps is not far from Matter of Fact, to try if we cannot approve even *diſadvantageous Actions*, and perceive *moral Good* in them. A few ingenious *Artiſans*, perſecuted in their own Country, flee to ours for Protection; they inſtruct us in *Manufactures* which ſupport Millions of Poor, increaſe the Wealth of almoſt every Perſon in the *State*, and make us formidable to our *Neighbours*. In a *Nation* not far diſtant from us, ſome reſolute *Burgomaſters*, full of Love to their *Country*, and Compaſſion toward their *Fellow-Citizens*, oppreſs'd in Body and Soul by a *Tyrant* and *Inquiſition*, with *indefatigable Diligence*, *publick Spirit*, and *Courage*, ſupport a tedious perilous War againſt the *Tyrant*, and form an *induſtrious Republick*, which rivals us in *Trade*, and almoſt in *Power*. All the World ſees whether the *former* or the *latter* have been more *advantageous*

vantageous to us: and yet let every Man consult his own Breaſt, which of the two Characters he has the moſt agreeable Idea of? whether of the *uſeful Refugee*, or the *publick-ſpirited Burgomaſter*, by whoſe Love to his own *Country*, we have often ſuffer'd in our *Intereſts*? And I am confident he will find ſome other Foundation of Eſteem than *Advantage*, and will ſee a juſt Reaſon, why the Memory of our *Artiſans* is ſo obſcure among us, and yet that of our *Rivals* is immortal. Sect. 1.

Self-Love not the Ground of Approbation.

IV. Some *Moraliſts*, who will rather twiſt *Self-Love* into a thouſand Shapes, than allow any other Principle of Approbation than *Intereſt*, may tell us, " That whatever profits " one Part without Detriment to another, " profits *the Whole*, and then ſome ſmall " Share will redound to *each Individual*; " that thoſe Actions which tend to the *Good* " of *the Whole*, if univerſally perform'd, " would moſt effectually ſecure to *each In-* " *dividual* his own Happineſs; and that con- " ſequently, we may approve ſuch Actions, " from the Opinion of their tending ulti- " mately to our own *Advantage*."

We need not trouble theſe *Gentlemen* to ſhew by their nice Train of Conſequences, and Influences of Actions by way of Precedent in particular Inſtances, that we in this Age reap any *Advantage* from Orestes's killing the *treacherous* Ægysthus, or from the

Sect. 1. the Actions of CODRUS or DECIUS. Allow their Reaſonings to be perfectly good, they only prove, that after long Reflection and Reaſoning, we may find out ſome Ground to judge certain Actions advantageous to us, which every Man admires as ſoon as he hears of them; and that too under a quite different Conception.

SHOULD any of our Travellers find ſome old *Grecian Treaſure*, the *Miſer* who hid it, certainly perform'd an Action more to the Traveller's *Advantage*, than CODRUS or ORESTES; for he muſt have but a ſmall Share of Benefit from their Actions, whoſe Influence is ſo diſpers'd, and loſt in various Ages and Nations: Surely then this *Miſer* muſt appear to the Traveller a prodigious Hero in *Virtue!* For *Self-Intereſt* will recommend Men to us only according to the *Good* they do to *our Selves*, and not give us high Ideas of *publick Good*, but in proportion to our Share of it. But muſt a Man have the Reflection of CUMBERLAND or PUFENDORF, to admire *Generoſity*, *Faith*, *Humanity*, *Gratitude?* Or reaſon ſo nicely to apprehend the *Evil* in *Cruelty*, *Treachery*, *Ingratitude?* Do not the *former* excite our *Admiration*, and *Love*, and *Study* of Imitation, wherever we ſee them, almoſt at firſt View, without any ſuch Reflection, and the *latter*, our *Contempt*, and *Abhorrence?* Unhappy would it be for *Mankind*, if a *Senſe of Virtue* was of

as

as narrow an Extent, as a Capacity for ſuch *Metaphyſicks*. Sect. 1.

V. THIS *moral Senſe*, either of our *own* Actions, or of thoſe of *others*, has this in common with our other Senſes, that however our Deſire of *Virtue* may be counterbalanc'd by *Intereſt*, our Sentiment or Perception of its *Beauty* cannot; as it certainly might be, if the only Ground of our Approbation were Views of *Advantage*. Let us conſider this both as to our *own* Actions, and thoſe of *others*. *Our Moral Senſe cannot be brib'd.*

A COVETOUS *Man* ſhall diſlike any Branch of Trade, how uſeful ſoever it may be to the Publick, if there is no Gain for himſelf in it; here is an Averſion from *Intereſt*. Propoſe a ſufficient Premium, and he ſhall be the firſt who ſets about it, with full Satisfaction in his own Conduct. Now is it the ſame way with our *Senſe* of *moral Actions?* Should any one adviſe us to wrong a *Minor*, or *Orphan*, or to do an ungrateful Action, toward a *Benefactor*; we at firſt View abhor it: Aſſure us that it will be very *advantageous* to us, propoſe even a *Reward*; our *Senſe* of the Action is not alter'd. It is true, theſe Motives may make us undertake it; but they have no more Influence upon us to make us approve it, than a Phyſician's Advice has to make a nauſeous Potion pleaſant to the Taſte, when we perhaps *In judging of our own Actions.*

Sect. 1. force ourſelves to take it for the Recovery of Health.

HAD we no Notion of Actions beſide our Opinion of their *Advantage* or *Diſadvantage*, could we ever chooſe an Action as *advantageous*, which we are conſcious is ſtill *evil?* as it too often happens in human Affairs. Where would be the need of ſuch *high Bribes* to prevail with Men to abandon the Intereſts of a ruin'd Party, or of *Tortures* to force out the Secrets of their Friends? Is it ſo hard to convince Mens Underſtandings, if that be the only Faculty we have to do with, that it is probably more advantageous to ſecure preſent Gain, and avoid preſent Evils, by joining with the prevalent Party, than to wait for the remote Poſſibility of future Good, upon a Revolution often improbable, and ſometimes unexpected? And when Men are over-perſuaded by *Advantage*, do they always approve their own Conduct? Nay, how often is their remaining Life odious, and ſhameful, in their *own Senſe* of it, as well as in that of *others*, to whom the baſe Action was profitable?

IF any one becomes ſatisfy'd with his own Conduct in ſuch a Caſe, upon what Ground is it? How does he pleaſe himſelf, or vindicate his Actions to others? Never by reflecting upon his *private Advantage*, or alledging this to others as a Vindication; but

but by gradually warping into the *moral Principles* of his *new Party*; for no Party is without them. And thus Men become pleas'd with their Actions under some Appearance of *moral Good*, distinct from *Advantage*. Sect. 1.

Our Moral Sense not founded on Religion.

It may perhaps be alledg'd, "That in "those Actions of our own which we call "*good*, there is *this* constant *Advantage*, "superior to all others, which is the Ground "of our Approbation, and the Motive to "them from *Self-Love*, *viz.* That we sup-"pose the DEITY will *reward* them." This will be more fully consider'd * hereafter: At present it is enough to observe, that many have high Notions of *Honour*, *Faith*, *Generosity*, *Justice*, who have scarce any Dispositions of Piety, or Thoughts of *future Rewards*; and abhor any thing which is *treacherous*, *cruel*, or *unjust*, without any regard to *future Punishments*.

BUT farther, tho' these *Rewards* and *Punishments*, may make my own Actions appear *advantageous* to me, yet they would never make me approve, and love *another* Person for the like Actions, whose Merit would not be imputed to me. Those Actions are *advantageous* indeed to the *Agent*;

* See *Sect.* ii. *Art.* 7.

Sect. 1. but his *Advantage* is not my *Advantage*: and *Self-Love* could never recommend to me Actions as *advantageous* to others, or make me like the Authors of them on that account.

Our Moral Senſe of the Actions of others, not to be brib'd.

THIS is the ſecond thing to be conſider'd, "Whether our *Senſe* of the *moral Good* or "*Evil* in the Actions of others, can be "overbalanc'd, or brib'd by Views of *In-*"*tereſt.*" Now I may indeed eaſily be capable of wiſhing, that another would do an Action I abhor as *morally evil*, if it were very *advantageous* to me: *Intereſt* in that Caſe may overbalance my Deſire of *Virtue* in another: But no *Intereſt to myſelf*, will make me approve an Action as morally good, which without that *Intereſt to myſelf*, would have appear'd morally evil; if upon computing its whole Effects, it appears to produce as great a Moment of Good in the Whole, when it is not beneficial to me, as it did before, when it was. In our *Senſe* of *moral Good* or *Evil*, our own private Advantage or Loſs is of no more moment, than the Advantage or Loſs of a third Perſon, to make an Action appear *Good* or *Evil*. This Senſe therefore cannot be over-balanc'd by *Intereſt*. How ridiculous an Attempt would it be, to engage a Man by Rewards or Threatnings into a good Opinion of an Action, which was contrary to his *moral Notions*? We may procure Diſſimulation by ſuch means, and that is all.

Sect. 1.

Not occaſion'd by Praiſe.

VI. A LATE witty Author * ſays, "That "the Leaders of Mankind do not really ad- "mire ſuch Actions as thoſe of REGULUS, "or DECIUS, but only obſerve, that Men "of ſuch Diſpoſitions are very uſeful for "the Defence of any State; and therefore "by *Panegyricks* and *Statues* they encourage "ſuch Tempers in others, as the moſt *trac-* "*table* and *uſeful.*" Here firſt let us conſider, If a *Traitor*, who would ſell his own Country to us, may not often be as *advantageous* to us, as an *Hero* who defends us: And yet we can love the Treaſon, and hate the Traitor. We can at the ſame time praiſe a *gallant Enemy*, who is very *pernicious* to us. Is there nothing in all this but an Opinion of *Advantage?*

AGAIN, upon this Scheme what could a *Statue* or *Panegyrick* effect?——Men love *Praiſe*—They will do the Actions which they obſerve to be *praiſed*—*Praiſe*, with Men who have no other Idea of *Good* but *Self-Intereſt*, is *the Opinion which a Nation or Party have of a Man as uſeful to them*—— REGULUS, or CATO, or DECIUS, had no *Advantage* by the Actions which profited their Country, and therefore they themſelves could not admire them, however the

* See the Fable of the Bees, Page 34, 36. 3d. Edition.

Sect. 1. Perſons who reap'd the *Advantage* might praiſe ſuch Actions.— REGULUS or CATO could not poſſibly praiſe or love another Hero for a *virtuous Action*; for this would not gain them the *Advantage* of *Honour*; and their own Actions they muſt have look'd upon as the hard Terms on which Honour was to be purchas'd, without any thing amiable in them, which they could contemplate or reflect upon with Pleaſure. Nay, what ſhould excite a CATO or a DECIUS to deſire Praiſe, if it is only the cold Opinion of others that they were uſeful to the State, without any Perception of Excellence in ſuch Conduct?— Now how unlike is this to what the leaſt Obſervation would teach a Man concerning ſuch Characters?

BUT ſays * he, "Theſe wondrous cunning Governors made Men believe, by "their *Statues* and *Panegyricks*, that there "was *publick Spirit*, and that this was in it-"ſelf *excellent*; and hence Men are led to "admire it in others, and to imitate it in "themſelves, forgetting the Purſuit of their "own *Advantage*." So eaſy a matter it ſeems to him, to quit judging of others by what we feel in ourſelves!—for a Perſon who is wholly *ſelfiſh*, to imagine others to be *publick ſpirited!*—for one who has no Ideas

* See the ſame Author in the ſame Place.

of

of *Good* but in his own *Advantage*, to be led by the Perſuaſions of others, into a Conception of *Goodneſs* in what is avowedly detrimental to himſelf, and profitable to others; nay, ſo intirely, as not to approve the Action thorowly, but ſo far as he was conſcious that it proceeded from a *diſintereſted Study* of the *Good* of others!——Yet this it ſeems *Statues* and *Panegyricks* can accompliſh! Sect. 1.

Nil intra eſt oleam, nil extra eſt in nuce duri! *

It is an eaſy matter for Men to aſſert any thing in Words; but our own Hearts muſt decide the Matter, "Whether ſome *moral* "*Actions* do not at firſt View appear *ami-* "*able* even to thoſe who are unconcern'd in "their Influence? Whether we do not ſin- "cerely *approve* and love a generous kind "*Friend*, or *Patriot*, whoſe Actions pro- "cure *Honour* to him only, without any "*Advantage* to ourſelves?" It is true, that the Actions which we approve are uſeful to Mankind; but not always to the Approver. It would perhaps be uſeful to the *Whole*, that all Men agreed in performing ſuch Actions; and then every one would have his Share of the *Advantage*: But this only proves, that *Reaſon* and *calm Reflection* may recom-

* Hor. Ep. 1. Lib. 2. v. 31.

Sect. 1. mend to us, from *Self-Intereſt*, thoſe Actions, which at firſt View our *moral Senſe* determines us to admire, without conſidering this *Intereſt*. Nay, our *Senſe* ſhall operate even where the *Advantage* to ourſelves does not hold. We can approve the Juſtice of a Sentence againſt ourſelves: A condemn'd *Traitor* may approve the Vigilance of a CICERO in diſcovering Conſpiracies, tho' it had been for the Traitor's Advantage, that there never had been in the World any Men of ſuch Sagacity. To ſay that he may ſtill approve ſuch Conduct as tending to the *publick Good*, is a Jeſt from one whoſe only Idea of *Good* is *Self-Intereſt*. Such a Perſon has no Approbation of *publick Spirit*, nor Deſire of *publick Good*, farther than it tends to his own *Advantage*, which it does not at all in the preſent Caſe.

Nor Cuſtom, Education, &c.

VII. IF what is ſaid makes it appear, that we have ſome other *amiable Idea* of Actions than that of *advantageous* to ourſelves, we may conclude, "That this Perception of "*moral Good* is not deriv'd from *Cuſtom*, *E*-"*ducation*, *Example*, or *Study*." Theſe give us no new Ideas: They might make us ſee *private Advantage* in Actions whoſe Uſefulneſs did not at firſt appear; or give us Opinions of ſome Tendency of Actions to our *Detriment*, by ſome nice Deductions of Reaſon, or by a raſh Prejudice, when upon the firſt View of the Action we ſhould have

obſerv'd no ſuch thing: but they never could have made us apprehend Actions as *amiable* or *odious*, without any Conſideration of our own *Advantage*. Sect. 1.

VIII. It remains then, "That as the "Author of *Nature* has determin'd us to "receive, by our *external Senſes*, pleaſant or "diſagreeable Ideas of Objects, according as "they are uſeful or hurtful to our Bodies; "and to receive from *uniform Objects* the "Pleaſures of *Beauty* and *Harmony*, to ex- "cite us to the Purſuit of Knowledge, and "to reward us for it; or to be an Ar- "gument to us of his *Goodneſs*, as the *Uni- "formity* itſelf proves his *Exiſtence*, whe- "ther we had a *Senſe* of *Beauty* in *Uniſor- "mity* or not; in the ſame manner he has "given us a Moral Sense, to direct our "Actions, and to give us ſtill *nobler Plea- "ſures:* ſo that while we are only intend- "ing the *Good* of others, we undeſignedly "promote our own greateſt *private Good*."

This Moral Senſe does not infer innate Ideas or Propoſitions.

We are not to imagine, that this *moral Senſe*, more than the other Senſes, ſuppoſes any *innate Ideas*, *Knowledge*, or *practical Propoſition:* We mean by it only *a Determination of our Minds to receive the ſimple Ideas of Approbation or Condemnation, from Actions obſerv'd, antecedent to any Opinions of Advantage or Loſs to redound to our ſelves from them*; even as we are pleas'd with a *regular*

Sect. 1. *regular Form*, or an *harmonious Compoſition*, without having any Knowledge of *Mathematicks*, or ſeeing any *Advantage* in that Form or Compoſition, different from the immediate Pleaſure.

THAT we may diſcern more diſtinctly the Difference between *moral Perceptions* and others, let us conſider, when we taſte a pleaſant Fruit, we are conſcious of Pleaſure; when another taſtes it, we only conclude or form an Opinion that he enjoys Pleaſure; and, abſtracting from ſome previous *Good-Will* or *Anger*, his enjoying this Pleaſure is to us a Matter wholly indifferent, raiſing no new *Sentiment* or *Affection*. But when we are under the Influence of a virtuous Temper, and thereby engaged in virtuous Actions, we are not always conſcious of any Pleaſure, nor are we only purſuing private Pleaſures, as will appear hereafter: 'tis only by *reflex Acts* upon our Temper and Conduct, that Virtue never fails to give Pleaſure. When alſo we judge the Temper of another to be virtuous, we do not neceſſarily imagine him *then* to enjoy Pleaſure, tho' we know *Reflection* will give it to him: And farther, our Apprehenſion of his virtuous Temper raiſes Sentiments of *Approbation*, *Eſteem* or *Admiration*, and the Affection of *Good-will* toward him. The Quality approved by our moral Senſe is conceived to reſide in the Perſon approved, and to be a Per-

Perfection and Dignity in him: *Approbation* of another's Virtue is not conceived as making the Approver happy, or virtuous, or worthy, tho' 'tis attended with ſome ſmall Pleaſure. Virtue is then called *amiable* or *lovely*, from its raiſing *Good-will* or *Love* in Spectators toward the Agent; and not from the Agent's perceiving the virtuous Temper to be advantageous to him, or deſiring to obtain it under that View. A virtuous Temper is called *good* or *beatifick*, not that it is always attended with Pleaſure in the Agent; much leſs that ſome ſmall Pleaſure attends the Contemplation of it in the Approver: but from this, that every Spectator is perſuaded that the *reflex Acts* of the virtuous Agent upon his own Temper will give him the higheſt Pleaſures. The admired Quality is conceived as the Perfection of the Agent, and ſuch a one as is diſtinct from the *Pleaſure* either in the Agent or the Approver; tho' 'tis a ſure Source of Pleaſure to the Agent. The Perception of the Approver, tho' attended with Pleaſure, plainly repreſents ſomething quite diſtinct from this Pleaſure; even as the Perception of *external Forms* is attended with Pleaſure, and yet repreſents ſomething diſtinct from this Pleaſure. This may prevent many Cavils upon this Subject. Sect. 1.

SECT.

SECT. II.

Concerning the immediate Motive *to* virtuous Actions.

Nature.

THE *Motives* of human Actions, or their *immediate Cauſes*, would be beſt underſtood after conſidering the *Paſſions* and *Affections*; but here we ſhall only conſider the *Springs* of the Actions which we call *virtuous*, as far as it is neceſſary to ſettle the general Foundation of the *Moral Senſe*.

Affections, the Motives to Actions.

I. EVERY Action, which we apprehend as either *morally good* or *evil*, is always ſuppos'd to flow from ſome *Affection* toward ſenſitive Natures; and whatever we call *Virtue* or *Vice*, is either ſome ſuch *Affection* or ſome *Action* conſequent upon it. Or it may perhaps be enough to make an Action or Omiſſion, appear *vicious*, if it argues the Want of ſuch Affection toward rational Agents, as we expect in Characters counted *morally good*. All the Actions counted *religious* in any Country, are ſuppos'd, by thoſe who count them ſo, to flow from ſome Affections toward the DEITY; and whatever we call *ſocial Virtue*, we ſtill ſuppoſe to flow from Affections toward our *Fellow-Creatures*: for in this all ſeem to agree, "That external "Motions,

" Motions, when accompany'd with no Af- Sect. 2.
" fections toward God or *Man*, or evidenc-
" ing no Want of the *expected* Affections to-
" ward either, can have no *moral Good* or
" *Evil* in them.

Ask, for inſtance, the moſt *abſtemious Hermit*, if *Temperance* of itſelf would be *morally good*, ſuppoſing it ſhew'd no Obedience toward the Deity, made us no fitter for Devotion, or the Service of Mankind, or the Search after Truth, than *Luxury*; and he will eaſily grant, that it would be no *moral Good*, tho' ſtill it might be *naturally good* or *advantageous* to Health: And mere *Courage*, or Contempt of Danger, if we conceive it to have no regard to the Defence of the Innocent, or repairing of Wrongs or Self-Intereſt, would only entitle its Poſſeſſor to *Bedlam*. When ſuch ſort of Courage is ſometimes admir'd, it is upon ſome ſecret Apprehenſion of a good Intention in the Uſe of it, or as a natural Ability capable of an uſeful Application. *Prudence*, if it was only employ'd in promoting *private Intereſt*, is never imagin'd to be a *Virtue:* and *Juſtice*, or obſerving a ſtrict Equality, if it has no regard to the *Good* of *Mankind*, the Preſervation of *Rights*, and ſecuring *Peace*, is a Quality properer for its ordinary *Geſtamen*, a *Beam* and *Scales*, than for a *rational Agent*. So that theſe four Qualities, commonly call'd *Cardinal Virtues*, obtain that Name, becauſe they

Sect. 2. they are Diſpoſitions univerſally neceſſary to promote *publick Good*, and denote *Affections* toward *rational Agents*; otherwiſe there would appear no *Virtue* in them.

Affections diſintereſted.

II. Now, if it can be made appear, that none of theſe Affections which we approve as *virtuous*, are either *Self-love*, or Deſire of *private Intereſt*; ſince all *Virtue* is either ſome ſuch *Affections*, or *Actions* conſequent upon them; it muſt neceſſarily follow, "That *Virtue* ſprings from ſome other Affection than *Self-love*, or Deſire of private Advantage. And where Self-Intereſt excites to the ſame Action, the Approbation is given only to the diſintereſted Principle."

Love of Complacence, and Hatred of Diſplicence

THE Affections which are of moſt Importance in *Morals*, are commonly included under the Names LOVE and HATRED. Now in diſcourſing of *Love*, we need not be caution'd not to include that *Love* between the *Sexes*, which, when no other Affections accompany it, is only Deſire of Pleaſure, and is never counted a *Virtue*. *Love* toward rational Agents, is ſubdivided into *Love* of *Complacence* or *Eſteem*, and *Love* of *Benevolence*: And *Hatred* is ſubdivided into *Hatred* of *Diſplicence* or *Contempt*, and *Hatred of Malice*. *Complacence* denotes *Approbation of any Perſon by our Moral Senſe*; and is rather a Perception than an Affection; tho' the Affection

Affection of Good-will is ordinarily ſubſequent to it. *Benevolence* is the Deſire of the Happineſs of another. Their Oppoſites are called *Diſlike* and *Malice*. Concerning each of theſe ſeparately we ſhall conſider, "Whether they can be influenc'd by Motives of "*Self-Intereſt*." Sect. 2.

COMPLACENCE, *Eſteem*, or *Good-liking*, at firſt View appears to be *diſintereſted*, and ſo *Diſplicence* or *Diſlike*; and are intirely excited by ſome *moral Qualities*, *Good or Evil*, apprehended to be in the Objects; which Qualities the very *Frame* of our *Nature* determines us to approve or diſapprove, according to the *moral Senſe* * above explain'd. Propoſe to a Man all the Rewards in the World, or threaten all the Puniſhments, to engage him to *Eſteem* and *Complacence* toward a Perſon intirely *unknown*, or if known, apprehended to be *cruel*, *treacherous*, *ungrateful*; you may procure external Obſequiouſneſs, or good Offices, or Diſſimulation; but *real Eſteem* no Price can purchaſe. And the ſame is obvious as to *Contempt*, which no Motive of *Advantage* can prevent. On the contrary, repreſent a Character as *generous*, *kind*, *faithful*, *humane*, tho' in the moſt diſtant Parts of the World, and we cannot avoid *Eſteem* and *Complacence*. A *Bribe* may *Are intirely diſintereſted.*

* See *Sect.* i.

poſſibly

Sect. 2. poſſibly make us attempt to ruin ſuch a Man, or ſome ſtrong Motive of *Advantage* may excite us to oppoſe his Intereſt; but it can never make us diſapprove him, while we retain the ſame Opinion of his Temper and Intentions. Nay, when we conſult our own Hearts, we ſhall find, that we can ſcarce ever perſuade ourſelves to attempt any Miſchief againſt ſuch Perſons, from any Motive of *Advantage*; nor execute it without the ſtrongeſt Reluctance and Remorſe, until we have blinded ourſelves into a falſe Opinion about his Temper.

Benevolence diſintereſted.

III. As to the *Love* of *Benevolence*, the very Name excludes *Self-Intereſt*. We never call that Man *benevolent*, who is in Fact uſeful to others, but at the ſame time only intends his *own Intereſt*, without any ultimate Deſire of the *Good* of *others*. If there be any real *Good-will* or *Kindneſs* at all, it muſt be *diſintereſted*; for the moſt uſeful Action imaginable loſes all Appearance of *Benevolence*, as ſoon as we diſcern that it only flowed from *Self-Love* or *Intereſt*. Thus, never were any human Actions more *advantageous*, than the Inventions of *Fire*, and *Iron*; but if theſe were caſual, or if the *Inventor* only intended his own *Intereſt* in them, there is nothing which can be call'd *benevolent* in them. Where-ever then *Benevolence* is ſuppos'd, there it is imagin'd *diſintereſted*, and deſign'd for the *Good* of others.

To

To raiſe Benevolence, no more is required than calmly to conſider any *ſenſitive Nature* not pernicious to others. *Gratitude* ariſes from Benefits conferred from Good-will on ourſelves, or thoſe we love; *Complacence* is a Perception of the moral Senſe. Gratitude includes ſome *Complacence*, and Complacence ſtill raiſes a ſtronger Good-will than that we have toward indifferent Characters, where there is no Oppoſition of Intereſts. Sect. 2.

Self-Love *join'd with* Benevolence.

But it muſt be here obſerv'd, That as all Men have *Self-Love*, as well as *Benevolence*, theſe two Principles may jointly excite a Man to the ſame Action; and then they are to be conſider'd as two Forces impelling the ſame Body to Motion; ſometimes they conſpire, ſometimes are indifferent to each other, and ſometimes are in ſome degree oppoſite. Thus, if a Man have ſuch ſtrong *Benevolence*, as would have produc'd an Action without any Views of *Self-Intereſt*; that ſuch a Man has alſo in View *private Advantage*, along with *publick Good*, as the Effect of his Action, does no way diminiſh the *Benevolence* of the Action. When he would not have produc'd ſo much *publick Good*, had it not been for Proſpect of *Self-Intereſt*, then the Effect of *Self-Love* is to be deducted, and his *Benevolence* is proportion'd to the Remainder of *Good*, which pure *Benevolence* would have produc'd. When a Man's *Benevolence* is hurtful to himſelf,

Sect. 2. ſelf, then *Self-Love* is oppoſite to *Benevolence*, and the *Benevolence* is proportion'd to the Sum of the *Good* produc'd, added to the Reſiſtance of *Self-Love* ſurmounted by it. In moſt Caſes it is impoſſible for Men to know how far their Fellows are influenc'd by the one or other of theſe Principles; but yet the general Truth is ſufficiently certain, That this is the way in which the *Benevolence* of Actions is to be computed.

Benevolence is diſintereſted.

IV. THERE are two ways in which ſome may deduce *Benevolence* from *Self-Love*, the one ſuppoſing that "we voluntarily bring this Affection upon ourſelves, "whenever we have an Opinion that it "will be for our Intereſt to *have this Affection*, either as it may be immediately pleaſant, or may afford pleaſant Reflection afterwards by our Moral Senſe, or as it "may tend to procure ſome external Reward from GOD or Man." The other Scheme alledges no ſuch Power in us of raiſing Deſire or Affection of any kind by our *Choice* or *Volition*; but "ſuppoſes our "Minds determined by the Frame of their "Nature to deſire whatever is apprehended "as the *Means* of any private Happineſs; "and that the *Obſervation of the Happineſs "of other Perſons*, in may Caſes is made "the neceſſary Occaſion of Pleaſure to the "Obſerver, as their *Miſery* is the Occaſion "of his Uneaſineſs: and in conſequence of "this

" this Connexion, as ſoon as we have ob- Sect. 2.
" ſerved it, we begin to deſire the Happi-
" neſs of others as the *Means* of obtaining
" this Happineſs to ourſelves, which we
" expect from the Contemplation of others
" in a happy State. They alledge it to be
" impoſſible to deſire either the Happi-
" neſs of another, or any Event whatſo-
" ever, without conceiving it as the *Means*
" of ſome Happineſs or Pleaſure to *our-*
" *ſelves*; but own at the ſame time, that
" Deſire is not raiſed in us directly by any
" *Volition*, but ariſes neceſſarily upon our
" apprehending any Object or Event to be
" conducive to our Happineſs."

THAT the former Scheme is not juſt, may appear from this general Conſideration, that " neither Benevolence nor any other " Affection or Deſire can be directly raiſed " by *Volition*." If they could, then we could be bribed into any Affection whatſoever toward any Object, even the moſt improper: we might raiſe *Jealouſy*, *Fear*, *Anger*, *Love*, toward any ſort of Perſons indifferently by an Hire, even as we engage Men to external Actions, or to the Diſſimulation of Paſſions; but this every Perſon will by his own Reflection find to be impoſſible. The Proſpect of any Advantage to ariſe to us *from having any Affection*, may indeed turn our Attention to thoſe *Qualities* in the Object, which are naturally conſtituted

The firſt contrary Opinion confuted.

Sect. 2. ſtituted the neceſſary *Cauſes* or *Occaſions* of the advantageous Affection; and if we find ſuch Qualities in the Object, the Affection will certainly ariſe. Thus *indirectly* the Proſpect of Advantage may tend to raiſe any Affection; but if theſe Qualities be not found or apprehended in the Object, no *Volition* of ours, nor *Deſire*, will ever raiſe any Affection in us.

BUT more particularly, *that Deſire* of the Good of others, which we approve as virtuous, cannot be alledged to be voluntarily raiſed from Proſpect of any *Pleaſure accompanying* the Affection itſelf: for 'tis plain that our Benevolence is not always accompanied with *Pleaſure*; nay, 'tis often attended with Pain, when the Object is in Diſtreſs. Deſire in general is rather uneaſy than pleaſant. 'Tis true, indeed, all the Paſſions and Affections *juſtify themſelves*; while they continue, (as *Malebranch* expreſſes it) we generally approve our being thus affected on this Occaſion, as an innocent Diſpoſition, or a juſt one, and condemn a Perſon who would be otherwiſe affected on the like Occaſion. So the *Sorrowful*, the *Angry*, the *Jealous*, the *Compaſſionate*, approve their ſeveral Paſſions on the apprehended Occaſion; but we ſhould not therefore conclude, that *Sorrow*, *Anger*, *Jealouſy* or *Pity* are pleaſant, or choſen for their concomitant Pleaſure The Caſe is plainly thus: The Frame of

of our Nature on the Occaſions which move theſe Paſſions, determines us to be thus affected, and to approve our Affection at leaſt as innocent. *Uneaſineſs* generally attends our Deſires of any kind; and this *Senſation* tends to fix our Attention, and to continue the Deſire. But the Deſire does not terminate upon the *Removal of the Pain accompanying the Deſire*, but upon ſome other Event: the concomitant Pain is what we ſeldom reflect upon, unleſs when it is very violent. Nor does any Deſire or Affection terminate upon the Pleaſure which may accompany the Affection; much leſs is it raiſed by an Act of our Will, with a View to obtain this Pleaſure. Sect. 2.

THE ſame Reflection will ſhew that we do not by an Act of our Will raiſe in ourſelves that Benevolence which we approve as virtuous, with a View to obtain future Pleaſures of *Self-Approbation* by our Moral Senſe. Could we raiſe Affections in this manner, we ſhould be engaged to any Affection by the *Proſpect of an Intereſt* equivalent to this of *Self-Approbation*, ſuch as Wealth or ſenſual Pleaſure, which with many Tempers are more powerful; and yet we univerſally own, that *that* Diſpoſition to do good Offices to others, which is raiſed by theſe Motives, is not virtuous: how can we then imagine, that the virtuous Benevolence is brought upon us by a Motive equally *ſelfiſh*?

Sect. 2.

BUT what will moſt effectually convince us of the Truth on this Point, is Reflection upon our own Hearts, whether we have not a *Deſire* of the Good of others, generally without any Conſideration or Intention of obtaining theſe *pleaſant Reflections* on our own Virtue: nay, often this Deſire is ſtrongeſt where we leaſt imagine Virtue, in *natural Affection* toward Offspring, and in Gratitude to a great Benefactor; the *Abſence* of which is indeed the greateſt *Vice*, but the Affections themſelves are not eſteemed in any conſiderable degree virtuous. The ſame Reflection will alſo convince us, that theſe Deſires or Affections are not produced by *Choice*, with a View to obtain this private Good.

IN like manner, if no *Volition* of ours can directly raiſe Affections from the former Proſpects of Intereſt, no more can any *Volition* raiſe them from Proſpects of *eternal Rewards*, or to avoid *eternal Puniſhments*. The former Motives differ from theſe only as ſmaller from greater, ſhorter from more durable. If Affections could be directly raiſed by Volition, the ſame Conſideration would make us *angry* at the moſt innocent or virtuous Character, and *jealous* of the moſt faithful and affectionate, or *ſorrowful* for the Proſperity of a Friend; which we all find to be impoſſible. The Proſpect

Sect. 2.

Proſpect of a *future State*, may, no doubt, have a greater indirect Influence, by turning our Attention to the Qualities in the Objects naturally apt to raiſe the required Affection, than any other Conſideration *.

'T I S indeed probably true in Fact, that thoſe who are engaged by Proſpect of future Rewards to do good Offices to Mankind, have generally the *virtuous Benevolence* jointly exciting them to Action; becauſe, as it may appear hereafter, Benevolence is natu-

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* *THESE ſeveral* Motives of Intereſt, *which, ſome alledge, do excite us to Benevolence, operate upon us in a very different Manner. Proſpect of* external Advantage *of any kind in this Life from our Fellows, is only a Motive to the* Volition of external Actions *immediately, and not to raiſe Deſire of the Happineſs of others. Now being* willing to do external Actions *which we know do in Fact promote the Happineſs of others, without any* Deſire *of their Happineſs, is not approved as virtuous: Otherwiſe it were Virtue to do a beneficent Action for a Bribe of Money.*

The Proſpect of Rewards from the DEITY, *of future Pleaſures from the* Self-Approbation *of our Moral Senſe, or of any Pleaſure attending an Affection itſelf, are only Motives to us to* deſire *or* wiſh to have the Affection of Benevolence *in our Hearts; and conſequently, if our Volition could raiſe Affections in us, theſe Motives would make us will or chooſe to raiſe* benevolent Affections: *But theſe Proſpects cannot be Motives to us from Self-Love, to deſire the* Happineſs of others; *for, from Self-Love we only deſire what we apprehend to be the Means of private Good. Now the* having thoſe Affections *is the Means of obtaining theſe private Goods, and not the actual Happineſs of others; for the Pleaſure of Self-Approbation, and Divine Rewards, are not obtained or loſt according as others are happy or miſerable, but according to the* Goodneſs of our Affections. *If therefore Affections are not directly raiſed by Volition or Choice, Proſpects of future Rewards, or of Self-Approbation, cannot directly raiſe them.*

Sect. 2. ral to Mankind, and ſtill operates where there is no *Oppoſition of apparent Intereſt*, or where any contrary apparent Intereſt is overbalanced by a greater *Intereſt*. Men, conſcious of this, do generally approve good Offices, to which Motives of a future State partly excited the Agent. But that the Approbation is founded upon the Apprehenſion of a *diſintereſted Deſire* partly exciting the Agent, is plain from this, that not only Obedience to an *evil Deity* in doing Miſchief, or even in performing trifling Ceremonies, only from Hope of Reward, or Proſpect of avoiding Puniſhment, but even Obedience to a good DEITY only from the ſame Motives, without any *Love* or *Gratitude* towards him, and with a perfect Indifference about the Happineſs or Miſery of Mankind, abſtracting from this private Intereſt, would meet with no *Approbation*. We plainly ſee that a Change of *external Circumſtances* of Intereſt under an evil DEITY, without any Change in the *Diſpoſition* of the Agent, would lead him into every Cruelty and Inhumanity.

GRATITUDE toward the DEITY is indeed diſintereſted, as it will appear hereafter. This Affection therefore may obtain our Approbation, where it excites to Action, tho' there were no other Benevolence exciting the Agent. But this Caſe ſcarce occurs among Men. But where the *Sanction*

tion of the Law is the only Motive of Action, we could expect no more *Benevolence*, nor no other *Affection*, than those in one forced by the *Law* to be *Curator* to a Person for whom he has not the least Regard. The Agent would so manage as to save himself harmless if he could, but would be under no Concern about the *Success* of his Attempts, or the *Happiness* of the Person whom he served, provided he performed the Task required by Law; nor would any Spectator approve this Conduct. Sect. 2.

V. The other Scheme is more plausible: That Benevolence is not raised by any *Volition* upon Prospect of Advantage; but that we desire the Happiness of others as conceiving it necessary to procure some *pleasant Sensations* which we expect to feel upon seeing others happy; and that for like Reason we have Aversion to their Misery. This Connection between the Happiness of others and our Pleasure, say they, is chiefly felt among *Friends*, *Parents* and *Children*, and eminently virtuous Characters. But this Benevolence flows as directly from *Self-Love* as any other Desire. *The second Opinion confuted.*

To shew that this Scheme is not true in Fact, let us consider, that if in our Benevolence we only desired the Happiness of others as the *Means* of this Pleasure to ourselves, whence is it that no Man *approves* the Desire

Sect. 2. ſire of the Happineſs of others as a means of procuring *Wealth* or *ſenſual Pleaſure* to ourſelves? If a Perſon had *wagered* concerning the future Happineſs of a Man of ſuch Veracity, that he would ſincerely confeſs whether he were happy or not; would this Wagerer's Deſire of the Happineſs of another, in order to win the Wager, be *approved as virtuous?* If not, wherein does this Deſire differ from the former? except that in one caſe there is one pleaſant Senſation expected, and in the other caſe other Senſations: For by increaſing or diminiſhing the Sum wagered, the Intereſt in this Caſe may be made either greater or leſs than that in the other.

Reflecting on our own Minds again will beſt diſcover the Truth. Many have never thought upon this *Connection:* nor do we ordinarily intend the obtaining of any ſuch Pleaſure when we do generous Offices. We all often *feel* Delight upon ſeeing others happy, but during our Purſuit of their Happineſs we have no *Intention* of obtaining this Delight. We often feel the Pain of Compaſſion; but were our ſole ultimate Intention or Deſire the *freeing ourſelves* from this Pain, would the Deity offer to us either wholly to blot out all Memory of the Perſon in Diſtreſs, to take away this Connection, ſo that we ſhould be eaſy during the Miſery

Misery of our Friend on the one hand, or on the other would relieve him from his Misery, we should be as ready to choose the former way as the latter; since either of them would free us from *our Pain*, which upon this Scheme is the *sole End* proposed by the compassionate Person.—Don't we find in ourselves that our Desire does not terminate upon the Removal of our own Pain? Were this our sole Intention, we would run away, shut our Eyes, or divert our Thoughts from the miserable Object, as the readiest way of removing our Pain: This we seldom do, nay, we croud about such Objects, and voluntarily expose ourselves to this Pain, unless *calm Reflection* upon our Inability to relieve the Miserable, countermand our Inclination, or some *selfish Affection*, as *Fear of Danger*, over-power it. Sect. 2.

To make this yet clearer, suppose that the Deity should declare to a good Man that he should be suddenly *annihilated*, but at the Instant of his Exit it should be left to his Choice whether his Friend, his Children, or his Country should be made happy or miserable for the future, when he himself could have no Sense of either Pleasure or Pain from their State. Pray would he be any more indifferent about their State now, that he neither hoped or feared any thing to himself from it, than he was in any prior Period

Sect. 2. riod of his Life *? Nay, is it not a pretty common Opinion among us, that after our Deceaſe we know nothing of what befalls thoſe who ſurvive us? How comes it then that we do not loſe, at the Approach of Death, all Concern for our Families, Friends, or Country? Can there be any Inſtance given of our deſiring any Thing only as the *Means of private Good*, as violently when we know that we ſhall not enjoy this Good many Minutes, as if we expected the Poſſeſſion of this Good for many Years? Is this the way we compute the Value of *Annuities?*

How the diſintereſted Deſire of the Good of others ſhould ſeem inconceivable, 'tis hard to account: perhaps 'tis owing to the Attempts of ſome great Men to give Definitions of *ſimple Ideas.*——*Deſire*, ſay they, *is Uneaſineſs, or uneaſy Senſation upon the Abſence of any Good.*—Whereas Deſire is as diſtinct from *Uneaſineſs*, as *Volition* is from Senſation. Don't they themſelves often ſpeak of our *deſiring to remove Uneaſineſs? Deſire* then is different from *Uneaſineſs*, however a Senſe of Uneaſineſs accompanies it, as *Extenſion* does the Idea of *Colour*, which yet

* Cic. de Finib. lib. ii. c. 31. *Iſta commendatio puerorum, memoria et caritas amicitiæ, ſummorum officiorum in extremo ſpiritu conſervatio, indicat innatam eſſe homini probitatem gratuitam, non invitatam voluptatibus, nec præmiorum mercedibus evocatam, &c.*

is a very distinct Idea. Now wherein lies the Impossibility of desiring the Happiness of another without conceiving it as the Means of obtaining any thing farther, even as we desire our own Happiness without farther View? If any alledge, that we desire our own Happiness as the *Means* of removing the Uneasiness we feel in the Absence of Happiness, then at least the Desire of *removing our own Uneasiness* is an *ultimate Desire:* and why may we not have other *ultimate Desires?* Sect. 2.

" But can any Being be *concerned* a-" bout the Absence of an Event which " gives it no *Uneasiness?*" Perhaps superior Natures desire without *uneasy Sensation.* But what if we cannot? We may be uneasy while a desired Event is in Suspence, and yet not desire this Event only as the *Means* of removing this Uneasiness: Nay, if we did not desire the Event without View to this *Uneasiness*, we should never have brought the Uneasiness upon ourselves by *desiring* it. So likewise we may *feel Delight* upon the Existence of a desired Event, when yet we did not desire the Event only as the *Means* of obtaining this Delight; even as we often receive Delight from Events which we had an Aversion to.

VI. If any one should ask, since none of these Motives of Self-Interest excite our Bene-

Sect. 2. Benevolence, but we are in virtuous Actions intending ſolely the Good of others, to what Purpoſe ſerves our *moral Senſe*, our *Senſe of Pleaſure from the Happineſs of others?* To what Purpoſe ſerves the *wiſe Order of Nature*, by which Virtue is even made generally advantageous in this Life? To what End are *eternal Rewards* appointed and revealed? The Anſwer to theſe Queſtions was given partly already: all theſe Motives may make us deſire to have *benevolent Affections*, and conſequently turn our *Attention* to thoſe Qualities in Objects which excite them; they may overbalance all apparent *contrary Motives*, and all Temptations to Vice. But farther, I hope it will be ſtill thought an End worthy of the DEITY, to make the Virtuous happy, by a wiſe Conſtitution of Nature, whether the Virtuous were in every Action intending to obtain this Happineſs or not. Beneficent Actions tend to the publick Good; it is therefore good and kind to give all poſſible *additional Motives* to them; and to excite Men, who have ſome weak Degrees of good *Affection*, to promote the publick Good more vigorouſly by Motives of *Self-Intereſt*; or even to excite thoſe who have no Virtue at all to external *Acts of Beneficence*, and to reſtrain them from Vice *.

FROM

* *LET it be alſo remembred, that every Conſideration ſuggeſted in the Goſpel, as an* additional Motive *to beneficent Actions,*

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FROM the Whole it may appear, that there is in human Nature a *diſintereſted ultimate Deſire* of the Happineſs of others; and that our *Moral Senſe* determines us to approve only ſuch Actions as virtuous, which are apprehended to proceed partly at leaſt from ſuch Deſire.

VII. As

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tions, is not immediately to be looked upon as the proper Motive *to Virtue, or what would engage our Approbation of Actions flowing from it alone. We have the* Promiſes of this Life *as well as of the next, and yet the former alone was never thought a virtuous Principle. Some Texts are alſo brought to confute this Scheme of diſintereſted Affections as the only truly virtuous Principle, ſuch as* 1 Corinth. Ch. XV. ver. 32. *which imports no more than this, "That if there were no Reſurrec-" tion, and conſequently* Chriſt *had not riſen, and therefore " his Religion only an Impoſture, it had been the greateſt Folly " in the Apoſtle to have expoſed himſelf to Perſecution:" Not that the Proſpect of a future Reward was the only Motive to Virtue, or that the only Affection of Mind which made the Apoſtle bear Perſecution was, Hope of Reward.*

ANOTHER Text inſiſted on is, Heb. XI. ver. 6. *But this only means, either "that no Man can perform religious Acts " acceptably to God, who does not believe his Exiſtence and " Goodneſs, which is ſelf-evident: Or it is to be underſtood of " embracing the true Religion, and adhering to it under the " moſt ſevere Perſecutions, which we may allow no Man could " do without Hopes of future Reward." Now this does not prove either that our* ſole, *or our* ſtrongeſt Incitement *to virtuous Actions is a Proſpect of Intereſt, nor even that any Action is approved, becauſe it ſprings from Hope of Reward.*

HEB. XII. ver. 2. *is chiefly urged, but with leaſt Ground: if we have it well tranſlated, it only aſſerts, "That the Hope " of future Joy was one Incitement to our Saviour in enduring " Sufferings," not that this was the* principal Spring *of his beneficent Actions, or that they were made amiable by ariſing from it. Nay, this* Joy *may be underſtood metonymically, for its Object,* viz. the Salvation of Mankind. *Not to mention another*

Sect. 2.

Human Nature incapable of ſedate Malice.

VII. As to Malice, *Human Nature* ſeems ſcarce capable of *malicious diſintereſted Hatred*, or a ſedate ultimate Deſire of the Miſery of others, when we imagine them no way pernicious to us, or oppoſite to our *Intereſt:* And for that Hatred which makes us oppoſe *thoſe* whoſe Intereſts are oppoſite to *ours*, it is only the Effect of *Self-Love*, and not of *diſintereſted Malice.* A ſudden Paſſion may give us wrong Repreſentations of our Fellow-Creatures, and for a little time repreſent them as *abſolutely evil*; and during this Imagination perhaps we may give ſome Evidences of *diſintereſted Malice:* but as ſoon as we reflect upon *human Nature*, and form juſt Conceptions, this *unnatural* Paſſion is allay'd, and only *Self-Love* remains,

another Tranſlation long ago known to Criticks; ſome of whom inſiſt that ἀντὶ *is ſeldom uſed for the* final Cauſe; *but means* inſtead of, *in this Place, as well as in Texts debated with the* Socinians: *And then this Verſe may be thus tranſlated;* " *Who inſtead, of that Joy which was ready at hand, or in* " *his Power to have enjoyed. as he had from the Beginning,* " *he ſubmitted to the Croſs.*" *Nor is there any thing to confute this Tranſlation; ſave that ſome* Antitheſis *between our ſuffering from Faith in a Reward, and his ſuffering in like manner, is not kept up ſo well; as if it were a neceſſary Perfection in the Scriptures to abound in ſuch* Antitheſes. *For in this Tranſlation there is good Reaſoning, in ſhewing how our Saviour's Sufferings are enhanced by his exchanging a State of Joy for them, parallel to* Philip. II. ver. 6, 7.

WHOEVER would appeal to the general Strain of the Chriſtian Exhortations, will find diſintereſted Love *more inculcated, and* Motives of Gratitude *more frequently ſuggeſted, than any others.*

which may make us, from *Self-Intereſt*, oppoſe our Adverſaries. Sect. 2.

EVERY one at preſent rejoices in the Deſtruction of our *Pirates*; and yet let us ſuppoſe a Band of ſuch Villians caſt in upon ſome deſolate Iſland, and that we were aſſur'd ſome Fate would confine them there perpetually, ſo that they ſhould diſturb Mankind no more: Now let us calmly reflect, that theſe Perſons are capable of Knowledge and Counſel, may be happy and joyful, or may be involv'd in Miſery, Sorrow, and Pain; that they may return to a State of *Love*, *Humanity*, *Kindneſs*, and become *Friends*, *Citizens*, *Huſbands*, *Parents*, with all the ſweet Sentiments which accompany theſe Relations: then let us aſk ourſelves, when *Self-Love*, or Regard to the Safety of better Men, no longer makes us deſire their Deſtruction, and when we ceaſe to look upon them under the Ideas ſuggeſted by freſh Reſentment of Injuries done to us or our Friends, as utterly incapable of any good *moral Quality*; whether we would wiſh them the Fate of CADMUS's *Army*, by plunging their Swords in each others Breaſt, or a worſe Fate by the moſt exquiſite Tortures; or rather, that they ſhould recover the ordinary Affections of Men, become *kind*, *compaſſionate*, and *friendly*; contrive *Laws*, *Conſtitutions*, *Governments*, *Properties*;

Sect. 2. and form an honeſt happy Society with *Marriages*, and

Relations dear, and all the Charities
Of Father, Son, and Brother——*?*

I fancy the latter would be the Wiſh of every Mortal, notwithſtanding our preſent juſt Abhorrence of them from *Self-Intereſt*, or *publick Love*, and Deſire of promoting the Intereſt of our Friends who are expos'd to their Fury. Now this plainly evidences, that we ſcarce ever have any *ſedate Malice* againſt any Perſon, or ultimate Deſire of his Miſery. Our calm Ill-will is only from Oppoſition of *Intereſt*; or if we can entertain *ſedate Malice*, it muſt be toward a Character apprehended *neceſſarily* and *unalterably Evil* in a *moral Senſe*; ſuch as a ſudden Paſſion ſometimes repreſents our Enemies to us: yet perhaps no *ſuch Being* occurs to us among the Works of a *good* DEITY.

Other Affections diſinterеſted.

VIII. HAVING offer'd what may perhaps prove, That neither our *Eſteem* nor *Benevolence* is founded on *Self-Love*, or Views of *Intereſt*; let us ſee "if ſome *other Affections*, in which *Virtue* may be plac'd, do "ariſe from *Self-Love*;" ſuch as *Fear*, or *Reverence*, ariſing from an Apprehenſion of

* Milt. Par. Loſt. B. iv. ver. 756.

Goodneſs,

Goodneſs, *Power*, and *Juſtice*. For no body apprehends any *Virtue* in *baſe Dread* and *Servitude* toward a *powerful evil Being*: This is indeed the *meaneſt Selfiſhneſs*. Now the ſame Arguments which prove *Eſteem* to be *diſintereſted*, will prove this *honourable Reverence* to be ſo too; for it plainly ariſes from an Apprehenſion of *amiable Qualities* in the Perſon, and *Love* toward him, which raiſes an *Abhorrence* of offending him. Could we reverence a *Being* becauſe it was our *Intereſt* to do ſo, a third Perſon might bribe us into Reverence toward a *Being* neither *good*, nor *powerful*, which every one ſees to be a Jeſt. And this we might ſhew to be common to all other Paſſions, which have been reputed virtuous. Sect. 2.

IX. THERE is one Objection againſt *diſintereſted Good-will*, which occurs from conſidering, "That nothing ſo effectually excites our *Love* toward rational Agents, as their *Beneficence*, and eſpecially toward ourſelves; whence we are led to imagine, that our Love of Perſons, as well as irrational Objects, flows intirely from *Self-Intereſt*." But let us here examine ourſelves more narrowly. Do we only wiſh well to the *Beneficent*, becauſe it is our *Intereſt* to do ſo? Or do we chooſe to love them, becauſe our *Love* is the means of procuring their *Bounty*? If it be ſo, then we could indifferently love any Character, even *Objections.*

Sect. 2. to obtain the Bounty of a third Perſon; or we could be brib'd by a third Perſon to love the greateſt Villain heartily, as we may be brib'd to external Offices: Now this is plainly impoſſible. Nay, farther, is not our *Good-will* the Conſequent of *Bounty*, and not the Means of procuring it? External Shew, Obſequiouſneſs, and Diſſimulation may precede an Opinion of *Beneficence*; but *real Love* always preſuppoſes it, and will neceſſarily ariſe even when we expect no more, from Conſideration of paſt Benefits.

Or can any one ſay he only loves the *Beneficent*, as he does a *Field* or *Garden*, becauſe of its *Advantage?* His *Love* then muſt ceaſe toward one who has ruin'd himſelf in kind Offices to him, when he can do him no more; as we ceaſe to love an inanimate Object which ceaſes to be uſeful, unleſs a Poetical *Proſopopœia* animate it, and raiſe an imaginary Gratitude, which is indeed pretty common. *Beneficence* then muſt increaſe our Good-will, as it raiſes *Complacence*, which is ſtill attended with ſtronger Degrees of Benevolence: and hence we love even thoſe who are *beneficent* to others.

In the Benefits which we receive ourſelves, we are more fully ſenſible of their Value, and of the Circumſtances of the Action, which are Evidences of a generous Temper in the *Donor*; and from the good Opinion

Opinion we have of ourſelves, we are apt to look upon the Kindneſs as better employ'd, than when it is beſtow'd on others, of whom perhaps we have leſs favourable Sentiments. It is however ſufficient to remove the Objection, that *Bounty* from a *Donor* apprehended as *morally evil*, or extorted by *Force*, or conferr'd with ſome View of *Self-Intereſt*, will not procure *real Good-will*; nay, it may raiſe *Indignation*, if we ſuſpect Diſſimulation of Love, or a Deſign to allure us into any thing diſhonourable: whereas wiſely employ'd *Bounty* is always approv'd, and gains Love to the Author from all who hear of it. Sect. 2.

Virtue diſintereſted.

If then no *ultimate Good-will* toward Perſons ariſes from *Self-Love*, or Views of *Intereſt*, and all *Virtue* flows from *Good-will*, or ſome other Affection equally *diſintereſted*; it remains, "That there muſt be ſome other "Affection than *Self-Love* or *Intereſt*, which "excites us to the Actions we call *Virtuous*."

Had we no other *ultimate Deſire* but that of *private Advantage*, we muſt imagine that every *rational Being* acts only for its own *Advantage*; and however we may call a *beneficent Being* a *good Being*, becauſe it acts for our Advantage, yet upon *this Scheme* we ſhould not be apt to think there is any *beneficent Being* in *Nature*, or a *Being* who acts for the *Good* of others. Particularly,

Sect. 2. If there is no *Senſe* of Excellence in *publick Love*, and promoting the Happineſs of others, whence ſhould this Perſuaſion ariſe, "That the DEITY will make the *Virtuous* happy?" Can we prove that it is for the *Advantage* of the DEITY to do ſo? This I fancy will be look'd upon as very abſurd, by many who yet expect Mercy and Beneficence in the DEITY. And if there be ſuch Diſpoſitions in the DEITY, where is the Impoſſibility of ſome ſmall Degree of this *publick Love* in his Creatures? And why muſt they be ſuppos'd incapable of acting but from *Self-Love?*

IN ſhort, without acknowledging ſome other Principle of Action in rational Agents than *Self-Love*, I ſee no Foundation to expect *Beneficence*, or *Rewards* from *God* or *Man*, farther than it is the *Intereſt* of the *Benefactor*; and all Expectation of Benefits from a *Being* whoſe Intereſts are independent on us, muſt be *perfectly ridiculous.* What ſhould engage the DEITY to reward *Virtue? Virtue* is commonly ſuppos'd, upon *this Scheme*, to be only *a conſulting our own Happineſs in the moſt artful way, conſiſtently with the Good of the Whole*; and in *Vice* the *ſame thing* is fooliſhly purſu'd, in a manner which will not ſo probably ſucceed, and which is contrary to the *Good* of the *Whole.* But how is the DEITY concern'd

cern'd in this *Whole*, if every Agent always acts from *Self-Love?* And what Ground have we, from the Idea of infinite Power and Art, to believe the DEITY is *good* in the *Chriſtian Senſe*, that is, *ſtudious of the Good of his Creatures?* Perhaps the *Miſery* of his Creatures may give him as much Pleaſure, as their *Happineſs:* And who can find fault, or blame ſuch a *Being* to ſtudy their *Miſery?* for what elſe ſhould we expect? A *Manichean evil God*, is a Notion which Men would as readily run into, as that of a *good one*, if there is no Excellence in *diſintereſted Love*, and no *Being* acts but for its own *Advantage*; unleſs we prov'd, that the Happineſs of *Creatures* was *advantageous* to the DEITY. Sect. 2.

The true Spring of Virtue.

X. HAVING remov'd theſe *falſe Springs* of *virtuous Actions*, let us next eſtabliſh the *true one*, viz. *ſome Determination of our Nature to ſtudy the Good of others*; or *ſome Inſtinct, antecedent to all Reaſon from Intereſt, which influences us to the Love of others*; even as the *moral Senſe*, * above explain'd, determines us to *approve* the Actions which flow from *this Love* in ourſelves or others. This *diſintereſted Affection* may appear ſtrange to Men impreſs'd with Notions of *Self-Love*, as the *ſole* Spring of Action, from

* See *Sect.* i.

Sect. 2. the Pulpit, the Schools, the Syſtems, and Converſations regulated by them: but let us conſider it in its ſtrongeſt and ſimpleſt Kinds; and when we ſee the Poſſibility of it in theſe Inſtances, we may eaſily diſcover its *univerſal Extent.*

Natural Affection.

AN honeſt *Farmer* will tell you, that he ſtudies the *Preſervation* and *Happineſs* of his Children, and loves them without any Deſign of Good to himſelf. But ſay ſome of our *Philoſophers*, "The Happineſs of their "Children gives Parents Pleaſure, and their "Miſery gives them Pain; and therefore to "obtain the *former*, and avoid the *latter*, "they ſtudy, from *Self-Love*, the Good of "their Children." Suppoſe ſeveral Merchants join'd in Partnerſhip of their whole Effects; one of them is employ'd abroad in managing the Stock of the Company; his Proſperity occaſions Gain to all, and his Loſſes give them Pain for their Share in the Loſs: Is this then the ſame Kind of Affection with *that* of Parents to their Children? Is there the ſame tender, perſonal Regard? I fancy no Parent will ſay ſo. In this Caſe of Merchants there is a plain Conjunction of Intereſt; but whence the Conjunction of Intereſt between the *Parent* and *Child?* Do the Child's *Senſations* give Pleaſure or Pain to the Parent? Is the Parent *hungry*, *thirſty*, *ſick*, when his Children

dren are ſo? No; but *his* naturally implanted Deſire of their Good, and Averſion to their Miſery, makes him be affected with Joy or Sorrow from their Pleaſures or Pains. This Deſire then is antecedent to the Conjunction of Intereſt, and the Cauſe of it, not the Effect: it then muſt be *diſintereſted*. "No, ſay others, Children are "*Parts* of ourſelves, and in loving them we "but love *ourſelves* in them." A very good Anſwer! Let us carry it as far as it will go. How are they *Parts* of ourſelves? Not as a *Leg* or an *Arm:* We are not conſcious of their Senſations. "But *their* Bodies were "form'd from Parts of *ours*." So is a *Fly*, or a *Maggot*, which may breed in any diſcharg'd Blood or Humour: Very dear Inſects ſurely! there muſt be ſomething elſe then which makes Children *Parts* of ourſelves; and what is this but *that Affection*, which NATURE determines us to have toward them? *This Love* makes them *Parts* of ourſelves, and therefore does not flow from their being ſo before. This is indeed a good Metaphor; and where-ever we find a Determination among ſeveral rational Agents to *mutual Love*, let *each Individual* be look'd upon as a *Part* of a great *Whole*, or *Syſtem*, and concern himſelf in the *publick Good* of it. Sect. 2.

ANOTHER Author thinks all this eaſily deducible from Self-Love. "Children are "not

Sect. 2. " not only made of our Bodies, but re-
" ſemble us in Body and Mind; they are
" rational Agents as we are, and we only
" love our own Likeneſs in them." Very good all this. What is *Likeneſs?* 'Tis not *individual Sameneſs*; 'tis only being included under one general or ſpecifical Idea. Thus there is Likeneſs between us and other Mens Children, thus any Man is like any other, in ſome Reſpects; a Man is alſo like an Angel, and in ſome Reſpects like a Brute. Is there then a natural Diſpoſition in every Man to *love his Like*, to wiſh well not only to his individual Self, but to any other like rational or ſenſitive Being? and this Diſpoſition ſtrongeſt, where there is the greateſt Likeneſs in the more noble Qualities? If all this is called by the Name *Self-Love*; be it ſo: The higheſt Myſtick needs no more-diſintereſted Principle; 'tis not confined to the Individual, but terminates ultimately on the Good of others, and may extend to all; ſince each one ſome way reſembles each other. Nothing can be better than this Self-Love, nothing more generous.

If any alledge, That " Parents always de-
" rive Pleaſure, often Honour, and ſome-
" times Wealth, from the Wiſdom and
" Proſperity of their Children, and hence
" all Parental Solicitude ariſes;" let us recollect what was ſaid above; all theſe Motives ceaſe upon Approach of Death, and yet

yet the Affection is as ſtrong then as ever. Let Parents examine their own Hearts, and ſee if theſe Views are the only Springs of their Affection, and that toward the moſt infirm, from whom there is leaſt Hope. Sect. 2.

BUT a later Author obſerves, * "That "*natural Affection* in Parents is *weak*, till "the Children begin to give Evidences of "*Knowledge* and *Affections*." Mothers ſay they feel it ſtrong from the very firſt: and yet I could wiſh, for the Deſtruction of his Hypotheſis, that what he alledges was true; as I fancy it is in ſome meaſure, tho' we may find in ſome Parents an Affection toward Idiots. The obſerving of *Underſtanding* and *Affections* in Children, which make them appear *moral Agents*, can increaſe Love toward them without Proſpect of *Intereſt*; for I hope, this Increaſe of Love is not from Proſpect of Advantage from the Knowledge or Affections of Children, for whom Parents are ſtill toiling, and never intend to be refunded their Expences, or recompens'd for their Labour, but in Caſes of extreme Neceſſity. If then the obſerving a *Moral Capacity* can be the occaſion of increaſing Love without *Self-Intereſt*, even from the *Frame* of our *Nature*; pray, may not *this*

* See the Fable of the Bees, *Pag.* 68. *3d Ed.*

be

Sect. 2. be a Foundation of *weaker* degrees of Love, where there is no preceding Tie of Parentage, and extend it to *all Mankind?*

Publick Affections, natural.

XI. And that this is ſo in Fact, will appear by conſidering ſome more diſtant Attachments. If we obſerve any Neighbours, from whom perhaps we have receiv'd no good Offices, form'd into *Friendſhips*, *Families*, *Partnerſhips*, and with Honeſty and Kindneſs aſſiſting each other; pray aſk any Mortal, if he would not more deſire their *Proſperity*, when their Intereſts are no way inconſiſtent with his own, than their *Miſery* and *Ruin?* and you ſhall find a *Bond* of *Benevolence* farther extended than a *Family* and *Children*, altho' the Ties are not ſo ſtrong. Again, ſuppoſe a Perſon, for Trade, had left his *native Country*, and with all his Kindred had ſettled his Fortunes abroad, without any View of returning; and only imagine he had receiv'd no Injuries from his Country: aſk ſuch a Man, would he not rather deſire the *Proſperity* of his Country? Or could he, now that his Intereſts are ſeparated from that of his Nation, as readily wiſh that it was laid waſte by *Tyranny*, or a *foreign* Power? I fancy his Anſwer would ſhew us *a Benevolence* extended beyond *Neighbourhoods* or *Acquaintances*. Let a Man of a *compos'd* Temper, out of the Hurry of his *private* Affairs, only read of the *Con-*

Conſtitution of a *foreign* Country, even in the *moſt diſtant* Parts of the Earth, and obſerve *Art*, *Deſign*, and a *Study* of *publick Good* in the *Laws* of this Aſſociation; and he ſhall find his Mind *mov'd* in their Favour; he ſhall be *contriving* Rectifications and Amendments in their Conſtitution, and *regret* any unlucky Part of it, which may be pernicious to their Intereſt; he ſhall *bewail* any Diſaſter which befalls them, and *accompany* all their Fortunes with the Affections of a Friend. Now this proves *Benevolence* to be in ſome degree extended to all Mankind, where there is no *interfering* Intereſt, which from *Self-Love* may obſtruct it. And had we any Notions of *rational Agents*, capable of moral Affections, in the *moſt diſtant* Planets, our *good Wiſhes* would ſtill attend them, and we ſhould deſire their Happineſs. And that all theſe Affections, whether more or leſs extenſive, are properly *diſintereſted*, not even founded on any Deſire of that Happineſs we may expect in ſeeing their proſperous Condition; may appear from this, that they would continue even at the Inſtant of our Death, or intire Deſtruction, as was already obſerved, *Art.* IV. of this Section. Sect. 2.

XII. HERE we may tranſiently remark the Foundation of what we call *national Love*, or LOVE of one's *native Country*. *National Love.*

Whatever

Sect. 2. Whatever Place we have liv'd in for any conſiderable time, there we have moſt diſtinctly remark'd the *various Affections* of *human Nature*; we have known many *lovely Characters*; we remember the *Aſſociations*, *Friendſhips*, *Families*, *natural Affections*, and other *human Sentiments*: our *moral Senſe* determines us to approve theſe *lovely Diſpoſitions*, where we have moſt diſtinctly obſerv'd them; and our *Benevolence* concerns us in the Intereſts of thoſe Perſons poſſeſs'd of them. When we come to obſerve the like as diſtinctly in *another* Country, we begin to acquire a *national Love* toward it alſo; nor has our *own* Country any other Preference in our Idea, unleſs it be by an *Aſſociation* of the pleaſant Ideas of our Youth, with the *Buildings*, *Fields*, and *Woods* where we receiv'd them. This may let us ſee how *Tyranny*, *Faction*, a *Neglect* of Juſtice, a *Corruption* of Manners, and *any thing* which occaſions the Miſery of the Subjects, deſtroys this *national Love*, and the *dear Idea* of a COUNTRY.

The Reaſon why natural Affections do not always appear.

WE ought here to obſerve, That the only Reaſon of that *apparent Want* of natural Affection, among *collateral Relations*, is, that theſe *natural Inclinations*, in many Caſes, are overpower'd by *Self-Love*, where there happens any *Oppoſition* of Intereſts; but where this does not happen, we ſhall find

find all Mankind under its Influence, tho' with different Degrees of Strength, according to the *nearer* or *more remote* Relations they ſtand in to each other; and according as the *natural Affection* of *Benevolence* is join'd with and ſtrengthen'd by *Eſteem*, *Gratitude*, *Compaſſion*, or *other kind Affections*; or on the contrary, weaken'd by *Diſplicence*, *Anger*, or *Envy*. Sect. 2.

SECT.

SECT. III.

The Senſe *of* Virtue, *and the* various Opinions *about it*, *reducible to* one general Foundation. *The Manner of computing the* Morality *of* Actions.

All Virtue benevolent.

I. IF we examine all the Actions which are counted *amiable* any where, and inquire into the Grounds upon which they are *approv'd*, we ſhall find that in the Opinion of the Perſon who approves them, they generally appear as BENEVOLENT, or flowing from *Good-will to others*, and a Study of their Happineſs, whether the *Approver* be one of the Perſons belov'd, or profited, or not; ſo that all thoſe *kind Affections* which incline us to make others happy, and all Actions ſuppos'd to flow from *ſuch* Affections, appear *morally good*, if while they are *benevolent* towards ſome Perſons, they be not *pernicious* to others. Nor ſhall we find any thing amiable in any Action whatſoever, where there is no *Benevolence* imagin'd; nor in any Diſpoſition, or Capacity, which is not ſuppos'd applicable to, and deſign'd for, *benevolent* Purpoſes. Nay,

Nay, as was before obſerv'd *, the Actions which in Fact are exceedingly uſeful, ſhall appear void of *moral Beauty*, if we know they proceeded from no kind Intentions towards others; and yet an unſucceſsful Attempt of Kindneſs, or of promoting *publick Good*, ſhall appear as amiable as the moſt ſucceſsful, if it flow'd from as *ſtrong Benevolence*. Sect. 3.

II. HENCE *thoſe* Affections, which would lead us to do Good to our Benefactor, ſhall appear *amiable*, and the *contrary* Affections *odious*, even when our Actions cannot poſſibly be of any Advantage or Hurt to him. Thus a *ſincere Love* and *Gratitude* toward our Benefactor, a *chearful Readineſs* to do whatever he ſhall require, how burdenſom ſoever, a *hearty Inclination* to comply with his Intentions, and *Contentment* with the State he has plac'd us in, are the ſtrongeſt Evidences of *Benevolence* we can ſhew to ſuch a Perſon; and therefore they muſt appear exceedingly *amiable*. And under theſe is included all the *rational Devotion*, or *Religion* toward a DEITY apprehended as *good*, which we can poſſibly perform. *Religion.*

WE may here tranſiently obſerve one Circumſtance in the *Frame* of our *Nature*,

* See *Sect.* ii. Art. 3. *Par.* 1. *Art.* 9. *Par.* 2.

Sect. 3. which is wonderfully adapted to promote *Benevolence*, *viz.* That as a Benefit conferr'd neceſſarily raiſes *Gratitude* in the Perſon who receives it, ſo the Expreſſions of this Gratitude, even from the meaneſt of Mankind, are *wonderfully delightful* to the Benefactor. Never were there any Mortals ſo poor, ſo inconſiderable, whoſe grateful Praiſe would not be ſome way delightful; and by whom we would not rather chooſe to be belov'd than hated, if their Love no way evidenc'd us to be Partners in their Vices, or concern'd in their Meanneſs. And thus the *moſt abject Perſon oblig'd* is capable, and inclin'd to make no ſmall Addition to our Happineſs by his *Love* and *Gratitude*, when he is utterly incapable of any other Return, and when we expect none from him: Thus,

——————A grateful Mind
By owing owes not, but ſtill pays, at once
*Indebted and diſcharg'd————**

As to *external Performances* of Religion, they are no doubt very various in different Nations and Ages; and *Education* may give Men Opinions, that certain Actions are pleaſing, and others diſpleaſing to the DEITY: but then, wherever any external Rite of Worſhip is approv'd, there alſo it is look'd upon to proceed from *Love* toward the

* Par. Loſt, *B.* iv. l. 55.

DEITY,

DEITY, or ſome other Affection neceſſarily join'd with *Love*, as *Reverence*, *Repentance*, or *Sorrow* to have offended. So that the general Principle of *Love* is the Foundation of all the *apparent moral Excellence*, even in the moſt fantaſtick Rites of Worſhip which were ever approv'd. For as to Rites deſign'd only to appeaſe a *furious Being*, no Mortal, I fancy, apprehends there is any *Virtue*, or *Excellence* in them; but that they are choſen only as the diſhonourable Means of avoiding a greater Evil. Now as there are various Opinions about what is acceptable to the DEITY, it neceſſarily follows, "That, accordingly, *Practices*, and *Approbation*, muſt be "*various*; tho' all the *moral Goodneſs* of "Actions is ſtill preſum'd to flow from "*Love*." Sect. 3.

III. AGAIN, that we may ſee how *Benevolence* is the Foundation of all apprehended *Excellence* in *ſocial Virtues*, let us only obſerve, That amidſt the Diverſity of Sentiments on this Head among various Sects, this is ſtill allow'd to be the way of deciding the Controverſy about any diſputed Practice, *viz.* to inquire whether this Conduct, or the contrary, will moſt effectually promote the *publick Good*. The *Morality* is immediately adjuſted, when the natural Tendency, or Influence of the Action upon the *univerſal natural Good* of *Mankind*, is agreed upon. That which produces more *Good* than *Evil* *Social Virtues.*

Sect. 3. in the *Whole*, is acknowledg'd *good*; and what does not, is counted *evil*. In this Caſe, we no other way regard the Good of the *Actor*, or that of thoſe who are thus inquiring, than as they make a Part of the great *Syſtem*.

In our late Debates about *Paſſive Obedience*, and the Right of *Reſiſtance* in Defence of *Privileges*, the Point diſputed among Men of Senſe was, "Whether *univerſal Submiſſion* would probably be attended with greater *natural Evils*, than *temporary Inſurrections*, when Privileges are invaded? and not, Whether what tended in the Whole to the *publick natural Good*, was alſo *morally good?*" And if a *divine Command* was alledg'd in Favour of the Doctrine of *Paſſive Obedience*, this would, no doubt, by its eternal Sanctions caſt the Balance of *natural Good* to its own Side, and determine our Election from *Intereſt*; and yet *our Senſe* of the *moral Good* in *Paſſive Obedience*, would ſtill be founded upon ſome Species of *Benevolence*, ſuch as *Gratitude* toward the DEITY, and *Submiſſion* to his Will to whom we are ſo much oblig'd. But I fancy thoſe, who believe the DEITY to be *good*, would not raſhly alledge ſuch a Command, unleſs they alſo aſſerted, that the thing commanded did tend more to the *univerſal Good*, than the contrary, either by preventing the external Evils of *Civil War*,

or

or by enuring Men to *Patience*, or ſome *other* *Quality* which they apprehended neceſſary to their everlaſting Happineſs. And were it not ſo, *Paſſive Obedience* might be recommended as an *inglorious Method* of eſcaping a greater Miſchief, but could never have any thing *morally amiable* in it. Sect. 3.

But let us quit the Diſputes of the *Learned*, on whom, it may be alledg'd, *Cuſtom* and *Education* have a powerful Influence; and conſider upon what Grounds, in common Life, Actions are *approv'd* or *condemn'd*, *vindicated* or *excus'd*. We are univerſally aſham'd to ſay an Action is *juſt*, becauſe it tends to my *Advantage*, or to the *Advantage* of the *Actor*: And we as ſeldom condemn a *beneficent kind Action*, becauſe it is not *advantageous* to us, or to the *Actor*. *Blame* and *Cenſure* are founded on a Tendency to *publick Evil*, or a Principle of *private Malice* in the *Agent*, or *Neglect* at leaſt of the *Good* of others; on *Inhumanity* of Temper, or at leaſt ſuch *ſtrong Selfiſhneſs* as makes the *Agent* careleſs of the Sufferings of others: and thus we *blame* and *cenſure* when the Action no way affects ourſelves. All the moving and perſuaſive Vindications of Actions, which may, from ſome *partial* evil Tendency, appear *evil*, are taken from this, that they were neceſſary to ſome *greater Good*, which counterbalanc'd the *Evil*: "*Se-*
"*verity* toward a few, is *Compaſſion* toward

Sect. 3. " Multitudes.— *Tranſitory Puniſhments* are " neceſſary for avoiding more *durable Evils*. " —Did not *ſome* ſuffer on ſuch Occaſions, " there would be *no living* for honeſt Men," —and ſuch like. And even when an Action cannot be intirely juſtify'd, yet how greatly is the Guilt extenuated, if we can alledge, " That it was only the Effect of " *Inadvertence* without *Malice*, or of *par-* " *tial good Nature*, *Friendſhip*, *Compaſſion*, " *natural Affection*, or *Love* of a *Party?*" All theſe Conſiderations ſhew, what is the *univerſal Foundation* of *our Senſe* of *moral Good*, or *Evil*, viz. *Benevolence* toward others on the one hand, and *Malice*, or even *Indolence*, and *Unconcernedneſs* about the *manifeſt publick Evil* on the other. And let it be here obſerv'd, that we are ſo far from imagining all Men to act only from *Self-Love*, that we univerſally expect in others a Regard for the *Publick*; and do not look upon the Want of this, as barely the Abſence of *moral Good*, or *Virtue*, but even as *poſitively evil* and *hateful*.

Moral Evil not always Malice.

IV. CONTRARIES may illuſtrate each other; let us therefore obſerve the *general Foundation* of *our Senſe* of *moral Evil* more particularly. *Diſintereſted Malice*, or ultimate Deſire of the Miſery of others, is the higheſt Pitch of what we count *vicious*; and every Action appears *evil*, which is imagin'd to flow from any Degree of *this Affection*.

Perhaps a *violent Paſſion* may hurry Men into it for a few Moments, and our *raſh angry Sentiments* of our Enemies, may repreſent them as having ſuch *odious Diſpoſitions*; but it is very probable, from the Reaſons offer'd above *, that there is no ſuch Degree of Wickedneſs in *human Nature*, as, in *cold Blood*, to deſire the *Miſery* of others, when it is conceiv'd no way uſeful to *our Intereſts*. Sect. 3.

The frequent, and ſeemingly unprovoked Cruelties of the Nero's and Domitian's, are often alledged in Oppoſition to all this; but perhaps unjuſtly. Such Tyrants are conſcious that they are hated by all thoſe whom the World repute virtuous, and they apprehend Danger from them: A Tyrant looks upon ſuch Men as deſigning, artful, or ambitious, under a falſe Shew of Virtue. He imagines the ſureſt Means of his own Safety is to appear terrible, and to deprive his Enemies of all Hopes of eſcaping by his Compaſſion. The Fame of Virtue in eminent Subjects is matter of Envy, and is a Reproach upon the Tyrant: It weakens his Power, and makes them dangerous to him. *Power* becomes the Object of Delight to the Tyrant; and in Oſtentation of it, he may break through all Regards to Juſtice and Humanity. Habits of Cruelty can be acquired in ſuch

* See *Sect.* ii. *Art.* 4.

Sect. 3. a Courſe. Any of theſe apparent Intereſts ſeem better to account for the Cruelties of Tyrants, than the ſuppoſing in them a Principle of *calm Malice* without *Intereſt*, of which the *reſt* of *Mankind* ſeem intirely incapable.

Temper of a Tyrant. THE Temper of a *Tyrant* ſeems a continu'd State of *Anger*, *Hatred*, and *Fear*. To form our Judgment then of his Motives of Action, and thoſe of Men of like Tempers in lower Stations, let us reflect upon the Apprehenſions we form of Mankind, when we are under any of thoſe Paſſions which to the *Tyrant* are *habitual*. When we are under the freſh Impreſſions of an Injury, we find, that our Minds are wholly fill'd with Apprehenſions of the Perſon who injur'd us, as if he were *abſolutely evil*, and *delighted* in doing Miſchief: We overlook the Virtues, which, when calm, we could have obſerv'd in him: we forget that perhaps he acted from *Self-Love*, and not *Malice*, or, it may be, ſome *generous* or *kind Intention* toward others. Theſe, probably, are the Opinions which a *Tyrant* conſtantly forms concerning *Mankind*; and having very much weaken'd all *kind Affections* in himſelf, however he may pretend to them, he judges of the Tempers of others by his own. And were Men really ſuch as he apprehends them, his Treatment of them would not be very unreaſonable. We ſhall generally find our Paſſions

ſions ariſing ſuitably to the Apprehenſions we form of others: if they are raſhly form'd upon ſome ſudden ſlight Views, it is no Wonder if we find Diſpoſitions following upon them, very little ſuited to the *real State of human Nature.* Sect. 3.

THE ordinary Spring of *Vice* then among Men, muſt be a *miſtaken Self-Love*, made ſo violent, as to overcome *Benevolence*; or ſuch ſtrong *Appetites*, or Paſſions either ſelfiſh, or toward ſome narrow Syſtems, as overcome our Regard to Publick Good; or *Affections* ariſing from *falſe*, and *raſhly form'd Opinions* of *Mankind*; which we run into thro' the Weakneſs of our *Benevolence.* When Men, who had good Opinions of each other, happen to have *contrary Intereſts*, they are apt to have their *good Opinions* of each other *abated*, by imagining a *deſign'd Oppoſition* from *Malice*; without this, they can ſcarcely *hate* one another. Thus two *Candidates* for the ſame Office wiſh each other *dead*, becauſe that is an ordinary way by which Men make room for each other; but if there remains any Reflection on each other's Virtue, as there ſometimes may in benevolent Tempers, then their Oppoſition may be without *Hatred*; and if another better Poſt, where there is no Competition, were beſtow'd on one of them, the other ſhall rejoice at it. *Ordinary Springs of Vice.*

V. ACTIONS which flow ſolely from *Self-Love*, *Self Love indifferent.*

Sect. 3. *Love*, and yet evidence no want of *Benevolence*, having no hurtful Effects upon others, ſeem of a middle Nature, neither virtuous nor vicious, and neither raiſe the *Love* or *Hatred* of the Obſerver. Our Reaſon can indeed diſcover certain Bounds, within which we may not only act from *Self-Love*, conſiſtently with the *Good* of the *Whole*; but every Mortal's acting thus within theſe Bounds for his own *Good*, is abſolutely neceſſary for the *Good* of the *Whole*; and the Want of ſuch *Self-Love* would be *univerſally pernicious*. Hence, he who purſues his own *private Good*, with an Intention alſo to concur with that Conſtitution which tends to the *Good* of the *Whole*; and much more he who promotes his *own Good*, with a direct View of making himſelf more capable of ſerving God, or doing good to *Mankind*; acts not only *innocently*, but alſo *honourably*, and *virtuouſly*: for in both theſe Caſes, *Benevolence* concurs with *Self-Love* to excite him to the Action. And thus *a Neglect* of our *own Good* may be *morally evil*, and argue a Want of *Benevolence* toward the *Whole*. But when *Self-Love* breaks over the Bounds above-mentioned, and leads us into Actions detrimental to *others*, and to the *Whole*; or makes us inſenſible of the *generous kind Affections*; then it appears *vicious*, and is *diſapprov'd*. So alſo, when upon any ſmall Injuries, or ſudden Reſentment, or any weak ſuperſtitious Suggeſtions, our *Benevolence* becomes

comes ſo faint, as to let us entertain odious Conceptions of *Men*, or any Part of them, without juſt Ground, as if they were *wholly evil*, or *malicious*, or as if they were a worſe Sort of Beings than they really are; theſe Conceptions muſt lead us into *malevolent Affections*, or at leaſt weaken our *good ones*, and make us *really vicious*. Sect. 3.

VI. BENEVOLENCE is a Word fit enough in general, to denote the internal Spring of Virtue, as Biſhop *Cumberland* always uſes it. But to underſtand this more diſtinctly, 'tis highly neceſſary to obſerve, that under this Name are included very different Diſpoſitions of the Soul. Sometimes it denotes a *calm, extenſive Affection*, or Good-will toward all Beings capable of Happineſs or Miſery: Sometimes, 2. A calm deliberate Affection of the Soul toward the Happineſs of certain ſmaller Syſtems or Individuals; ſuch as Patriotiſm, or Love of a Country, Friendſhip, Parental-Affection, as it is in Perſons of Wiſdom and Self-Government: Or, 3. The ſeveral kind particular Paſſions of Love, Pity, Sympathy, Congratulation. This Diſtinction between the calm Motions of the Will, Affections, Diſpoſitions, or Inſtincts of the Soul, and the ſeveral turbulent Paſſions, is elſewhere more fully conſidered *. *Benevolence of different Kinds.*

* See Treatiſe III. Sect. ii. Art. 3. and Treatiſe IV. Sect. vi. Art. 4.

Now

Sect. 3.

Now tho' all theſe different Diſpoſitions come under the general Character of Benevolent, yet as they are in Nature different, ſo they have very different Degrees of Moral Beauty. The firſt Sort is above all amiable and excellent: 'Tis perhaps the ſole Moral Perfection of ſome ſuperior Natures; and the more this prevails and rules in any human Mind, the more amiable the Perſon appears, even when it not only checks and limits our lower Appetites, but when it controuls our kind particular Paſſions, or counteracts them. The ſecond Sort of *Benevolence* is more amiable than the third, when it is ſufficiently ſtrong to influence our Conduct: And the third Sort, tho' of a leſſer Moral Dignity, is alſo beautiful, when it is no way oppoſite to theſe more noble Principles. And when it is oppoſite, tho' it does not juſtify ſuch Actions as are really detrimental to greater Syſtems, yet it is a ſtrong extenuating Circumſtance, and much alleviates the Moral Deformity. We are all ſenſible of this, when any Perſon from Friendſhip, Parental-Affection, or Pity, has done ſomething hurtful to larger Societies.

Self-Love *not excluded by Benevolence.*

VII. HERE we muſt alſo obſerve, that every *moral Agent* juſtly conſiders himſelf as a *Part* of this *rational Syſtem*, which may be uſeful to the *Whole*; ſo that he may be, in part, an Object of his own univerſal *Benevolence.*

volence. Nay farther, as was hinted above, he may ſee, that the Preſervation of the *Syſtem* requires every one to be *innocently ſolicitous* about himſelf. Hence he may conclude, that an Action which brings *greater Evil* to the *Agent*, than *Good* to others, however it may evidence the Strength of ſome particular kind Attachment, or of a *virtuous Diſpoſition* in the *Agent*, yet it muſt be founded upon a miſtaken Opinion of its Tendency to *publick Good*; ſo that a Man who reaſon'd juſtly, and conſider'd the Whole, would not be led into it, by the calm extenſive *Benevolence*, how ſtrong ſoever it were; nor would he recommend it to the Practice of others; however he might acknowledge, that the Detriment ariſing to the *Agent* from a *kind Action*, did evidence a ſtrong virtuous Diſpoſition. Nay farther, if any *Good* was propos'd to the Purſuit of an *Agent*, and he had a *Competitor* in every reſpect *only equal* to himſelf; the *higheſt* univerſal *Benevolence* poſſible would not lead a wiſe Man to prefer another to himſelf, were there no Ties of Gratitude, or ſome other external Circumſtance, to move him to yield to his *Competitor*. A Man ſurely of the *ſtrongeſt Benevolence*, may juſt treat himſelf as he would do a third Perſon, who was a Competitor of *equal Merit* with the other; and as his preferring one to another, in ſuch a Caſe, would argue no Weakneſs of *Benevolence*; ſo no more would he evidence it by preferring himſelf to a Man of only *equal Abilities*. Sect. 3.

WHERE-

Sect. 3.

WHEREVER a Regard to *myſelf* tends as much to the Good of the *Whole*, as Regard to *another*; or where the *Evil* to myſelf is equal to the *Good* obtain'd for another; tho' by acting, in ſuch Caſes, for the Good of *another*, I really ſhew a very amiable Diſpoſition; yet by acting in the contrary manner, from Regard to *myſelf*, I evidence no evil Diſpoſition, nor any want of the moſt extenſive *Benevolence*; ſince the *Moment* of Good to the *Whole* is, in both Caſes, exactly equal. And let it be here obſerv'd, that this does not ſuperſede the Neceſſity of *Liberality*, or *gratuitous Gifts*, altho' in ſuch Actions the Giver loſes what the other receives; ſince the *Moment* of Good to any Perſon, in any given Caſe, is in a compound Proportion of the *Quantity* of the Good itſelf, and the *Indigence* of the Perſon. Hence it appears, that a Gift may make a much greater *Addition* to the Happineſs of the *Receiver*, than the *Diminution* it occaſions in the Happineſs of the *Giver:* And that the moſt uſeful and important Gifts are thoſe from the *Wealthy* to the *Indigent*. Yet Gifts from *Equals* are not uſeleſs, ſince they often increaſe the Happineſs of both, as they are ſtrong Evidences of *mutual Love:* but Gifts from the *Poor* to the *Wealthy* are really fooliſh, unleſs they be only little Expreſſions of *Gratitude*, which are alſo fruitful of Joy on both Sides: for theſe Expreſſions of Gratitude are really delightful

delightful and acceptable to the *Wealthy*, if they have any Humanity; and their Acceptance of them is matter of Joy to the poor *Giver*. Sect. 3.

In like manner, when an Action does more Harm to the *Agent*, than Good to the *Publick*; the doing it evidences an amiable and truly virtuous Diſpoſition in the *Agent*, tho' 'tis plain he acts upon a miſtaken View of his Duty. But if the private Evil to the *Agent* be ſo great, as to make him incapable, at another time, of promoting a *publick Good* of greater moment than what is attain'd by this Action; the Action may really be evil, ſo far as it evidences a prior Neglect of a greater attainable *publick Good* for a ſmaller one; tho' at preſent this Action alſo flows from a virtuous Diſpoſition.

VIII. The *moral Beauty*, or *Deformity* of Actions, is not alter'd by the *moral Qualities* of the Objects any farther than the Qualities of the Objects increaſe or diminiſh the *Benevolence* of the Action, or the *publick Good* intended by it. Thus *Benevolence* toward the *worſt* Characters, or the Study of their *Good*, may be as *amiable* as any whatſoever; yea, often more ſo than *that* toward the *Good*, ſince it argues ſuch a ſtrong Degree of *Benevolence* as can ſurmount the greateſt Obſtacle, the *moral Evil* in

Benevolence, *how affected by the Qualities of its Object.*

Sect. 3. in the Object. Hence the *Love* of *unjuſt Enemies*, is counted among the *higheſt Virtues*. Yet, when our *Benevolence* to the *Evil* encourages them in their bad Intentions, or makes them more capable of Miſchief; this diminiſhes or deſtroys the *Beauty* of the Action, or even makes it *evil*, as it betrays *a Neglect* of the *Good of others* more valuable; Beneficence toward *whom*, would have tended more to the *publick Good*, than *that* toward our *Favourites*: But *Benevolence* toward *evil* Characters, which neither encourages nor enables them to do Miſchief, nor diverts our *Benevolence* from Perſons more uſeful, has as much *moral Beauty* as any whatſoever.

Qualities determining our Election.

In comparing the *moral Qualities* of Actions, in order to regulate our *Election* among various Actions propos'd, or to find which of them has the greateſt *moral Excellency*, we are led by *our moral Senſe* of *Virtue* to judge thus; that in *equal Degrees* of Happineſs, expected to proceed from the Action, the *Virtue* is in proportion to the *Number* of Perſons to whom the Happineſs ſhall extend; (and here the *Dignity*, or *moral Importance* of Perſons may compenſate Numbers) and in equal *Numbers*, the *Virtue* is as the *Quantity* of the Happineſs, or natural Good; or that the *Virtue* is in a *compound Ratio* of the *Quantity* of Good, and *Number* of Enjoyers. In the ſame manner, the *moral Evil*, or *Vice*,

is as the Degree of Miſery, and *Number* of Sufferers; ſo that *That Action* is *beſt*, which procures the *greateſt Happineſs* for the *greateſt Numbers*; and *that worſt*, which, in *like manner*, occaſions *Miſery*. Sect. 3.

Conſequences, how they affect the Morality of Actions.

AGAIN, when the *Conſequences* of Actions are of a *mix'd* Nature, partly *advantageous*, and partly *pernicious*; *that Action* is *good*, whoſe *good* Effects preponderate the *evil* by being uſeful to many, and pernicious to few; and *that evil*, which is otherwiſe. Here alſo the *moral Importance* of Characters, or *Dignity* of Perſons may compenſate Numbers; as may alſo the *Degrees* of Happineſs or Miſery: for to procure an *inconſiderable Good* to many, but an *immenſe Evil* to few, may be *evil*; and an *immenſe Good* to few, may preponderate a *ſmall Evil* to many.

BUT the *Conſequences* which affect the *Morality* of Actions, are not only the direct and natural Effects of the Actions themſelves; but alſo all thoſe *Events* which otherwiſe would not have happen'd. For many Actions which have no immediate or natural *evil Effects*, nay, which actually produce *good Effects*, may be *evil*; if a man foreſees, that the evil Conſequences, which will probably flow from the *Folly* of others, upon his doing of ſuch Actions, are ſo great as to overbalance all the *Good* produc'd by thoſe Actions, or all the *Evils* which would flow

Sect. 3. from the Omiſſion of them: And in ſuch Caſes the *Probability* is to be computed on both ſides. Thus, if an Action of mine will probably, thro' the Miſtake or Corruption of others, be made a *Precedent* in unlike Caſes, to very evil Actions; or when my Action, tho' good in itſelf, will probably provoke Men to very evil Actions, upon ſome *miſtaken Notion* of their Right; any of theſe Conſiderations foreſeen by me, may make ſuch an Action of mine *evil*, whenever the Evils which will probably be occaſion'd by the *Action*, are greater than the Evils occaſion'd by the *Omiſſion*.

And this is the Reaſon, that many *Laws* prohibit Actions in general, even when ſome particular *Inſtances* of thoſe Actions would be very uſeful; becauſe an univerſal *Allowance* of them, conſidering the Miſtakes Men would probably fall into, would be more pernicious than an univerſal *Prohibition*; nor could there be any more *ſpecial Boundaries* fix'd between the right and wrong Caſes. In ſuch Caſes, it is the Duty of Perſons to comply with the generally uſeful Conſtitution; or if in ſome very important Inſtances, the Violation of the Law would be of leſs *evil Conſequence*, than Obedience to it, they muſt patiently reſolve to undergo thoſe Penalties, which the State has, for valuable Ends to the Whole, appointed: and this Diſobedience will have nothing criminal in it.

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'Tis here to be obſerved, that tho' every *kind Affection* abſtractly conſidered, is approved by our moral Senſe, yet all ſorts of Affections or Paſſions which purſue the Good of others are not equally approved, or do not ſeem in the ſame degree virtuous. Our *calm Affections*, either private or publick, are plainly diſtinct from our *particular Paſſions*; *calm Self-Love* quite diſtinct from *Hunger*, *Thirſt*, *Ambition*, *Luſt*, or *Anger*; ſo *calm Good-will* toward others is different from *Pity*, *paſſionate Love*, *the parental Affection*, or the Paſſion of *particular Friends*. Now every kind Paſſion, which is not pernicious to others, is indeed approved as virtuous and lovely: And yet a calm Good-will toward the ſame Perſons appears more lovely. So calm Good-will toward a ſmall Syſtem is lovely and preferable to more paſſionate Attachments; and yet a more extenſive calm Benevolence is ſtill more beautiful and virtuous; and the higheſt Perfection of Virtue is *an univerſal calm Good-will* toward all ſenſitive Natures. Hence it is, that we condemn particular Attachments, when inconſiſtent with the Intereſt of great Societies, becauſe they argue ſome Defect in that more noble Principle, which is the Perfection of Virtue *.

* See *Eſſay on Paſſions*, Sect. 2. Art. 3. *And Illuſtrations*, Sect. 6. Art. 4.

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Partial Benevolence, how virtuous.

IX. From theſe Obſervations, we may ſee what Actions our *moral Senſe* would moſt recommend to our Election, as the moſt *perfectly virtuous: viz.* ſuch as appear to have the moſt univerſal unlimited Tendency to the *greateſt* and *moſt extenſive Happineſs* of all the *rational Agents*, to whom our Influence can reach. All *Beneficence*, even toward a *Part*, is amiable, when not inconſiſtent with the *Good* of the *Whole:* But this is a ſmaller Degree of *Virtue*, unleſs our Beneficence be reſtrain'd by want of Power, and not want of Love to the *Whole*. All ſtrict Attachments to Parties, Sects, Factions, have but an imperfect Species of *Beauty*, even when the *Good* of the *Whole* requires a ſtricter Attachment to a *Part*, as in *natural Affection*, or *virtuous Friendſhips*; except when *ſome Parts* are ſo eminently uſeful to the *Whole*, that even *univerſal Benevolence* does determine us with ſpecial Care and Affection to ſtudy their Intereſts. Thus *univerſal Benevolence* would incline us to a more ſtrong Concern for the Intereſts of *great* and *generous Characters* in a high Station, or make us more earneſtly ſtudy the Intereſts of any *generous Society*, whoſe whole Conſtitution was contriv'd to promote *univerſal Good*. Thus a good Fancy in *Architecture* would lead a Man, who was not able to bear the Expence of a completely regular Building, to chooſe ſuch a Degree of Ornament as he could keep uniformly thro'

thro' the *Whole*, and not move him to make a vain unfiniſh'd Attempt in *one Part*, of what he foreſaw he could not ſucceed in as to *the Whole*. And he would condemn a great Profuſion of Ornament on *one Part*, above the Proportion of *the Whole*, unleſs *that Part* be ſome eminent Place of the *Edifice*, ſuch as the *chief Front*, or *publick Entrance*; the adorning of which would beautify the *Whole* more than an equal Expence of Ornament on any *other Part*. Sect. 3.

THIS Conſtitution of our *Senſe*, whereby the *moral Beauty* of Actions, or Diſpoſitions, increaſes according to the *Number* of Perſons to whom the good Effects of them extend; whence alſo Actions which flow from the *nearer Attachments* of *Nature*, ſuch as *that* between the *Sexes*, and the *Love* of *our Offſpring*, do not appear *ſo virtuous* as Actions of *equal Moment* of *Good* towards Perſons leſs attach'd to us; has been choſen by the AUTHOR OF NATURE for this good Reaſon, " That the more limited *Inſtincts* tend " to produce a ſmaller Moment of Good, be- " cauſe confined to ſmall Numbers. Where- " as the more *extenſive calm Inſtinct* of Good- " will, attended with Power, would have " no Bounds in its good Effects, and would " never lead into any Evil, as the particular " Paſſions may: and hence it is made more " lovely to our *Senſe*, that we might be in- " duced to cultivate and ſtrengthen it; and

Sect. 3. " make it check even *kind Paſſions*, when " they are oppoſite to a greater Good."

Moral Diſpoſitions and Abilities.

X. FROM this primary Idea of *moral Good* in Actions, may ariſe a Notion of moral *Good* in thoſe Diſpoſitions, whether *natural* or *acquir'd*, which enable us to do good to others; or which are preſum'd to be deſign'd, and acquir'd or cultivated for that purpoſe; or are natural Indications of a good Temper, and uſually accompany it. And hence thoſe Abilities, while nothing appears contrary to our Preſumption, may increaſe our Approbation of the Poſſeſſor of them; but when they are imagin'd to be intended for *publick Miſchief*, they make us hate him the more: Such are a *penetrating Judgment*, a *tenacious Memory*, a *quick Invention*; *Patience of Labour, Pain, Hunger, Watching*; a *Contempt* of *Wealth, Rumour, Death.* Theſe may be rather call'd *natural Abilities*, than *moral Qualities*: And we ſeem to have a natural Reliſh for them diſtinct from moral Approbation. But if we plainly ſee them *maliciouſly* employ'd, they make the Agent more deteſtable.

How we compute the Morality of Actions in our Senſe *of them.*

XI. To find a *univerſal Rule* to compute the *Morality* of any Actions, with all their Circumſtances, when we judge of the Actions done by ourſelves, or by others, we muſt obſerve the following *Propoſitions* or *Axioms.*

I. THE

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1. The moral *Importance* of any Agent, or the Quantity of publick Good he produces, is in a compound Proportion of his *Benevolence* and *Abilities*. For 'tis plain that his good Offices depend upon theſe two jointly. In like manner, the Quantity of private Good which any Agent obtains for himſelf, is in a like compound Proportion of his *ſelfiſh Principles*, and his *Abilities*. We ſpeak here only of the external Goods of this World, which one purſues from ſome ſelfiſh Principles. For as to internal Goods of the Mind, theſe are moſt effectually obtain'd by the Exerciſe of other Affections than thoſe called *Selfiſh*, even thoſe which carry the Agent beyond himſelf toward the Good of others.

2. In comparing the Virtues of different Agents, when the Abilities are equal, the *Moments* of publick Good are proportioned to the Goodneſs of the Temper, or the *Benevolence*; and when the *Tempers* are equal, the Quantities of Good are as the *Abilities*.

3. The Virtue then or Goodneſs of Temper is directly as the *Moment of Good*, when other Circumſtances are equal, and *inverſly* as the Abilities. That is to ſay, where the Abilities are greateſt, there is leſs Virtue evidenced in any given Moment of Good produced.

Sect. 3. 4. But as the natural Conſequences of our Actions are various, ſome *good* to ourſelves, and *evil* to the Publick; and others *evil* to ourſelves, and *good* to the Publick; or either *uſeful* both to ourſelves and others, or *pernicious* to both; the intire Spring of good Actions is not always *Benevolence alone*; or of Evil, *Malice alone* (nay, ſedate Malice is rarely found;) but in moſt Actions we muſt look upon *Self-Love* as another Force, ſometimes conſpiring with *Benevolence*, and aſſiſting it, when we are excited by Views of *private Intereſt*, as well as *publick Good*; and ſometimes oppoſing *Benevolence*, when the good Action is any way *difficult* or *painful* in the Performance, or *detrimental* in its Conſequences to the *Agent*.

These *ſelfiſh Motives* ſhall be * hereafter more fully explain'd; here we may in general denote them by the Word *Intereſt*: which when it concurs with *Benevolence*, in any Action capable of Increaſe or Diminution, muſt produce a greater Quantity of *Good*, than *Benevolence* alone in the ſame *Abilities*; and therefore when the *Moment* of *Good*, in an Action partly intended for the *Good* of the *Agent*, is but equal to the *Moment* of *Good* in the Action of *another Agent*, influenc'd only by *Benevolence*, the former is leſs *virtuous*; and in this Caſe the *Intereſt* muſt be de-

* Vide *Sect.* v.

ducted

ducted to find the true Effect of the *Benevolence* or *Virtue*. In the ſame manner, when *Intereſt* is oppoſite to *Benevolence*, and yet is ſurmounted by it; this *Intereſt* muſt be added to the *Moment*, to increaſe the *Virtue* of the Action, or the Strength of the *Benevolence*. By *Intereſt*, in this laſt Caſe, is underſtood all the *Advantage* which the *Agent* might have obtain'd by omitting the Action, which is a *negative Motive* to it; and this, when ſubtracted, becomes *poſitive*. Sect. 3.

Intention and Foreſight affect Actions.

BUT here we muſt obſerve, that no *Advantage*, not *intended*, altho' caſually, or naturally, redounding to us from the Action, does at all affect its *Morality* to make it leſs *amiable:* nor does any *Difficulty* or *Evil* unforeſeen, or not reſolved upon, make a kind Action more *virtuous*; ſince in ſuch Caſes *Self-Love* neither aſſiſts nor oppoſes *Benevolence*. Nay, *Self-Intereſt* then only diminiſhes the *Benevolence*, when without this View of *Intereſt* the Action would not have been undertaken, or ſo much *Good* would not have been produc'd by the *Agent*; and it extenuates the *Vice* of an *evil* Action, only when without this *Intereſt* the Action would not have been done by the *Agent*, or ſo much *Evil* have been produc'd by him.

THE ſixth Axiom only explains the external Marks by which Men muſt judge, who do not ſee into each other's Hearts; for it

Sect. 3. it may really happen in many Caſes, that Men may have *Benevolence* ſufficient to ſurmount any Difficulty, and yet they may meet with none at all: And in that Caſe, it is certain there is as much *Virtue* in the *Agent*, tho' he does not give ſuch Proof of it to his Fellow-Creatures, as if he had ſurmounted Difficulties in his kind Actions. And this too muſt be the Caſe with the DEITY, to whom nothing is difficult.

Perfect Virtue.

SINCE then, in judging of the Goodneſs of Temper in any Agent, the Abilities muſt come into Computation, as is above-mentioned, and none can act beyond their natural Abilities; that muſt be the Perfection of Virtue, where the *Moment* of Good produced equals the Ability, or when the *Being* acts to the utmoſt of his Power for the *publick Good*; and hence the Perfection of *Virtue*, in this Caſe, is as *Unity*. And this may ſhew us the only Foundation for the boaſting of the *Stoicks*, "That a Creature ſuppos'd inno-"cent, by purſuing *Virtue* with his utmoſt "Power, may in *Virtue* equal the *Gods*." For in their Caſe, if the *Ability* be *infinite*, unleſs the *Good* to be produced in the whole, be ſo too, the *Virtue* is not *abſolutely perfect*; and the *Quotient* can never ſurmount *Unity*.

Moral Evil how computed.

XII. IN the ſame Manner we may compute the Degree of Depravity of any Temper, *directly* as the Moment of Evil affected, and

inverſly

inverſly as the Abilities. The Springs of vicious Actions however are ſeldom any real ultimate Intention of Miſchief, and never ultimate deliberate Malice; but only ſudden Anger, Self-Love, ſome ſelfiſh Paſſion or Appetite, ſome kind Attachments to Parties, or particular kind Paſſions. Sect. 3.

THE Motives of Intereſt may ſometimes ſtrongly co-operate with a depraved Temper, or may oppoſe it, in the ſame Manner that they co-operate with or oppoſe a good Temper. When they co-coperate, they diminiſh the Moral Evil; when they oppoſe, they may argue the Depravity of Temper to be greater, which is able to ſurmount ſuch Motives of Intereſt.

BUT we muſt obſerve, that not only *Innocence* is expected from all Mortals, but they are preſum'd, from their *Nature*, in ſome meaſure inclin'd to *publick Good* *; ſo that a bare Abſence of this Deſire is enough to make an *Agent* be reputed *evil:* Nor is a direct Intention of *publick Evil* neceſſary to make an Action *evil*; it is enough that it flows from *Self-Love*, with a plain Neglect of the *Good* of others, or an Inſenſibility of their Miſery, which we either *actually* foreſee, or have a probable *Preſumption* of. *Intention, Foreſight.*

* See *Treatiſe* IV. § 6.

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IT is true indeed, that *that publick Evil* which I neither certainly foreſee, nor have actual Preſumptions of, as the Conſequence of my Action, does not make my *preſent Action* criminal or odious; even altho' I might have foreſeen this Evil by a ſerious Examination of my own Actions; becauſe ſuch Actions do not, at preſent, evidence either *Malice*, or *want of Benevolence*. But then it is alſo certain, that my *prior Negligence*, in not examining the Tendency of my Actions, is a plain Evidence of the Want of *that* Degree of good Affections which is neceſſary to a virtuous Character; and conſequently the *Guilt* properly lies in this *Neglect*, rather than in an *Action* which really flows from a *good Intention*. *Human Laws* however, which cannot examine the *Intentions*, or ſecret Knowledge of the *Agent*, muſt judge in groſs of the Action itſelf; preſuppoſing all that Knowledge as actually attain'd, which we are oblig'd to attain.

IN like manner, no good Effect, which I did not actually foreſee and intend, makes my Action *morally good*; however *Human Laws* or *Governors*, who cannot ſearch into Mens *Intentions*, or know their ſecret *Deſigns*, juſtly reward Actions which tend to the publick Good, altho' the Agent was engag'd to thoſe Actions only by *ſelfiſh Views*;

and conſequently had no virtuous Diſpoſition influencing him to them. Sect. 3.

THE Difference in *Degree of Guilt* between *Crimes of Ignorance*, when the Ignorance is *vincible*, and *faulty*, as to the natural Tendency of the Action; and *Crimes of Malice*, or direct evil Intention; conſiſts in this, that the former, by a *prior Neglect*, argues a want of the due Degree of *Benevolence*, or *right Affection*; the latter evidences direct *evil Affections*, which are vaſtly more odious.

XIII. FROM the former Reaſonings we may form almoſt a demonſtrative Concluſion, "That we have a *Senſe* of *Goodneſs* and *moral Beauty* in Actions, diſtinct from *Advantage*;" for had we no other Foundation of Approbation of Actions, but the *Advantage* which might ariſe to us from them, if they were done toward ourſelves, we ſhould make no Account of the *Abilities* of the *Agent*, but would barely eſteem them according to their *Moment*. The *Abilities* come in only to ſhew the Degree of *Benevolence*, which ſuppoſes *Benevolence* neceſſarily *amiable*. Who was ever the better pleas'd with a *barren rocky Farm*, or an *inconvenient Houſe*, by being told that the *poor Farm* gave as great Increaſe as it could; or that the *Houſe* accommodated its Poſſeſſor as well as it could? And yet in our Sentiments of Actions, whoſe *Moment* is very inconſiderable, it ſhall wonderfully *Morality diſtinct from Intereſt.*

Sect. 3. derfully increaſe the *Beauty* to alledge, "That "it was all the *poor Agent* could do for the "*Publick*, or his *Friend*."

Morality of Characters.

XIV. The *moral Beauty* of *Characters* ariſes from their Actions, or ſincere Intentions of the *publick Good*, according to their Power. We form our Judgment of them according to what appears to be their *fix'd Diſpoſition*, and not according to any *particular Sallies* of *unkind Paſſions*; altho' theſe abate the *Beauty* of *good Characters*, as the Motions of the *kind Affections* diminiſh the *Deformity* of the *bad ones*. What then properly conſtitutes a *virtuous Character*, is not ſome few accidental Motions of *Compaſſion*, *natural Affection*, or *Gratitude*; but ſuch a *fix'd Humanity*, or *Deſire* of the *publick Good* of all, to whom our Influence can extend, as uniformly excites us to all Acts of *Beneficence*; and makes us careful of informing ourſelves right, concerning the trueſt Methods of ſerving their Intereſts. Every Motion indeed of the *kind Affections* appears in ſome degree *amiable*; but we denominate the *Character* from the *prevailing Principle*.

Inſtinct may be the Spring of Virtue.

XV. Some will not allow that Virtue can ſpring from Paſſions, Inſtincts, or Affections of any Kind. 'Tis true, kind particular Paſſions are but a lower kind of Goodneſs, even when they are not oppoſite to the general Good. Thoſe *calmer Determinations* of the

the Will, whether of greater or leſs Extent, Sect. 3.
or ſedate ſtrong Affections, or Deſires of the Good of others, are more amiable. Theſe may be as much rooted in the Frame of the Soul, or there may be as natural a Diſpoſition to them as to particular Paſſions. They tell us, That "Virtue ſhould wholly ſpring from "Reaſon;" as if Reaſon or Knowledge of any true Propoſition could ever move to Action where there is no *End* propoſed, and no Affection or Deſire toward that End *. For this ſee *Treatiſe* IV. *Sect.* i. and ii.

THE ultimate End, according to many of our Moraliſts, is to each one *his own Happineſs*; and yet this he ſeeks by Inſtinct. Now may not another *Inſtinct* toward the *Publick*, or the *Good* of others, be as proper a Principle of *Virtue*, as the *Inſtinct* toward *private Happineſs?* This is certain, that

* *Theſe Gentlemen ſhould either remember the common Doctrine of the Schools, or elſe confute it better; that the* προαίρεσις *which is neceſſary in virtuous Actions is* ὄρεξις βουλυτικὴ: *And that Virtue needs not only the* λογὸν ἀληθῆ, *but the* ὄρεξιν ὀρθήν. *Theſe very Authors who deny any* Affections *or Motions of the Will to be the proper Springs of ſublime Virtue, yet, inconſiſtently with themſelves, muſt allow in Men of ſublime Virtue, and even in the Deity too, a ſettled* Diſpoſition of Will, *or a conſtant* Determination, *or* Deſire *to act in Conformity to Reaſon, or a fixed Affection toward a certain Manner of Conduct. Now an ill natur'd Adverſary would call this an* Inſtinct, *an Eſſential or Natural* Diſpoſition of Will, *an* Affectionate Determination *toward a very ſublime Object preſented by the Underſtanding. See* Ariſtotle's Magn. Moral. Lib. i. c. 18, 35. *and* Lib. ii. c. 7 & 8. *and in many other Places.*

whereas

Sect. 3. whereas we behold the *ſelfiſh* Actions of others, with *Indifference* at beſt, we ſee ſomething *amiable* in every Action which flows from *kind Affections* or *Paſſions* toward others; if they be conducted by Prudence, ſo as any way to attain their End, conſiſtently with the general Good. If it be ſaid, "That "Actions from *Inſtinct* are not the Effect "of *Prudence* and *Choice*;" this Objection holds full as ſtrongly againſt the Actions which flow from *Self-Love*; ſince the Uſe of our Reaſon is as requiſite to find the proper Means of promoting *publick Good*, as *private Good*. And as it muſt be an *Inſtinct*, or *a Determination previous to Reaſon*, which makes us purſue *private Good*, as well as *publick Good* as our *End*; there is the ſame Occaſion for *Prudence* and *Choice*, in the Election of proper Means for promoting of either. I ſee no Harm in ſuppoſing, "That Men "are *naturally* diſpos'd to *Virtue*, and not "left *merely indifferent*, until ſome Proſpect "of Intereſt allures them to it." Surely, the Suppoſition of a *benevolent univerſal Inſtinct* would recommend *human Nature*, and its AUTHOR, more to the *Love* of a *good Man*, and leave Room enough for the Exerciſe of our *Reaſon*, in contriving and ſettling *Rights*, *Laws*, *Conſtitutions*; in *inventing* Arts, and *practiſing* them ſo as to gratify, in the moſt effectual manner, that *generous Inclination*. And if we muſt bring in *Self-Love* to make *Virtue rational*, a little Reflection will

will diſcover, as ſhall appear hereafter, that this *Benevolence* is our *greateſt Happineſs*; and thence we may reſolve to cultivate, as much as poſſible, this *ſweet Diſpoſition*, and to deſpiſe every *oppoſite Intereſt*. Not that we can be *truly virtuous*, if we intend only to obtain the Pleaſure which ariſes from *Beneficence*, without the *Love* of *others*: Nay, this very Pleaſure is founded on our being conſcious of *diſintereſted Love* to *others*, as the *Spring* of our Actions. But *Self-Intereſt* may be our *Motive* in ſtudying to raiſe theſe kind Affections, and to continue in this *agreeable State*; tho' it cannot be the *ſole* or *principal Motive* of any Action, which to our *moral Senſe* appears *virtuous* *. Sect. 3.

* *'Tis thus we muſt underſtand many Places of* Plato, Ariſtotle, Cicero, *and others of the Antients, when they ſpeak of "a natural Inſtinct or Diſpoſition in each Being, toward his "own Preſervation and higheſt Perfection, as the Spring of "Virtue." 'Tis acknowledged by all, that we have ſuch an Inſtinct, which muſt operate very indiſtinctly at firſt, till we come to conſider our Conſtitution, and our ſeveral Powers. When we do ſo, we find, according to them, the natural Principles of Virtue, or the* φυσικαὶ ἀρεταὶ, *implanted in us: They appear to us the nobleſt Parts of our Nature; ſuch are our* Deſires of Knowledge, *our* Reliſh for Beauty, *eſpecially of the* Moral *Kind, our* Sociable Affections. *Theſe upon Reflection we find to be natural Parts of our Conſtitution, and we deſire to bring them to Perfection from the firſt mentioned general Inſtinct. We muſt not thence conclude, that all our Affections ſpring from Self-Love, or are ultimately purſuing private Good.* Diſintereſted Affections *are preſuppoſed as natural Parts of our Conſtitution, and found in it upon Reflection, not raiſed by an Act of Choice for ſome private Good, nor ultimately purſuing it. (See* Cicer. de Finib. Lib. iii. & Lib. v.) *This would be manifeſtly contrary to the moſt expreſs Words of theſe great Men on Friendſhip, Patriotiſm, and other Subjects. See* Ariſtotle *in the* Magn. Moral. & Nicom. *on Friendſhip; and* Cicero de Finib. Lib. ii. & Lib. v.

Sect. 3.

Heroiſm in all Stations.

FROM the preceding *Reaſonings* we ſhall only draw this one Inference, which ſeems the moſt joyful imaginable, even to the loweſt Rank of Mankind, *viz.* "That no "external Circumſtances of Fortune, no "involuntary Diſadvantages, can exclude "any Mortal from the *moſt heroick Virtue.*" For how ſmall ſoever the *Moment* of *publick Good* be, which any one can accompliſh, yet if his *Abilities* are proportionably ſmall, the *Virtue* may be as great as any whatſoever. Thus, not only the *Prince*, the *Stateſman*, the *General*, are capable of *true Heroiſm*, tho' theſe are the chief Characters, whoſe Fame is diffus'd thro' various Nations and Ages: but when we find in an *honeſt Trader*, the *kind Friend*, the *faithful prudent Adviſer*, the *charitable* and *hoſpitable Neighbour*, the *tender Huſband*, and *affectionate Parent*, the *ſedate* yet *chearful Companion*, the *generous Aſſiſtant* of *Merit*, the *cautious Allayer* of *Contention* and *Debate*, the *Promoter* of *Love* and *good Underſtanding* among Acquaintances; if we conſider, that theſe were *all* the *good Offices* which his Station in the World gave him an Opportunity of performing to Mankind, we muſt judge *this Character* really as *amiable*, as thoſe, whoſe external Splendor dazzles an injudicious World into an Opinion, "That "they are the *only Heroes* in *Virtue.*"

SECT.

SECT. IV.

All Mankind agree in this general Foundation *of their Approbation of* moral Actions. *The Grounds of the* different Opinions *about* Morals.

This Moral Senſe univerſal.

I. TO ſhew how far Mankind agree in that which we have made the *univerſal Foundation* of this *moral Senſe*, *viz.* BENEVOLENCE, we have obſerv'd already *, that when we are aſk'd the Reaſon of our Approbation of any Action, we univerſally alledge its *Uſefulneſs* to the *Publick*, and not to the *Actor* himſelf. If we are vindicating a cenſur'd Action, and maintaining it lawful, we generally make this one Article of our Defence, " That it injur'd nobody, or did " more *Good* than *Harm*." On the other hand, when we blame any Piece of Conduct, we ſhew it to be *prejudicial* to others, beſides the *Actor*; or to evidence at leaſt a *Neglect* of their Intereſt, when it was in our Power to ſerve them; or when *Gratitude*, *natural Affection*, or ſome other *diſintereſted Tye* ſhould have rais'd in us a Study of their

* See above, Sect. iii. Art. 3. Par. 3.

Sect. 4. Intereſt. If we ſometimes blame fooliſh Conduct in others, without any Reflection upon its Tendency to *publick Evil*, it is generally occaſion'd by our *Benevolence*, which makes us concern'd for the Evils befalling others *. We all know how great an Extenuation of Crimes it is, to alledge, "That "the poor Man does harm to nobody but "himſelf;" and how often this turns Hatred into Pity. And yet we ſhall find, that the greateſt part of the Actions which are *immediately prejudicial* to ourſelves, and are often look'd upon as *innocent* toward others, do really tend to the *publick Detriment*, by making us incapable of performing the good Offices we could otherwiſe have done, and perhaps would have been inclin'd to do. This is the Caſe of *Intemperance* and *extravagant Luxury*.

Benevolence the ſole ground of Approbation.

II. And farther, we may obſerve, that no Action of any other Perſon was ever approv'd by us, but upon ſome Apprehenſion, well or ill-grounded, of ſome *really good moral Quality*. If we obſerve the Sentiments of Men concerning Actions, we ſhall find, that it is

* *Beſide that moral Approbation or Commendation, we have alſo an immediate natural Reliſh for certain Powers and Abilities, and the regular Exerciſe of them; and a Diſlike and Contempt of a Perſon who wants them, or has not cultivated them; when we don't think of any Subſerviency to a publick Good. But this is rather perceiving a* vigorous *or a* mean *Character, than a* virtuous *or* vicious *one.*

always ſome *really amiable* and *benevolent Appearance* which engages their Approbation. We may perhaps commit Miſtakes, in judging that Actions tend to the publick Good, which do not; or be ſo inadvertent, that while our Attention is fix'd on ſome *partial good Effects*, we may quite overlook many *evil Conſequences* which counterbalance the *Good*. Our *Reaſon* may be very deficient in its Office, by giving us partial Repreſentations of the Tendency of Actions; but it is ſtill ſome *apparent Species* of *Benevolence* which commands our Approbation. And *this Senſe*, like our other Senſes, tho' counteracted by ſtronger Motives of *external Advantage*, ceaſes not to operate, but makes us *uneaſy* and *diſſatisfy'd* with ourſelves; even as the *Senſe* of *Taſting* makes us loath and diſlike the nauſeous Potion, which we may force ourſelves, from Intereſt, to ſwallow. Sect. 4.

False Approbations.

It is therefore to no purpoſe to alledge here, "That many Actions are really done, "and approv'd, which tend to the *univerſal* "*Detriment*." For the ſame way, Actions are often perform'd, and in the mean time approv'd, which tend to the *Hurt* of the *Actor*. But as we do not, from the *latter*, infer the *Actor* to be void of *Self-Love*, or a *Senſe* of *Intereſt*; no more ſhould we infer from the *former*, that ſuch Men are void of a *Senſe* of *Morals*, or a Deſire of *publick Good*. The Matter is plainly this: Men are often miſ-

Sect. 4. taken in the Tendency of Actions either to *publick*, or *private Good:* Nay, ſometimes *violent Paſſions*, while they laſt, will make them approve very bad Actions by their *Moral Senſe*, and conceive very *pernicious ones* to the *Agent*, to be *advantageous:* But this proves only, "That ſometimes there may "be ſome more *violent Motive* to Action, "than a *Senſe* of *moral Good*; or that Men "by Paſſion may become blind even to "their own *Intereſt.*"

But to prove that Men are void of a *moral Senſe*, we ſhould find ſome Inſtances of *cruel*, *malicious Actions*, done without any *Motive* of *Intereſt*, *real* or *apparent*; and approv'd without any Opinion of *Tendency to publick Good*, or *flowing from Good-will:* We muſt find a Country where *Murder* in cold Blood, *Tortures*, and *every thing malicious*, without any *Advantage*, is, if not *approv'd*, at leaſt look'd upon with *Indifference*, and raiſes *no Averſion* toward the Actors in the unconcern'd Spectators: We muſt find Men with whom the *Treacherous*, *Ungrateful*, *Cruel*, are in the ſame account with the *Generous*, *Friendly*, *Faithful*, and *Humane*; and who approve the *latter*, no more than the *former*, in all Caſes where they are not affected by the Influence of theſe Diſpoſitions, or when the *natural Good* or *Evil* befals other Perſons. And it may be queſtion'd, whether the *Univerſe*, tho' large enough,

and

and ſtor'd with no inconſiderable Variety of Characters, will yield us any Inſtance, not only of a *Nation*, but even of a *Club*, or a *ſingle Perſon*, who will think all Actions *indifferent*, but thoſe which regard his *own Concerns*. Sect. 4.

III. FROM what has been ſaid, we may eaſily account for the *vaſt Diverſity* of *moral Principles*, in *various Nations* and *Ages*; and the Grounds of *this Diverſity* as principally theſe: *Diverſity of Manners accounted for.*

1ſt. DIFFERENT Opinions of *Happineſs*, or *natural Good*, and of the moſt effectual Means to advance it. Thus in one Country, where there prevails a *courageous Diſpoſition*, where *Liberty* is counted a *great Good*, and *War* an *inconſiderable Evil*, all Inſurrections in Defence of Privileges will have the Appearance of *moral Good* to our *Senſe*, becauſe of their appearing *benevolent*; and yet the *ſame Senſe* of *moral Good* in *Benevolence*, ſhall in another Country, where the Spirits of Men are more *abject* and *timorous*, where *Civil War* appears the *greateſt natural Evil*, and *Liberty* no *great Purchaſe*, make the ſame Actions appear *odious*. So in SPARTA, where thro' Contempt of Wealth the Security of Poſſeſſions was not much regarded, but the Thing chiefly deſir'd, as *naturally good to the State*, was to abound in a *hardy ſhifting Youth*; *Theft*, if dexterouſly *From various Notions of Happineſs.*

Sect. 4. rouſly perform'd, was ſo little odious, that it receiv'd the Countenance of a Law to give it Impunity.

But in theſe, and all other Inſtances of the like Nature, the Approbation is founded on *Benevolence*, becauſe of ſome real, or apparent Tendency to the *publick Good*. For we are not to imagine, that this *Senſe* ſhould give us, without Obſervation, Ideas of complex Actions, or of their natural Tendencies to *Good* or *Evil*: it only determines us to approve *Benevolence*, whenever it appears in any Action, and to hate *the contrary*. So our *Senſe* of *Beauty* does not, without Reflection, Inſtruction or Obſervation, give us Ideas of the *regular Solids*, *Temples*, *Cirques*, and *Theatres*; but determines us to approve and delight in *Uniformity amidſt Variety*, wherever we obſerve it. Let us read the *Preambles* of any Laws we count unjuſt, or the Vindications of any diſputed Practice by the *Moraliſts*, and we ſhall find, no doubt, that Men are often miſtaken in computing the Exceſs of the *natural good* or *evil Conſequences* of certain Actions; but the Ground on which any Action is approv'd, is ſtill ſome Tendency to the *greater natural Good* of others, apprehended by thoſe who approve it.

Travellers accounts of barbarous Cuſtoms.

The ſame Reaſon may remove alſo the Objections againſt the *Univerſality of this Senſe*,

Senſe, from ſome Stories of Travellers, concerning *ſtrange Cruelties* practis'd toward the *Aged*, or *Children*, in certain Countries. If ſuch Actions be done in ſuch angry Paſſions, they only prove, that other Motives, or Springs of Action, may overpower *Benevolence* in its *ſtrongeſt Ties:* and if they really be univerſally allow'd, look'd upon as innocent, and vindicated; it is certainly under ſome Appearance of *Benevolence*; ſuch as to ſecure them from Inſults of Enemies, to avoid the Infirmities of Age, which perhaps appear greater Evils than Death, or to free the vigorous and uſeful Citizens from the Charge of maintaining them, or the Troubles of Attendance upon them. A Love of Pleaſure and Eaſe, may in the immediate Agents be ſtronger in ſome Inſtances, than *Gratitude* toward Parents, or *natural Affection* to Children. But that ſuch Nations are continu'd, notwithſtanding all the Toil in educating their Young, is ſtill a ſufficient Proof of *natural Affection:* For I fancy we are not to imagine any nice Laws in ſuch Places, compelling Parents to a proper Education of ſome certain Number of their Offſpring. We know very well that an Appearance of *publick Good* was the Ground of Laws equally barbarous, enacted by LYCURGUS and SOLON, of killing the Deform'd, or Weak, to prevent a burdenſome Croud of uſeleſs Citizens. SECT. 4.

A LATE

Sect. 4.

A LATE ingenious Author * has juſtly obſerv'd the Abſurdity of the *monſtrous Taſte*, which has poſſeſs'd both the *Readers* and *Writers* of *Travels*. They are ſparing enough in Accounts of the *natural Affections*, *the Families*, *Aſſociations*, *Friendſhips*, *Clans*, of the *Indians*; and as tranſiently do they mention their Abhorrence of *Treachery* among themſelves; their *Proneneſs*, to mutual Aid, and to the Defence of their ſeveral *States*; their Contempt of Death in Defence of their Country, or upon Points of *Honour*. "Theſe are but *common Stories*.—No need "to travel to the *Indies* for what we ſee in "*Europe* every Day." The Entertainment therefore in theſe ingenious Studies conſiſts chiefly in exciting *Horror*, and making Men *ſtare*. The ordinary Employment of the Bulk of the *Indians* in Support of their Wives and Offspring, or Relations, has nothing of the *Prodigious*: But a *Human Sacrifice*, a Feaſt upon Enemies Carcaſes, can raiſe an Horror and Admiration of the wondrous Barbarity of *Indians*, in Nations no Strangers to the *Maſſacre* at *Paris*, the *Iriſh Rebellion*, or the Journals of the *Inquiſition*. Theſe they behold with religious Veneration; but the *Indian Sacrifices*, flowing from a like Perverſion of *Humanity* by *Superſtition*, raiſe

* Ld. Shaftſbury, Vol. i. p. 346, 7, 8, 9, &c.

the

the higheſt Abhorrence and Amazement. What is moſt ſurprizing in theſe Studies, is the wondrous *Credulity* of ſome Gentlemen of great Pretenſions in other Matters to Caution of Aſſent, for theſe *marvellous Memoirs* of Monks, Friars, Sea-Captains, Pirates; and for the *Hiſtories*, *Annals*, *Chronologies*, receiv'd by oral Tradition, or Hieroglyphicks. Sect. 4.

Uſe of Reaſon in Morals.

Men have *Reaſon* given them, to judge of the Tendencies of their Actions, that they may not ſtupidly follow the firſt Appearance of *publick Good*; but it is ſtill ſome Appearance of *Good* which they purſue. And it is ſtrange, that *Reaſon* is univerſally allow'd to Men, notwithſtanding all the ſtupid ridiculous Opinions receiv'd in many Places; and yet abſurd Practices, founded upon thoſe very *Opinions*, ſhall ſeem an Argument againſt any *moral Senſe*, altho' the bad Conduct is not owing to any Irregularity in the *moral Senſe*, but to a wrong *Judgment* or *Opinion*. If putting the *Aged* to *Death*, with all its Conſequences, really tends to the *publick Good*, and the *leſſer Miſery* of the *Aged*, it is, no doubt, *juſtifiable*; nay, perhaps the *Aged* chooſe it, in Hopes of a *future State*. If a *deform'd* or *weak Race* could never, by Ingenuity and Art, make themſelves uſeful to Mankind, but ſhould grow an abſolutely unſupportable Burden; ſo as to involve a whole State in Miſery, it is *juſt* to put them to Death. This all allow to

be

Sect. 4. be *juſt*, in the Caſe of an over-loaded Boat in a Storm. And as for *killing* of their Children, when Parents are ſufficiently ſtock'd, it is perhaps practis'd, and allow'd from *Self-Love*; but I can ſcarce think it paſſes for a good Action any where. If *Wood* or *Stone*, or *Metal* be DEITIES, have *Government*, and *Power*, and have been the *Authors* of *Benefits* to us; it is *morally amiable* to praiſe and worſhip them. Or if the true DEITY be pleas'd with Worſhip before *Statues*, or any *other Symbol* of ſome more *immediate Preſence* or *Influence*; *Image-Worſhip* is *virtuous*. If *he* delights in *Sacrifices*, *Penances*, *Ceremonies*, *Cringings*; they are *all laudable*. Our *Senſe* of *Virtue* generally leads us exactly enough according to our Opinions; and therefore the abſurd Practices which prevail in the World, are much better Arguments that Men have no *Reaſon*, than that they have no *moral Senſe* of *Beauty* in Actions.

Narrow Syſtems pervert the moral Senſe.

IV. THE next *Ground* of *Diverſity* in Sentiments, is the *Diverſity* of *Syſtems*, to which Men, from fooliſh Opinions, confine their *Benevolence*. We intimated above *, that it is *regular* and *beautiful*, to have *ſtronger Benevolence* toward the *morally good* Parts of Mankind, who are *uſeful* to the *Whole*, than toward the *uſeleſs* or *pernicious*. Now, if

* See *Sect.* iii. *Art.* 10. *Par.* 1.

Men

Men receive a *low* or *baſe Opinion* of any *Body*, or *Sect* of Men; if they imagine them bent upon the Deſtruction of the more valuable Parts, or but uſeleſs *Burdens* of the Earth; *Benevolence* itſelf will lead them to neglect the Intereſts of ſuch, and to ſuppreſs them. This is the Reaſon why, among Nations who have high Notions of *Virtue*, every Action toward an Enemy may paſs for *juſt*; why ROMANS and GREEKS could approve of making thoſe they call'd *Barbarians*, *Slaves*. Sect. 4.

Sects pernicious to Virtue.

A LATE ingenious Author * juſtly obſerves, "That the various *Sects*, *Parties*, "*Factions*, *Cabals* of Mankind in larger So- "cieties, are all influenc'd by a *publick Spi-* "*rit*: That ſome generous Notions of *pub-* "*lick Good*, ſome ſtrong friendly Diſpoſi- "tions, raiſe them at firſt, and excite Men "of the ſame *Faction* or *Cabal* to the moſt "diſintereſted mutual Succour and Aid: "That all the Contentions of the different "Factions, and even the fierceſt Wars againſt "each other, are influenc'd by a ſociable "*publick Spirit* in a limited Syſtem." But certain it is, that Men are little oblig'd to thoſe, who often artfully raiſe and foment this Party Spirit; or cantonize them into ſeveral Sects for the Defence of very trifling

* Ld. Shaftſbury's Eſſay on Wit and Humour, *Part* iii. *Sect.* ii. Vol. i. p. 110.

Cauſes.

Sect. 4. Cauſes. Aſſociations for innocent *Commerce*, or *Manufactures*; Cabals for Defence of *Liberty*, againſt a *Tyrant*; or even lower Clubs for *Pleaſantry*, or *Improvement* by Converſation, are very amiable and good. But when Mens Heads are filled with ſome trifling Opinions; when deſigning Men raiſe in their Minds ſome unaccountable Notion of *Sanctity* and *Religion*, in Tenets or Practices, which neither increaſe our Love to God, or our own *Species*; when the ſeveral Factions are taught to look upon each other as *odious*, *contemptible*, *profane*, becauſe of their different Tenets or Opinions; even when theſe Tenets, whether true or falſe, are perhaps perfectly uſeleſs to the publick Good; when the keeneſt Paſſions are rais'd about ſuch Trifles, and Men begin to hate each other for what, of itſelf, has no Evil in it; and to love the Zealots of their own Sect for what is no way valuable; nay, even for their Fury, Rage, and Malice againſt oppoſite Sects; (which is what all Parties commonly call *Zeal*) 'tis then no Wonder, if our *moral Senſe* be much impair'd, and our *natural Notions* of *Good* and *Evil* almoſt loſt, when our *Admiration*, and *Love* or *Contempt*, and *Hatred* are thus perverted from their natural Objects.

If any Mortals are ſo happy as never to have heard of the *Party-Tenets* of moſt of our Sects; or, if they have heard of them, have

have either never eſpous'd any Sect, or all equally; they bid faireſt for a truly *natural* and *good* Diſpoſition, becauſe their *Tempers* have never been ſoured about vain Trifles; nor have they contracted any *Sallenneſs* or *Rancour* againſt any Part of their own *Kind*. If any *Opinions* deſerve to be contended for, they are thoſe which give us lovely Ideas of the DEITY, and of our *Fellow-Creatures*: If any Opinions deſerve Oppoſition, they are ſuch as raiſe Scruples in our Minds about the *Goodneſs* of PROVIDENCE, or repreſent our Fellow-Creatures as *baſe* and *ſelfiſh*, by inſtilling into us ſome ill-natur'd, cunning, ſhrewd Inſinuations, "That our moſt generous Ac- "tions proceed wholly from *ſelfiſh Views*." This wiſe *Philoſophy* of ſome *Moderns*, after EPICURUS, muſt be fruitful of nothing but *Diſcontent*, *Suſpicion*, and *Jealouſy*; a State infinitely worſe than any little tranſitory *Injuries*, to which we might be expos'd by a good-natur'd *Credulity*. But Thanks be to the kind AUTHOR of our Nature, that in ſpite of ſuch Opinions, our *Nature* itſelf leads us into *Friendſhip*, *Truſt*, and *mutal Confidence*. Sect. 4.

WERE we freely converſant with *Robbers*, who ſhew a *moral Senſe* in the *equal* or *proportionable Diviſion* of their Prey, and in *Faith* to each other, we ſhould find they have their own ſublime *moral Ideas* of their Party, as *generous*, *courageous*, *truſty*, nay

Sect. 4. *honeſt* too; and that thoſe we call *honeſt* and *induſtrious*, are imagin'd by them to be *mean-ſpirited*, *ſelfiſh*, *churliſh*, or *luxurious*; on whom that Wealth is ill beſtow'd, which therefore they would apply to better Uſes, to maintain gallanter Men, who have a Right to a Living as well as their Neighbours, who are their profeſs'd Enemies. Nay, if we obſerve the Diſcourſe of our *profeſs'd Debauchees*, our *moſt diſſolute Rakes*, we ſhall find their Vices cloath'd, in their Imaginations, with ſome amiable Dreſs of *Liberty*, *Generoſity*, *juſt Reſentment* againſt the Contrivers of artful Rules to enſlave Men, and rob them of their Pleaſures.

PERHAPS never any Men purſu'd Vice long with Peace of Mind, without ſome ſuch deluding Imagination of *moral Good**, while they may be ſtill inadvertent to the *barbarous* and *inhuman Conſequences* of their Actions: The Idea of an *ill-natur'd Villain* is too frightful ever to become familiar to any Mortal. Hence we ſhall find, that the *baſeſt Actions* are dreſs'd in ſome *tolerable Maſk*. What others call *Avarice*, appears to the *Agent* a *prudent Care* of a *Family*, or *Friends*; *Fraud*, *artful Conduct*; *Malice* and *Revenge*, a *juſt Senſe* of *Honour*, and a *Vindication* of our Right in Poſſeſſions, or Fame; *Fire* and

* See below, *Sect.* vi. *Art.* 2. *Par.* 1.

Sword,

Sword, and *Deſolation*, among Enemies, a *juſt thorough Defence* of *our Country*; *Perſecution*, a *Zeal* for the *Truth*, and for the *eternal Happineſs* of Men, which *Hereticks* oppoſe. In all theſe Inſtances, Men generally act from a *Senſe* of *Virtue* upon *falſe Opinions*, and *miſtaken Benevolence*; upon *wrong* or *partial Views* of *publick Good*, and the Means to promote it; or upon very *narrow Syſtems* form'd by like *fooliſh Opinions*. It is not a *Delight* in the Miſery of others, or *Malice*, which occaſions the horrid Crimes which fill our Hiſtories; but generally an *injudicious*, *unreaſonable Enthuſiaſm* for ſome kind of *limited Virtue*. Sect. 4.

Inſani ſapiens nomen ferat, æquus iniqui,
Ultra, quam ſatis eſt, VIRTUTEM *ſi petat ipſam* *.

V. The laſt Ground of *Diverſity* which occurs, are the *falſe Opinions* of the *Will* or *Laws* of the Deity. To obey theſe we are determin'd from *Gratitude*, and a *Senſe* of *Right* imagin'd in the Deity, to diſpoſe at Pleaſure the Fortunes of his Creatures. This is ſo abundantly known to have produc'd *Follies*, *Superſtitions*, *Murders*, *Devaſtations* of Kingdoms, from a Senſe of *Virtue* and *Duty*, that it is needleſs to mention particu- *Falſe Opinions of the divine Laws.*

* Hor. *Ep.* 6. *Lib.* 1. ver. 15.

Sect. 4. lar Inſtances. Only we may obſerve, " That " all thoſe *Follies*, or *Barbarities*, rather con- " firm than deſtroy the Opinion of a *moral* " *Senſe*;" ſince the DEITY is believ'd to have a *Right* to diſpoſe of his Creatures; and *Gratitude* to him, if he be conceiv'd *good*, muſt move us to Obedience to his Will: if he be not conceiv'd *good*, *Self-Love* may overcome our *moral Senſe* of the Action which we undertake to avoid his Fury.

As for the Vices which commonly proceed from *Love* of *Pleaſure*, or any *violent Paſſion*, ſince generally the *Agent* is ſoon ſenſible of their *Evil*, and that ſometimes amidſt the Heat of the Action, they only prove, " That this *moral Senſe* and *Benevolence* may " be overcome by the more importunate So- " licitations of *other Deſires*."

Objection from Inceſt.

VI. BEFORE we leave this Subject, it is neceſſary to remove one of the ſtrongeſt Objections againſt what has been ſaid ſo often, *viz.* " That this *Senſe* is *natural*, and inde- " pendent on *Cuſtom* and *Education*." The Objection is this, " That we ſhall find *ſome* " *Actions* always attended with the ſtrongeſt " Abhorrence, even at firſt View, in ſome " whole Nations, in which there appears " nothing contrary to *Benevolence*; and that " the *ſame Actions* ſhall in another Nation " be counted *innocent*, or *honourable*. Thus " Inceſt, among *Chriſtians*, is abhorr'd at " firſt

" firſt Appearance as much as *Murder*; even Sect. 4.
" by thoſe who do not know or reflect up-
" on any neceſſary Tendency of it to the
" Detriment of Mankind. Now we gene-
" rally allow, that what is from *Nature* in
" one Nation, would be ſo in all. This
" Abhorrence therefore cannot be from *Na-*
" *ture*, ſince in GREECE, the marrying Half-
" ſiſters was counted *honourable*; and among
" the *Perſian* MAGI, the marrying of Mo-
" thers. Say they then, may not all our
" *Approbation* or *Diſlike* of Actions ariſe the
" ſame Way from *Cuſtom* and *Education?*"

THE Anſwer to this may be eaſily found from what is already ſaid. Had we no *moral Senſe natural* to us, we ſhould only look upon *Inceſt* as hurtful to ourſelves, and ſhun it, and never diſapprove other *inceſtuous Perſons*, more than we do a *broken Merchant*; ſo that ſtill this Abhorrence ſuppoſes a *Senſe* of *moral Good*. And farther, it is true, that many who abhor *Inceſt* do not know, or reflect upon the natural Tendency of ſome ſorts of *Inceſt* to the *publick Detriment:* but wherever it is hated, it is apprehended as offenſive to the DEITY, and that it expoſes the Perſon concern'd to his juſt Vengeance. Now it is univerſally acknowledg'd to be the groſſeſt Ingratitude and Baſeneſs, in any Creature, to counteract the Will of the DEITY, to whom it is under ſuch Obligations. This then is plainly *a moral evil Quality* ap-

Sect. 4. prehended in *Inceſt*, and reducible to the general Foundation of *Malice*, or rather Want of *Benevolence*. Nay farther, where this Opinion, "That *Inceſt* is offenſive to "the DEITY," prevails, *Inceſt* muſt have another direct Contrariety to *Benevolence*; ſince we muſt apprehend the *Inceſtuous*, as expoſing an Aſſociate, who ſhould be dear to him by the Ties of *Nature*, to the loweſt State of *Miſery* and *Baſeneſs*, *Infamy* and *Puniſhment*. But in thoſe Countries where no ſuch Opinion prevails of the DEITIES abhorring or prohibiting *Inceſt*; if no obvious *natural Evils* attend it, it may be look'd upon as *innocent*. And farther, as Men who have the *Senſe* of *Taſting*, may, by *Company* and *Education*, have Prejudices againſt Meats they never taſted, as *unſavoury*; ſo may Men who have a *moral Senſe*, acquire an Opinion by implicit Faith of the *moral Evil* of Actions, altho' they do not themſelves diſcern in them any Tendency to *natural Evil*; imagining that others do; or, by Education, they may have ſome Ideas aſſociated, which raiſe an Abhorrence without Reaſon. But without a *moral Senſe* we could receive no Prejudice againſt Actions, under any other View than as *naturally diſadvantageous* to ourſelves.

Moral Senſe not from Education.

VII. THE *Univerſality* of this *moral Senſe*, and that it is antecedent to *Inſtruction*, may appear from obſerving the Sentiments of *Children*, upon hearing the Stories with which they

they are commonly entertain'd as ſoon they underſtand Language. They always paſſionately intereſt themſelves on that ſide where *Kindneſs* and *Humanity* are found; and deteſt the *Cruel*, the *Covetous*, the *Selfiſh*, or the *Treacherous*. How ſtrongly do we ſee their Paſſions of *Joy*, *Sorrow*, *Love*, and *Indignation*, mov'd by theſe *moral Repreſentations*, even tho' there have been no Pains taken to give them Ideas of a DEITY, of *Laws*, of a *future State*, or of the more intricate Tendency of the *univerſal Good* to that of each *Individual!* Sect. 4.

SECT. V.

A farther Confirmation, that we have practical Diſpoſitions *to* Virtue *implanted in our* Nature; *with a farther Explication of our Benevolent* Inſtincts *of various Kinds, with the* additional Motives *of* Intereſt, *viz.* Honour, Shame *and* Pity.

Degrees of Benevolence.

I. WE have already endeavoured to prove, "That there is a *univerſal Determination* to *Benevolence* in *Mankind*, even toward the moſt diſtant Parts of the Species:" But we are not to imagine, that all benevolent Affections are of one Kind, or alike ſtrong. There are nearer and ſtronger Kinds of *Benevolence*, when the Objects ſtand in ſome nearer Relations to ourſelves, which have obtain'd diſtinct Names; ſuch as *natural Affection*, *Gratitude*, *Eſteem*.

Natural Affection.

ONE Species of *natural Affection*, viz. that in *Parents* towards their *Children*, has been conſider'd already *; we ſhall only obſerve farther, That there is the ſame kind of

* See above, *Sect.* ii. *Art.* 9. *Par.* 2, 3.

Affection

Affection among *collateral Relations*, tho' in a weaker Degree; which is univerſally obſervable, where no Oppoſition of *Intereſt* produces contrary Actions, or counterbalances the Power of this *natural Affection*. Sect. 5.

Not founded on Merit, or Acquaintance.

We may alſo obſerve, that as to the *Affection* of *Parents*, it cannot be entirely founded on *Merit* and *Acquaintance*; not only becauſe it is antecedent to all Acquaintance, which might occaſion *Eſteem*; but becauſe it operates where Acquaintance would produce *Hatred*, even toward *Children* apprehended to be *vicious*. And this *Affection* is farther confirm'd to be from Nature, becauſe it is always obſerv'd to *deſcend* more ſtrongly and conſtantly than it *aſcends* from *Children* to *Parents* mutually. Nature, who ſeems ſometimes frugal in her Operations, has ſtrongly determin'd *Parents* to the Care of their *Children*, becauſe they univerſally ſtand in abſolute need of Support from them; but has left it more to *Reflection*, and a *Senſe* of *Gratitude*, to produce Returns of *Love in Children*, toward ſuch *tender kind Benefactors*, who very ſeldom ſtand in ſuch abſolute Need of Support from their Poſterity, as their Children did from them. Now, did *Acquaintance* or *Merit* produce *natural Affection*, we ſurely ſhould find it ſtrongeſt in *Children*, on whom all the Obligations are laid by a thouſand good Offices; which yet is quite contrary to Obſervation. Nay, this

Sect. 5. Principle ſeems not confin'd to *Mankind*, but extends to other *Animals*, where yet we ſcarcely ever ſuppoſe any Ideas of Merit; and is obſerv'd to continue in them no longer than the Neceſſities of their Young require. Nor could it be of any Service to the Young that it ſhould, ſince when they are grown up, they can receive little Benefit from the Love of their *Dams*. But as it is otherwiſe with *rational Agents*, ſo *their Affections* are of longer Continuance, even during their whole Lives.

Gratitude. II. BUT nothing will give us a juſter Idea of the *wiſe Order* in which *human Nature* is form'd for *univerſal Love*, and *mutual good Offices*, than conſidering *that ſtrong Attraction* of *Benevolence*, which we call *Gratitude*. Every one knows that *Beneficence* toward ourſelves makes a much deeper Impreſſion upon us, and raiſes *Gratitude*, or a *ſtronger Love* toward the *Benefactor*, than *equal Beneficence* toward a *third Perſon* *. Now becauſe of the great Numbers of Mankind, their diſtant Habitations, and the Incapacity of any one to be remarkably uſeful to great Multitudes; that our *Benevolence* might not be quite diſtracted with a Multiplicity of Objects, whoſe equal Virtues would equally recommend them to our Regard; or become

* See above, *Sect.* ii. *Art.* 6. *Par.* 3.

uſeleſs,

uſeleſs, by being equally extended to Multitudes, whoſe Intereſts we could not underſtand, nor be capable of promoting, having no Intercourſe of Offices with them; NATURE has ſo well ordered it, that as our Attention is more raiſed by thoſe good Offices which are done to ourſelves or our Friends, ſo they cauſe a ſtronger Senſe of Approbation in us, and produce a ſtronger Benevolence toward the Authors of them. This we call *Gratitude*. And thus a Foundation is laid for *joyful Aſſociations* in all kinds of *Buſineſs*, and *virtuous Friendſhips*. Sect. 5.

BY *this Conſtitution* alſo the *Benefactor* is more encourag'd in his *Beneficence*, and better ſecur'd of an *Increaſe* of Happineſs by *grateful Returns* *, than if his *Virtue* were only to be honour'd by the colder general Sentiments of Perſons unconcern'd, who could not know his Neceſſities, nor how to be profitable to him; eſpecially, when they would all be equally determin'd to love innumerable Multitudes, whoſe equal Virtues would have the ſame Pretenſions to their Love.

THE *univerſal Benevolence* toward all Men, we may compare to that Principle of *Gravitation*, which perhaps extends to all Bodies in the *Univerſe*; but *increaſes* as the

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* See above, *Sect.* iii. *Art.* 2. *Par.* 2.

Diſtance

Sect. 5. Diſtance is diminiſh'd, and is *ſtrongeſt* when Bodies come to touch each other. Now this *Increaſe*, upon nearer Approach, is as neceſſary as that there ſhould be any *Attraction* at all. For a *general Attraction*, equal in all Diſtances, would by the Contrariety of ſuch Multitudes of equal Forces, put an End to all Regularity of Motion, and perhaps ſtop it altogether. Beſide this general Attraction, the Learned in theſe Subjects ſhew us a great many other Attractions among ſeveral Sorts of Bodies, anſwering to ſome particular Sorts of Paſſions, from ſome ſpecial Cauſes. And that Attraction or Force by which the Parts of each Body cohere, may repreſent the Self-Love of each Individual.

THESE different Sorts of Love to Perſons according to their *nearer Approaches* to *ourſelves* by their *Benefits*, is obſervable in the high Degree of *Love*, which *Heroes* and *Lawgivers* univerſally obtain in their own Countries, above what they find abroad, even among thoſe who are not inſenſible of their Virtues; and in all the ſtrong Ties of *Friendſhip*, *Acquaintance*, *Neighbourhood*, *Partnerſhip*; which are exceedingly neceſſary to the Order and Happineſs of Human Society.

Love of Honour.

III. FROM conſidering that *natural Gratitude*, and *Love* toward our *Benefactors*, which was already ſhewn to be *diſintereſted*;

*ed**; we are eaſily led to conſider *another Determination* of our *Minds*, equally *natural* with the *former*, which is to deſire and delight in the *good Opinion* and *Love of others*, even when we expect no other *Advantage* from them, except what flows from *this Conſtitution*, whereby HONOUR is made an *immediate Good*. This Deſire of *Honour* I would call AMBITION, had not *Cuſtom* join'd ſome evil Ideas to that Word, making it denote ſuch a *violent Deſire* of *Honour*, and of *Power* alſo, as will make us ſtop at no baſe Means to obtain them. On the other hand, we are by NATURE ſubjected to a *grievous Senſation* of *Miſery*, from the unfavourable Opinions of others concerning us, even when we dread no other *Evil* from them. This we call SHAME; which in the ſame manner is conſtituted an *immediate Evil*, as we ſaid *Honour* was an *immediate Good*. Sect. 5.

Now, were there no *moral Senſe*, or had we no other Idea of Actions but as *advantageous* or *hurtful*, I ſee no Reaſon why we ſhould be *delighted* with *Honour*, or ſubjected to the *Uneaſineſs* of *Shame*; or how it could ever happen, that a Man, who is ſecure from Puniſhment for any Action, ſhould ever be *uneaſy* at its being known to *all the World*. The *World* may have any Opinion of him as pernicious to his Neighbours; but

* See above, *Sect.* ii. *Art.* 6.

what

Sect. 5. what ſubjects his Eaſe to this Opinion of the *World?* Why, perhaps, he ſhall not be ſo much truſted henceforward in Buſineſs, and ſo ſuffer Loſs. If this be the only Reaſon of *Shame*, and it has no *immediate Evil* or *Pain* in it, diſtinct from Fear of Loſs, then, where-ever we expoſe ourſelves to Loſs, we ſhould be *aſham'd*, and endeavour to conceal the Action: and yet it is quite otherwiſe.

A MERCHANT, for Inſtance, leſt it ſhould impair his Credit, conceals a *Shipwreck*, or a very bad *Market*, which he has ſent his Goods to. But is this the ſame with the Paſſion of SHAME? Has he that *Anguiſh*, that *Dejection* of *Mind*, and *Self-condemnation*, which one ſhall have whoſe *Treachery* is detected? Nay, how will Men ſometimes glory in their Loſſes, when in a Cauſe imagin'd *morally good*, tho' they really weaken their Credit in the Merchant's Senſe; that is, the Opinion of their *Wealth*, or *Fitneſs* for Buſineſs? Was any Man ever *aſham'd* of impoveriſhing himſelf to ſerve his *Country*, or his *Friend?*

The Foundation of Morals not the Opinions of our Country.

IV. THE *Opinions* of our Country are by ſome made the firſt Standard of *Virtue*. They alledge, "That by comparing Actions "to them, we firſt diſtinguiſh between *mo*-"*ral Good* and *Evil:* And then, ſay they, "AMBITION, or the *Love* of HONOUR, is

" our *chief Motive.*" But what is *Honour?* It is not the being univerſally known, no matter how. A *covetous Man* is not *honour'd* by being univerſally known as *covetous*; nor a *weak*, *ſelfiſh*, or *luxurious Man*, when he is known to be ſo: Much leſs can a *treacherous*, *cruel* or *ungrateful Man*, be ſaid to be *honour'd* for his being known as ſuch. A *Poſture-maſter*, a *Fire-eater*, or *Practiſer* of *Leger-de-main*, is not *honour'd* for theſe publick Shews, unleſs we conſider him as a Perſon capable of giving the Pleaſures of *Admiration* and *Surprize* to Multitudes. *Honour* then is *the Opinion of others concerning our morally good Actions, or Abilities preſum'd to be apply'd that way*; for *Abilities* conſtantly apply'd to other Purpoſes, procure the greateſt Infamy. Now it is certain, that *Ambition*, or Love of *Honour*, is really *ſelfiſh*; but then this Determination to love *Honour*, preſuppoſes a *Senſe* of *moral Virtue*, both in the Perſons who confer the Honour, and in him who purſues it. Sect. 5.

And let it be obſerv'd, that if we knew an *Agent* had no other Motive of Action than *Ambition*, we ſhould apprehend no Virtue even in his moſt uſeful Actions, ſince they flow'd not from any *Love* to others, or *Deſire* to their Happineſs. When *Honour* is thus conſtituted by Nature *pleaſant* to us, it may be an *additional Motive* to *Virtue*, as,

Sect. 5. as, we ſaid above *, the Pleaſure ariſing from *Reflection on our Benevolence* was: but the Perſons whom we imagine *perfectly virtuous*, acts immediately from the *Love* of others; however theſe refined Intereſts may be *joint Motives* to him to ſet about ſuch a Courſe of Actions, or to cultivate every *kind Inclination*, and to deſpiſe every *contrary Intereſt*, as giving a ſmaller Happineſs than *Reflection* on his own Virtue, and *Conſciouſneſs* of the Eſteem of others.

SHAME is in the ſame manner conſtituted an *immediate Evil*, and influences us the ſame way to abſtain from *moral Evil*: not that any Action or Omiſſion would appear *virtuous*, where the *ſole Motive* was Fear of *Shame*.

Opinions flow from the Moral Senſe.

V. BUT to inquire farther, how far the Opinions of our Company can raiſe a Senſe of *moral Good or Evil*: If any Opinion be univerſal in any Country, Men of little Reflection will probably embrace it. If an Action be believ'd to be *advantageous* to the *Agent*, we may be led to believe ſo too, and then *Self-Love* may make us undertake it; or may, the ſame way, make us ſhun an Action reputed *pernicious* to the *Agent*. If an

* See *Sect.* iii. *Art.* 15. *Par.* 2.

Action paſs for *advantageous* to the *Publick*, we may believe ſo too; and what next? If we have no *diſintereſted Benevolence*, what ſhall move us to undertake it? " Why, we " love *Honour*; and to obtain this Pleaſure, " we will undertake the Action from *Self-* " *Intereſt*." Now, is *Honour* only the Opinion of our Country, that an Action is *advantageous* to the *Publick?* No: we ſee no Honour paid to the *uſeful Treachery* of an Enemy, whom we have brib'd to our Side, to *caſual undeſign'd Services*, or to the moſt uſeful Effects of *Compulſion* on *Cowards*; and yet we ſee Honour paid to *unſucceſsful Attempts* to ſerve the Publick from ſincere Love to it. *Honour* then preſuppoſes a *Senſe* of ſomething *amiable* beſides *Advantage*, *viz.* a *Senſe* of *Excellence* in a *publick Spirit*; and therefore the *firſt Senſe* of *moral Good* muſt be antecedent to *Honour*; for *Honour* is founded upon it *. The Company we keep may lead us, without examining, to believe that certain Actions tend to the *publick Good*; but that our Company *honours* ſuch Actions, and loves the *Agent*, muſt flow from a *Senſe* of *ſome Excellence* in this Love of the *Publick*, and ſerving its Intereſts. Sect. 5.

" We therefore, ſay they again, pretend

* *THIS ſhould be conſidered by thoſe who talk much of* Praiſe, high Opinion, or Value, Eſteem, Glory, *as Things much deſired; while yet they allow no* moral Senſe.

" to

Sect. 5. " to *love* the *Publick*, altho' we only desire " the Pleasure of *Honour*; and we will ap- " plaud all who seem to act in that manner, " either that we may reap *Advantage* from " their Actions, or that others may believe " we *really love* the *Publick*." But shall any Man ever be heartily *approved* and *admired*, when we know that *Self-Love* is the only Spring of his Actions? No: that is impossible. Or, shall we ever really admire Men who appear to *love* the *Publick*, without a *moral Sense*? No; we should distrust all Pretenders to such a Temper, and hate these Pretenders to *publick Love*, we should hate them as Hypocrites, and our Rivals in Fame. Now this is all which could be effected by the Opinions of our Country, even supposing they had a *moral Sense*, provided we had none ourselves: They never could make us admire *Virtue*, or *virtuous Characters* in others; but could only give us Opinions of *Advantage* or *Disadvantage* in Actions, according as they tended to procure to us the Pleasures of *Honour*, or the Pain of Shame.

But if we suppose that Men have, by Nature, a *moral Sense* of *Goodness* in Actions; and that they are capable of *disinterested Love*; all is easy. The Opinions of our Company may make us rashly conclude, that certain Actions tend to the universal Detriment, and are *morally evil*, when perhaps they are not so; and then *our Sense* may determine

termine us to have an Averſion to them, and their Authors; or we may, the ſame way, be led into implicit Prejudices in favour of Actions as *good*; and then our Deſire of *Honour* may co-operate with *Benevolence*, to move us to ſuch Actions. But, had we no *Senſe* of *moral Qualities* in Actions, nor any Conceptions of them, except as *advantageous* or *hurtful*, we never could have *honour'd* or *lov'd Agents* for *publick Love*, or had any Regard to their Actions, farther than they affected ourſelves in particular. We might have form'd the metaphyſical Idea of *publick Good*, but we had never deſir'd it, farther than it tended to our own *private Intereſt*, without a Principle of *Benevolence*; nor admir'd and lov'd thoſe who are ſtudious of it, without a *moral Senſe*. So far is *Virtue* from being (in the Language of a late * Author) *the Offspring of Flattery, begot upon Pride*; that *Pride*, in the bad Meaning of that Word, is *the ſpurious Brood of Ignorance by our moral Senſe, and Flattery* only *an Engine, which the Cunning may uſe to turn this moral Senſe in others, to the Purpoſes of Self-Love in the Flatterer.* Sect. 5.

VI. To explain what has been ſaid of the Power of *Honour*: Suppoſe a STATE or PRINCE, obſerving the Money which is *Moral Senſe, not from Love of Honour.*

* Author of the Fable of the Bees, *P. g.* 37. *3d. Ed.*

Sect. 5. drawn out of *England* by *Italian Muſicians*, ſhould decree *Honours*, *Statues*, *Titles*, for *great Muſicians*: This would certainly excite all who had Hopes of Succeſs, to the Study of *Muſick*; and all Men would look upon the good Performers as uſeful Subjects, as well as very entertaining. But would this give all Men a *good Ear*, or make them delight in *Harmony*? Or coud it ever make us really love a *Muſician*, who ſtudy'd nothing but his own Gain, in the ſame Manner we do a *Patriot*, or a *generous Friend*? I doubt, not. And yet *Friendſhip*, without the Aſſiſtance of Statues, or Honours, can make Perſons appear *exceedingly amiable*.

Let us take another Inſtance: Suppoſe *Statues* and *triumphal Arches* were decreed, as well as a *large Sum* of *Money*, to the Diſcoverer of the *Longitude*, or any other uſeful Invention in Mathematicks: This would raiſe an univerſal Deſire of ſuch Knowledge from *Self Love*; but would Men therefore love a *Mathematician*, as they do a *virtuous Man*? Would a *Mathematician* love every Perſon who had attain'd Perfection in that Knowledge, where-ever he obſerv'd it, altho' he knew that it was not accompany'd with any *Love* to *Mankind*, or *Study* of their *Good*, but with *Ill-nature*, *Pride*, *Covetouſneſs*? In ſhort, let us honour other Qualities by external Shew as much as we pleaſe; if we do not diſcern a *benevolent Intention* in the Application,

Application, or preſume upon it, we may look upon theſe Qualities as uſeful, enriching, or otherwiſe advantageous to any one who is poſſeſs'd of them; but they ſhall never meet with thoſe endearing Sentiments of *Eſteem* and *Love*, which our *Nature* determines us to appropriate to *Benevolence* or *Virtue*. Sect. 5.

Love of *Honour*, and Averſion to *Shame*, may often move us to do Actions, for which others profeſs to honour us, even tho' we ſee no *Good* in them ourſelves: And *Compliance* with the Inclinations of others, as it evidences Humanity, may procure ſome Love to the *Agent*, from Spectators who ſee no *moral Good* in the Action itſelf. But without ſome *Senſe* of *Good* in the Actions, Men ſhall never be fond of ſuch Actions in Solitude, nor ever love any one for Perfection in them, or for practiſing them in Solitude; and much leſs ſhall they be diſſatisfi'd with themſelves, when they act otherwiſe in Solitude. Now this is the Caſe with us, as to *Virtue*; and therefore we muſt have, by Nature, a *moral Senſe* of it antecedent to *Honour*.

This will ſhew us with what Judgment a late * Author compares the Original of

* See the Fable of the Bees, *Page* 38. 3*d. Ed.*

Sect. 5. our Ideas of *Virtue*, and Approbation of it, to *the manner of regulating the Behaviour of* aukward *Children by Commendation.* It ſhall appear hereafter *, that our Approbation of ſome *Geſtures*, and what we call *Decency* in Motion, depends upon ſome *moral Ideas* in People of advanced Years. But before Children come to obſerve this Relation, it is only *good Nature*, an *Inclination* to pleaſe, and *Love* of *Praiſe*, which makes them endeavour to behave as they are deſir'd; and not any Perception of *Excellence* in this Behaviour. Hence they are not ſolicitous about Geſtures when alone, unleſs with a View to pleaſe when they return to Company; nor do they ever love or approve others for any Perfection of this Kind, but rather envy or hate them; till they either diſcern the Connexion between *Geſtures* and *moral Qualities*; or reflect on the *good Nature*, which is evidenc'd by ſuch a Compliance with the Deſire of the Company.

False Honour.

VII. The conſidering *Honour* in the manner above explain'd may ſhew us the Reaſon, why Men are often *aſham'd* for things which are not *vitious*, and *honour'd* for what is not *virtuous*. For, if any Action only appears *vitious* to any Perſons or Company, altho' it be not ſo, they will have a bad Idea of the

* See *Sect.* vi. *Art.* 4.

Agent;

Agent; and then he may be aſham'd, or ſuffer Uneaſineſs, in being thought *morally evil.* The ſame way, thoſe who look upon an Action as *morally good*, will honour the *Agent*; and he may be pleas'd with the *Honour*, altho' he does not himſelf perceive any *moral Good* in what has procur'd it. Sect. 5.

Moral Incapacity, matter of Shame.

AGAIN, we ſhall be *aſham'd* of every Evidence of *moral Incapacity*, or Want of *Ability*; and with good Ground, when this Want is occaſion'd by our own Negligence. Nay farther, if any Circumſtance be look'd upon as *indecent* in any Country, *offenſive* to others, or *deform'd*; we ſhall, out of our Deſire of the good Opinions of others, be *aſham'd* to be found in ſuch Circumſtances, even when we are ſenſible that this Indecency or Offence is not founded on *Nature*, but is merely the Effect of *Cuſtom.* Thus being obſerv'd in thoſe Functions of Nature which are counted *indecent* and *offenſive*, will make us *uneaſy*, altho' we are ſenſible that they really do not argue any *Vice* or *Weakneſs.* But on the contrary, ſince *moral Abilities* of any kind, upon the general Preſumption of a good Application, and of having been acquired by Virtue, procure the Eſteem of others, we ſhall value ourſelves upon them, or grow proud of them, and be aſham'd of any Diſcovery of our Want of ſuch *Abilities.* This is the Reaſon that *Wealth* and *Power*, the great *Engines* of *Virtue*, when preſum'd

Sect. 5. to be intended for *benevolent* Purpoſes, either toward our Friends or our Country, procure *Honour* from others, and are apt to beget *Pride* in the *Poſſeſſor*; which, as it is a general Paſſion, which may be either *good* or *evil*, according as it is grounded, we may deſcribe to be *the Joy which ariſes from the real or imagin'd Poſſeſſion of Honour, or Claim to it.* The ſame are the Effects of *Knowledge*, *Sagacity*, *Strength*; and hence it is that Men are apt to boaſt of them.

But, whenever it appears that Men have only their *private Advantage* in View, in the Application of theſe *Abilities*, or *natural Advantages*, the *Honour* ceaſes, and we ſtudy to conceal them, or at leaſt are not fond of diſplaying them; and much more, when there is any Suſpicion of an *ill-natur'd* Application. Thus ſome *Miſers* are aſham'd of their *Wealth*, and ſtudy to conceal it; as the *Malicious* or *Selfiſh* do their *Power:* Nay, this is very often done, where there is no poſitive evil Intention; becauſe the diminiſhing their *Abilities*, increaſes the *moral Good*, of any little kind Action, which they can find in their Hearts to perform.

Selfiſhneſs ſhameful.

In ſhort, we always ſee Actions which flow from *publick Love*, accompany'd with generous Boldneſs and Openneſs; and not only *malicious*, but even *ſelfiſh ones*, the matter of Shame and Confuſion; and that Men ſtudy

ſtudy to conceal them. The Love of *private Pleaſure* is the ordinary Occaſion of *Vice*; and when Men have got any lively Notions of *Virtue*, they generally begin to be aſham'd of every thing which betrays *Selfiſhneſs*, even in Inſtances where it is innocent. We are apt to imagine, that others obſerving us in ſuch Purſuits, form mean Opinions of us, as too much ſet on private Pleaſure; and hence we ſhall find ſuch Enjoyments, in moſt polite Nations, conceal'd from thoſe who do not partake with us, Such are *venereal Pleaſures* between *Perſons marry'd*, and even *eating* and *drinking* alone, any nicer ſorts of Meats or Drinks: whereas a *hoſpitable Table* is rather matter of boaſting; and ſo are all other kind generous Offices between *marry'd Perſons*, where there is no Suſpicion of *Self-Love* in the *Agent*; but he is imagin'd as acting from Love to his *Aſſociate*. This, ſtrengthens the natural Modeſty in civiliz'd Nations, as Habits and Education improve it; ſo that we are now aſham'd of many things, upon ſome confus'd implicit Opinions of *moral Evil*, tho' we know not upon what account. Sect. 5.

Honour and Shame often from ſome Aſſociations of Ideas.

HERE too we may ſee the Reaſon, why we are not aſham'd of any of the Methods of *Grandeur*, or *High-Living*. There is ſuch a Mixture of *moral Ideas*, of *Benevolence*, of *Abilities* kindly employ'd; ſo many Dependants *ſupported*, ſo many Friends *entertain'd*.

Sect. 5 *aſſiſted, protected*; ſuch a *Capacity* imagin'd for *great* and *amiable Actions*, that we are never aſham'd, but rather boaſt of ſuch *things*. We never affect Obſcurity or Concealment, but rather deſire that our *State* and *Magnificence* ſhould be known. Were it not for this Conjunction of *moral Ideas*, no Mortal could bear the Drugery of *State*, or abſtain from laughing at thoſe who did. Could any Man be pleas'd with a Company of *Statues* ſurrounding his Table, ſo artfully contriv'd as to conſume his various Courſes, and inſpir'd by ſome Servant, like ſo many Puppets, to give the uſual trifling Returns in Praiſe of their Fare; Or with ſo many *Machines* to perform the Cringes and Whiſpers of a Levee?

THE *Shame* we ſuffer from the Meanneſs of *Dreſs*, *Table*, *Equipage*, is entirely owing to the ſame Reaſon. This Meanneſs is often imagin'd to argue *Avarice*, *Meanneſs* of *Spirit*, Want of *Capacity*, or *Conduct* in Life, of *Induſtry*, or *moral Abilities* of one kind or other. To confirm this, let us obſerve that Men will glory in the Meanneſs of their Fair, when it was occaſion'd by a *good* Action. How many would be aſham'd to be ſurpriz'd at a Dinner of *cold Meat*, who will boaſt of their having fed upon *Dogs* and *Horſes* at the Siege of *Derry*? And they will all tell you, that they were not, nor are aſham'd of it.

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THIS ordinary Connexion in our Imagination, between *external Grandeur*, *Regularity* in *Dreſs*, *Equipage*, *Retinue*, *Badges* of *Honour*, and ſome *moral Abilities* greater than ordinary, is perhaps of more Conſequence in the World than ſome *recluſe Philoſophers* apprehend, who pique themſelves upon deſpiſing theſe external Shews. This may poſſibly be a great, if not the only Cauſe of what ſome count *miraculous*, *viz.* That *civil Governors* of no greater Capacity than their Neighbours, by ſome inexpreſſible *Awe* and *Authority*, quell the Spirits of the *Vulgar*, and keep them in Subjection by ſuch ſmall Guards, as might eaſily be conquer'd by thoſe Aſſociations of the *Diſaffected*, or *Factions* of any *State*; who are daring enough among their *Equals*, and ſhew a ſufficient Contempt of Death for undertaking ſuch an Enterprize.

HENCE alſo we may diſcover the Reaſon, why the gratifying our *ſuperior Senſes* of *Beauty* and *Harmony*, or the Enjoyment of the Pleaſure of *Knowledge*, never occaſions any Shame or Confuſion, tho' our Enjoyment were known to all the *World*. The Objects which furniſh this Pleaſure, are of ſuch a Nature, as to afford the ſame Delights to Multitudes; nor is there any thing in the Enjoyment of them by one which excludes any Mortal from a like Enjoyment. So that, altho' we purſue theſe Enjoyments from *Self-Love*,

Sect. 5. *Love*, yet, ſince our Enjoyment cannot be prejudicial to others, no Man is imagin'd any way *inhumanly Selfiſh*, from the fulleſt Enjoyment of them which is poſſible. The ſame *Regularity* or *Harmony* which delights me, may at the ſame time delight Multitudes; the ſame *Theorem* ſhall be equally fruitful of Pleaſure, when it has entertain'd Thouſands. Men therefore are not aſham'd of ſuch Purſuits, ſince they never, of themſelves, ſeduce us into any thing *malicious*, *envious*, or *ill-natur'd*; nor does any one apprehend another *too Selfiſh*, from his purſuing Objects of unexhauſted univerſal Pleaſure*.

THIS View of *Honour* and *Shame* may alſo let us ſee the Reaſon, why moſt Men are uneaſy at being prais'd, when they themſelves are preſent. Every one is delighted with the Eſteem of others, and muſt enjoy great Pleaſure when he hears himſelf commended; but we are unwilling others ſhould obſerve our Enjoyment of this Pleaſure, which is really *Selfiſh*; or that they ſhould imagine us fond of it, or influenc'd by Hopes of it in our good Actions: and therefore we chooſe Secrecy for the Enjoyment of it, as we do with reſpect to other Pleaſures, in which others do not ſhare with us.

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* See another Reaſon of this, perhaps more probably true, in the *Eſſay on the Paſſions*, p. 6.

Sect. 5.

Compaſſion a Motive to Virtue.

VIII. LET us next conſider another Determination of our *Mind*, which ſtrongly proves *Benevolence* to be *natural* to us, and that is COMPASSION; by which we are diſpos'd to ſtudy the *Intereſt* of others, without any Views of *private Advantage*. This needs little Illuſtration. Every Mortal is made uneaſy by any grievous Miſery he ſees another involv'd in, unleſs the Perſon be imagin'd *morally evil* in a *moral Senſe*: Nay, it is almoſt impoſſible for us to be unmov'd, even in that Caſe. *Advantage* may make us do a cruel Action, or may overcome *Pity*; but it ſcarce ever extinguiſhes it. A ſudden Paſſion of *Hatred* or *Anger* may repreſent a Perſon as *abſolutely evil*, and ſo extinguiſh *Pity*; but when the Paſſion is over, it often returns. Another *diſintereſted* View may even in cold Blood overcome *Pity*; ſuch as *Love* to *our Country*, or *Zeal* for *Religion*. *Perſecution* is generally occaſion'd by *Love* of *Virtue*, and a *Deſire* of the *eternal Happineſs* of *Mankind*, altho' our *Folly* makes us chooſe abſurd Means to promote it; and is often accompany'd with *Pity* enough to make the *Perſecutor* uneaſy, in what, for prepollent Reaſons, he chooſes; unleſs his Opinion leads him to look upon the *Heretick* as *abſolutely* and *intirely evil*.

WE may here obſerve, how wonderfully the Conſtitution of *human Nature* is adapted to

Sect. 5. to move *Compaſſion*. Our *Miſery* or *Diſtreſs* immediately appears in our *Countenance*, if we do not ſtudy to prevent it, and propagates ſome Pain to all Spectators; who, from Obſervation, univerſally underſtand the Meaning of thoſe *diſmal Airs*. We *mechanichally* ſend forth *Shrieks* and *Groans* upon any ſurprizing Apprehenſion of *Evil*; ſo that no Regard to Decency can ſometimes reſtrain them. This is the Voice of NATURE, underſtood by all Nations, by which all who are preſent are rous'd to our Aſſiſtance, and ſometimes our *injurious* Enemy is made to relent.

WE obſerv'd above*, that we are not immediately excited by *Compaſſion* to deſire the *Removal* of our own Pain: we think it juſt to be ſo affected upon the Occaſion, and diſlike thoſe who are not ſo. But we are excited directly to deſire the *Relief* of the Miſerable; without any Imagination, that this Relief is a *private Good* to ourſelves: And if we ſee this impoſſible, we may by *Reflection* diſcern it to be vain for us to indulge our *Compaſſion* any farther; and then *Self-Love* prompts us to retire from the Object which occaſions our Pain, and to endeavour to divert our Thoughts. But where there is no ſuch *Reflection*, People are hurry'd by a *na-*

* See Sect. ii. Art. 8. Par. 2.

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tural kind Inſtinct, to ſee Objects of *Compaſſion*, and expoſe themſelves to this Pain, when they can give no Reaſon for it; as in the Inſtance of *publick Executions*. Sect. 5.

THIS ſame Principle leads Men to *Tragedies*; only we are to obſerve, that another ſtrong Reaſon of this is the *moral Beauty* of the *Characters* and *Actions*, which we love to behold. For I doubt, whether any Audience would be pleas'd to ſee fictitious Scenes of Miſery, if they were kept Strangers to the *moral Qualities* of the Sufferers, or their *Characters* and *Actions*. As in ſuch a Caſe, there would be no *Beauty* to raiſe Deſire of ſeeing ſuch Repreſentations, I fancy we would not expoſe ourſelves to Pain alone, from Miſery which we knew to be fictitious.

IT was the ſame Cauſe which crouded the *Roman Theatres* to ſee *Gladiators*. There the People had frequent Inſtances of great *Courage*, and *Contempt* of Death, two great *moral Abilities*, if not *Virtues*. Hence CICERO looks upon them as great Inſtructions in *Fortitude*. The *Antagoniſt Gladiator* bore all the Blame of the Cruelty committed, among People of little Reflection; and the *courageous* and artful one, really obtain'd a Reputation of *Virtue*, and Favour among the Spectators, and was vindicated by the Neceſſity of *Self-defence*. In the mean time they were inadvertent to this, that their crouding

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Sect. 5. to ſuch Sights, and favouring the Perſons who preſented them with ſuch Spectacles of Courage, and with Opportunities of following their *natural Inſtinct* to *Compaſſion*, was the true Occaſion of all the real Diſtreſs, or Aſſaults which they were ſorry for.

WHAT Sentiments can we imagine a *Candidate* would have rais'd of himſelf, had he preſented his Countrymen only with Scenes of *Miſery*; had he drain'd *Hoſpitals* and *Infirmaries* of all their pityable Inhabitants, or had he bound ſo many *Slaves*, and without any Reſiſtance, butcher'd them with his own Hands? I ſhould very much queſtion the Succeſs of his Election, (however *Compaſſion* or *Curioſity* might cauſe his Shews ſtill to be frequented) if his *Antagoniſt* choſe a Diverſion apparently more *virtuous*, or with a *Mixture* of Scenes of *Virtue*. Some have alledged, That " however the Sight of ano-
" ther's Miſery ſome way or other gives us
" Pain, yet the very feeling of Compaſſion
" is alſo attended with Pleaſure: This Plea-
" ſure is ſuperior to the Pain of Sympathy,
" and hence we deſire to raiſe Compaſſion in
" ourſelves, and incline to indulge it." Were this truly the Caſe, the *Continuation of the Suffering* would be the natural Deſire of the Compaſſionate, in order to continute this State, not of pure Pleaſure indeed, but of Pleaſure ſuperior to all Pains.

How

Sect. 5.

Compaſſion natural.

How independent this Diſpoſition to *Compaſſion* is on *Cuſtom*, *Education*, or *Inſtruction*, will appear from the Prevalence of it in *Women* and *Children*, who are leſs influenc'd by theſe. That *Children* delight in ſome Actions which are *cruel* and *tormenting* to Animals which they have in their Power, flows not from *Malice*, or want of *Compaſſion*, but from their *Ignorance* of thoſe Signs of Pain which many Creatures make; together with a *Curioſity* to ſee the various Contortions of their Bodies. For when they are more acquainted with theſe Creatures, or come by any means to know their Sufferings, their *Compaſſion* often becomes too ſtrong for their *Reaſon*; as it generally does in beholding *Executions*, where as ſoon as they obſerve the Evidences of Diſtreſs, or Pain in the *Malefactor*, they are apt to condemn this neceſſary Method of Self-defence in the *State*.

SECT.

Sect. 6.

SECT. VI.

Concerning the Importance *of this* moral Senſe *to the preſent Happineſs of* Mankind, *and its* Influence *on human Affairs.*

Importance of the Moral Senſe.

I. IT may now probably appear, that notwithſtanding the Corruption of Manners ſo juſtly complain'd of every where, this *moral Senſe* has a greater Influence on *Mankind* than is generally imagin'd, altho' it is often directed by very partial imperfect Views of *publick Good*, and often overcome by *Self-Love*. But we ſhall offer ſome farther Conſiderations to prove, "That it gives "us more *Pleaſure* and *Pain*, than all our "*others Faculties.*" And to prevent Repetitions let us obſerve, "That wherever any "*morally good Quality* gives Pleaſure from "*Reflection*, or from *Honour*, the contrary "*evil one* will give proportionable Pain, from "*Remorſe* and *Shame*" Now we ſhall conſider the *moral Pleaſures*, not only *ſeparately*, but as they are the *moſt delightful Ingredient* in the ordinary Pleaſures of *Life*.

ALL MEN ſeem perſuaded of ſome *Excellency* in the Poſſeſſion of *good moral Qualities*, which is ſuperior to all other Enjoyment;

ments; and on the contrary, look upon a State of *moral Evil*, as worſe and more wretched than any other whatſoever. We muſt not form our Judgment in this matter from the Actions of Men; for, however they may be influenc'd by *moral Sentiments*, yet it is certain, that *ſelf-intereſted Paſſions* frequently overcome them, and *partial Views* of the Tendency of Actions, make us do what is really *morally evil*, apprehending it to be *good*. But let us examine the Sentiments which Men univerſally form of the State of others, when they are no way immediately concern'd; for in theſe Sentiments *human Nature* is *calm* and *undiſturb'd*, and ſhews its *true Face*. Sect. 6.

Now ſhould we imagine a *rational Creature* in a ſufficiently happy State, whoſe Mind was, without *Interruption*, wholly occupy'd with pleaſant Senſations of *Smell*, *Taſte*, *Touch*, *&c.* if at the ſame time all other Ideas were excluded? Should we not think the State *low*, *mean*, and *ſordid*, if there were no *Society*, no *Love* or *Friendſhip*, no *good Offices*? What then muſt that State be, wherein there are no Pleaſures but thoſe of the *external Senſes*, with ſuch long Intervals as *human Nature* at preſent muſt have? Do theſe ſhort Fits of Pleaſure make the *Luxurious* happy? How *inſipid* and *joyleſs* are the Reflections on paſt Pleaſure! And how poor a Recompence is the Return of the tranſient

Sect. 6. Senſation, for the *nauſeous Satieties*, and *Langours* in the Intervals! This *Frame* of our *Nature*, ſo incapable of long Enjoyments of the *external Senſes*, points out to us, "That "there muſt be ſome other more *durable* "*Pleaſure*, without ſuch *tedious Interrup-* "*tions*, and *nauſeous Reflections*."

LET us even join with the Pleaſures of the *external Senſes*, the Perceptions of *Beauty*, *Order*, *Harmony*. Theſe are, no doubt, more *noble Pleaſures*, and ſeem to inlarge the *Mind*; and yet how *cold* and *joyleſs* are they, if there be no *moral Pleaſures* of *Friendſhip*, *Love* and *Beneficence!* Now, if the bare Abſence of *moral Good* makes, in our Judgment, the State of a rational Agent contemptible; the Preſence of *contrary* Diſpoſitions is always imagin'd by us to ſink him into a degree of Miſery, from which no other Pleaſures can relieve him. Would we ever wiſh to be in the ſame Condition with a *wrathful*, *malicious*, *revengeful*, or *envious Being*, tho' we were at the ſame time to enjoy all the Pleaſures of the *external* and *internal Senſes*? The internal Pleaſures of *Beauty* and *Harmony* contribute greatly indeed toward ſoothing the Mind into a Forgetfulneſs of *Wrath*, *Malice* or *Revenge*; and they muſt do ſo, before we can have any tolerable Delight or Enjoyment: for while *theſe Affections* poſſeſs the Mind, there is nothing but *Torment* and *Miſery*.

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Caſtle-builders prove it.

WHAT *Caſtle-builder*, who forms to himſelf imaginary Scenes of Life, in which he thinks he ſhould be happy, ever made *acknowledg'd Treachery*, *Cruelty*, or *Ingratitude*, the Steps by which he mounted to his wiſh'd-for Elevation, or Parts of his Character, when he had attain'd it? We always conduct ourſelves in ſuch Reſveries, according to the Dictates of *Honour*, *Faith*, *Generoſity*, *Courage*; and the loweſt we can ſink, is hoping we may be enrich'd by ſome innocent Accident.

O ſi urnam Argenti FORS *qua mihi monſtret* * *!* ——

But *Labour*, *Hunger*, *Thirſt*, *Poverty*, *Pain*, *Danger*, have nothing ſo deteſtable in them, that our *Self-Love* cannot allow us to be often expos'd to them. On the contrary, the Virtues which theſe give us Occaſions of diſplaying, are ſo amiable and excellent, that ſcarce ever is any imaginary Hero, in *Romance* or *Epic*, brought to his higheſt Pitch of Happineſs, without going thro' them *all*. Where there is no *Virtue*, there is nothing worth Deſire or Contemplation; the *Romance* or *Epos* muſt end. Nay, the *Difficulty* †, or *natural Evil*, does ſo much increaſe the *Vir-*

* Hor. *Lib.* 2. *Sat.* 6. ver. 10.
† *Sect.* iii. *Art.* 11. *Axiom* 6.

Sect. 6. *tue* of the *good* Action which it accompanies, that we cannot eaſily ſuſtain theſe Works after the Diſtreſs is over; and if we continue the Work, it muſt be by preſenting a new Scene of *Benevolence*, in a proſperous Fortune. A Scene of *external Proſperity* or *natural Good*, without any Thing *moral* or *virtuous*, cannot entertain a Perſon of the dulleſt Imagination, had he ever ſo much intereſted himſelf in the Fortunes of his Hero; for where *Virtue* ceaſes, there remains nothing worth wiſhing to our Favourite, or which we can be delighted to view his Poſſeſſion of, when we are moſt ſtudious of his Happineſs.

Virtue own'd ſuperior to all Pleaſure.

LET us take a particular Inſtance, to try how much we prefer the Poſſeſſion of *Virtue* to all other Enjoyments, and how we look upon *Vice* as worſe than any other Miſery. Who could ever read the Hiſtory of REGULUS, as related by CICERO, and ſome others, without concerning himſelf in the Fortunes of that *gallant* Man, ſorrowing at his Sufferings, and wiſhing him a better Fate? But how better a Fate? Should he have comply'd with the Terms of CARTHAGINIANS, and preſerv'd himſelf from the intended Tortures, tho' to the Detriment of his Country? Or ſhould he have violated his plighted Faith, and Promiſe of returning? Will any Man ſay, that either of theſe is the better Fate he wiſhes his Favourite? Had he acted thus, *that* Virtue would

would have been gone, which intereſts every one in his Fortunes.——" Let him take his " Fate like other common Mortals."——— What elſe do we wiſh then, but that the CARTHAGINIANS had relented of their Cruelty, or that PROVIDENCE, by ſome unexpected Event, had reſcued him out of their Hands? Sect. 6.

Now may not this teach us, that we are indeed determin'd to judge *Virtue* with Peace and Safety, preferable to *Virtue* with Diſtreſs; but that at the ſame time we look upon the State of the *Virtuous*, the *Publick-ſpirited*, even in the utmoſt natural Diſtreſs, as preferable to all Affluence of other Enjoyments? For this is what we chooſe to have our Favourite Hero in, notwithſtanding all its Pains, and natural Evils. We ſhould never have imagin'd him happier, had he acted otherwiſe; or thought him in a more eligible State, with Liberty and Safety, at the Expence of his *Virtue*. We ſecretly judge the Purchaſe too dear; and therefore we never imagine he acted fooliſhly in ſecuring his *Virtue*, his *Honour*, at the Expence of his *Eaſe*, his *Pleaſure*, his *Life*. Nor can we think theſe *latter* Enjoyments worth the keeping, when the former are intirely loſt.

Neceſſary in other Pleaſures.

II. LET us in the ſame manner examine our Sentiments of the Happineſs of others in common Life. WEALTH and EXTER-

Sect. 6. NAL PLEASURES bear no ſmall bulk in our Imaginations; but does there not always accompany this Opinion of Happineſs in *Wealth*, ſome ſuppos'd *beneficent Intention* of doing good Offices to Perſons dear to *us*, at leaſt to our *Families* or *Kinſmen?* And in our imagin'd Happineſs from *external Pleaſure*, are not ſome Ideas always included of ſome *moral* Enjoyments of *Society*, ſome *Communication* of Pleaſure, ſomething of *Love*, of *Friendſhip*, of *Eſteem*, of *Gratitude?* Who ever pretended to a *Taſte* of theſe Pleaſures without *Society?* Or if any ſeem violent in Purſuit of them, how *baſe* and *contemptible* do they appear to all Perſons, even to thoſe who could have no Expectation of Advantage from their having a more generous Notion of Pleaſure?

Now, were there no *moral Senſe*, no Happineſs in *Benevolence*, and did we act from no other Principle than *Self-Love*; ſure there is no Pleaſure of the external Senſes, which we could not enjoy alone, with leſs Trouble and Expence than in *Society*. But a *Mixture* of the *moral Pleaſures* is what gives the *alluring Reliſh*; 'tis ſome Appearance of *Friendſhip*, of *Love*, of *communicating Pleaſure* to others, which preſerves the Pleaſures of the *Luxurious* from being *nauſeous* and *inſipid*. And this partial Imagination of ſome *good moral Qualities*, ſome *Benevolence*, in Actions which have many *cruel*, *inhuman*, and

and *deſtructive* Conſequences towards others, is what has kept *Vice* more in Countenance than any other Conſideration *. Sect. 6.

But to convince us farther wherein the Happineſs of *Wealth*, and *external Pleaſure* lies; let us but ſuppoſe *Malice*, *Wrath*, *Revenge*; or only *Solitude*, Abſence of *Friendſhip*, of *Love*, of *Society*, of *Eſteem*, join'd with the Poſſeſſion of them; and all the Happineſs vaniſhes like a Dream. And yet *Love*, *Friendſhip*, *Society*, *Humanity*, tho' accompany'd with *Poverty* and *Toil*, nay even with ſmaller degrees of *Pain*, ſuch as do not wholly occupy the Mind, are not only the Object of Love from others, but even of a ſort of Emulation: which plainly ſhews, "That *Virtue* is the chief *Happineſs* in the "Judgment of *all Mankind*."

III. There is a farther Conſideration which muſt not be paſs'd over, concerning the External Beauty of Perſons, which all allow to have a great Power over human Minds. Now it is ſome apprehended *Morality*, ſome natural or imagin'd Indication of *concomitant Virtue*, which gives it this powerful Charm above all other kinds of *Beauty*. Let us conſider the Characters of *Beauty*, which are commonly admir'd in *The Charm in* Beauty.

* See above *Sect.* vi. *Art.* 4. *Par.* 5.

Sect. 6. Countenances, and we ſhall find them to be *Sweetneſs*, *Mildneſs*, *Majeſty*, *Dignity*, *Vivacity*, *Humility*, *Tenderneſs*, *Good-nature*; that is, that certain *Airs*, *Proportions*, *je ne ſcai quoy's*, are natural Indications of ſuch Virtues, or of Abilities or Diſpoſitions toward them. As we obſerv'd above * of *Miſery* or *Diſtreſs* appearing in Countenances; ſo it is certain, almoſt all *habitual Diſpoſitions* of *Mind* form the Countenance in ſuch a manner, as to give ſome Indications of them to the Spectator. Our *violent* Paſſions are obvious at firſt View in the Countenance; ſo that ſometimes no Art can conceal them: and ſmaller Degrees of them give ſome leſs obvious Turns to the Face, which an accurate Eye will obſerve. Now, when the *natural Air* of a Face approaches to that which any Paſſion would form it unto, we make a Conjecture from this concerning the *leading Diſpoſition* of the Perſon's *Mind*.

As to thoſe Fancies which prevail in certain Countries toward *large Lips*, *little Noſes*, *narrow Eyes*; unleſs we knew from themſelves under what Idea ſuch Features are admir'd, whether as *naturally beautiful* in Form, or Proportion to the reſt of the Face; or as preſum'd Indications of ſome *moral Qualities*; we may more probably conclude

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* See *Sect.* v. *Art.* 8. *Par.* 2.

that

that it is the *latter*; ſince this is ſo much the Ground of Approbation or Averſion towards Faces among ourſelves. And as to thoſe Features which we count *naturally diſagreeable* as to Form, we know the Averſion on this Account is ſo weak, that *moral Qualities* ſhall procure a Liking even to the Face, in Perſons who are ſenſible of the *Irregularity*, or Want of that *Regularity* which is common in others. With us, certain Features are imagin'd to denote *Dullneſs*; as *hollow Eyes, large Lips*; a *Colour* of Hair, *Wantonneſs:* and may we not conclude the like *Aſſociation of Ideas*, upon ſome probable Foundation in Nature, and ſometimes without any, to be the Ground of thoſe Approbations which appear unaccountable to us? Sect. 6.

In the ſame manner, when there is nothing *groſly* diſproportion'd in any Face, what is it we diſpraiſe? Is it *Pride*, *Haughtineſs*, *Sourneſs*, *Ill-nature*, *Diſcontent*, *Folly*, *Levity*, *Wantonneſs*; which ſome Countenances diſcover in the Manner above hinted at? And *theſe Airs*, when brought by Cuſtom upon the moſt *regulas Set* of Features, have often made them very diſagreeable; as the *contrary Airs* have given the ſtrongeſt Charms to Countenances, which were far from Perfection in *external Beauty*. Had Homer, in his Character of Helen, rais'd our Idea of her *external Beauty* to the greateſt Height, yet

Sect. 6. yet it would have been ridiculous to have engag'd his Countrymen in a War for ſuch a HELEN as VIRGIL has drawn her. He therefore ſtill retains ſomething morally amiable amidſt all her Weakneſs, and often ſuggeſts to his Reader,

——Ἑλένης ὁρμήματά τε στοναχάς τε *,

as the Spring of his Countrymens Indignation and Revenge.

The Cauſe of different Fancies of Beauty.

THIS Conſideration may ſhew us one Reaſon, among many others, for Mens *different Fancies*, or *Reliſhes* of *Beauty*. The *Mind* of Man, however generally diſpos'd to eſteem *Benevolence* and *Virtue*, yet by more particular Attention to ſome Kinds of it than others, may gain a ſtronger Admiration of ſome *moral Diſpoſitions* than others. *Military* Men may admire *Courage* more than other Virtues; Perſons of *ſmaller Courage*, may admire *Sweetneſs* of *Temper*; Men of *Thought* and *Reflection*, who have more extenſive Views, will admire the like *Qualities* in others; Men of *keen Paſſions* expect equal Returns of all the kind Affections, and are wonderfully charm'd by *Compliance*: The *Proud* may like thoſe of *higher Spirit*, as more ſuitable to their Dignity; tho' *Pride*,

* See *Homer*, *Iliad* 2. *ver.* 356, 590.

join'd

join'd with *Reflection* and *good Senſe*, will recommend to them *Humility* in the Perſon belov'd. Now as the *various* Tempers of Men make *various* Tempers of others agreeable to them, ſo they muſt differ in their *Reliſhes* of *Beauty*, according as it denotes the ſeveral Qualities moſt agreeable to themſelves. Sect. 6.

THIS may alſo ſhew us, how, in *virtuous Love*, there may be the greateſt Beauty, without the leaſt Charm to engage a Rival. *Love* itſelf gives a Beauty to the *Lover*, in the Eyes of the Perſon *belov'd*, which no other Mortal is much affected with. And this perhaps is the *ſtrongeſt Charm* poſſible, and that which will have the greateſt Power, where there is not ſome very great Counterbalance from *worldly Intereſt*, *Vice*, or *groſs Deformity*.

IV. THIS ſame Conſideration may be extended to the whole AIR and MOTION of any Perſon. Every thing we count agreeable, ſome way denotes *Chearfulneſs*, *Eaſe*, a *Condeſcenſion*, and *Readineſs* to oblige, a *Love* of *Company*, with a *Freedom* and *Boldneſs* which always accompanies an *honeſt*, *undeſigning Heart*. On the contrary, what is ſhocking in *Air* or *Motion*, is *Roughneſs*, *Ill-nature*, a *Diſregard* to others, or a *fooliſh Shame-facedneſs*, which evidences a Perſon to be unexperienc'd in Society, or Offices of Humanity. *Air, Motion, Geſtures.*

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WITH relation to theſe *Airs*, *Motions*, *Geſtures*, we may obſerve, that conſidering the different *Ceremonies* and *Modes* of ſhewing Reſpect, which are practis'd in different Nations, we may indeed probably conclude, that there is no *natural* Connection between any of theſe *Geſtures* or *Motions*, and the *Affections* of *Mind* which they are by *Cuſtom* made to expreſs. But when *Cuſtom* has made any of them paſs for Expreſſions of *ſuch Affections*, by a conſtant *Aſſociation* of Ideas, ſome ſhall become *agreeable* and *lovely*, and others *extremely offenſive*, altho' they were both, in their own Nature, *perfectly indifferent*.

The Spring of Love between the Sexes.

V. HERE we may remark the Manner in which NATURE leads *Mankind* to the Continuance of their Race, and by its ſtrongeſt Power engages them to what occaſions the greateſt Toil and Anxiety of Life; and yet ſupports them under it with an inexpreſſible Delight. We might have been excited to the Propagation of our Species, by ſuch an uneaſy Senſation as would have effectually determin'd us to it, without any great Proſpect of Happineſs; as we ſee *Hunger* and *Thirſt* determine us to preſerve our Bodies, tho' few look upon eating and drinking as any conſiderable Happineſs. The *Sexes* might have been engag'd to Concurrence, as we imagine the *Brutes* are, by *Deſire* only, or by a *Love* of *ſenſual Pleaſure*.

Pleaſure. But how dull and inſipid had Life been, were there no more in MARRIAGE! Who would have had Reſolution enough to bear all the Cares of a *Family*, and Education of *Children?* Or who, from the general Motive of *Benevolence* alone, would have choſen to ſubject himſelf to *natural Affection* toward an *Offspring*, when he could ſo eaſily foreſee what Troubles it might occaſion? Sect. 6.

THIS Inclination therefore of the *Sexes*, is founded on ſomething ſtronger, and more efficacious and joyful, than the Solicitations of *Uneaſineſs*, or the bare *Deſire* of *ſenſible Pleaſure*. BEAUTY gives a favourable Preſumption of *good Moral Diſpoſitions*, and *Acquaintance* confirms this into a real *Love* of *Eſteem*, or begets it, where there is little *Beauty*. This raiſes an Expectation of the greateſt *moral Pleaſures* along with the *ſenſible*, and a thouſand tender Sentiments of *Humanity* and *Generoſity*; and makes us impatient for a *Society* which we imagine big with unſpeakable *moral Pleaſures:* where nothing is indifferent, and every trifling Service, being an Evidence of *this ſtrong Love* and *Eſteem*, is mutually receiv'd with the Rapture and Gratitude of the greateſt Benefit, and of the moſt ſubſtantial Obligation; and where *Prudence* and *Good nature* influence both Sides, this *Society* may anſwer all their Expectations.

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NAY, let us examine thoſe of looſer Conduct with relation to the *fair Sex*, and we ſhall find, that *Love* of *ſenſible Pleaſure* is not the chief Motive of *Debauchery*, or *falſe Gallantry*. Were it ſo, the *meaneſt Proſtitutes* would pleaſe as much as any. Bnt we know ſufficiently, that Men are fond of *Good-nature*, *Faith*, *Pleaſantry* of *Temper*, *Wit*, and many other *moral Qualities*, even in a *Miſtreſs*. And this may furniſh us with a Reaſon for what appears pretty unaccountable, *viz.* "That *Chaſtity* itſelf has a powerful Charm "in the Eyes of the *Diſſolute*, even when "they are attempting to deſtroy it."

THIS powerful Determination even to a *limited Benevolence*, and other *moral Sentiments*, is obſerv'd to give a ſtrong Bias to our Minds towards a *univerſal Goodneſs*, *Tenderneſs*, *Humanity*, *Generoſity*, and *Contempt* of *private Good* in our whole Conduct; beſides the obvious Improvement it occaſions in our *external Deportment*, and in our Reliſh of *Beauty*, *Order*, and *Harmony*. As ſoon as a Heart, before *hard* and *obdurate*, is ſoften'd in this Flame, we ſhall obſerve, ariſing along with it, a Love of *Poetry*, *Muſic*, the *Beauty* of *Nature* in rural Scenes, a *Contempt* of other ſelfiſh Pleaſures of the *external Senſes*, a *neat Dreſs*, a *humane Deportment*, a *Delight* in, and *Emulation* of, every thing which is *gallant*, *generous*, and *friendly*.

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In the ſame manner we are determin'd to common Friendſhips and Acquaintances, not by the ſullen Apprehenſions of our *Neceſſities*, or Proſpects of *Intereſt*; but by an incredible Variety of little, agreeable, engaging Evidences of *Love*, *Good-nature*, and other *morally*, *amiable Qualities* in thoſe we converſe with. Among the reſt, none of the leaſt conſiderable is an Inclination to *Chearfulneſs*, a *Delight* to raiſe *Mirth* in others, which procures a ſecret Approbation and Gratitude toward the Perſon who puts us in ſuch an *agreeable*, *innocent*, *good-natur'd*, and *eaſy State* of Mind, as we are conſcious of, while we enjoy pleaſant Converſation, enliven'd by *moderate Laughter*.

Society, Friendſhips, from our Moral Senſe.

VI. Upon this *moral* Senſe is founded all the Power of the Orator. The various Figures of Speech are the ſeveral Manners, which a lively Genius, warm'd with Paſſions ſuitable to the Occaſion, naturally runs into, only a little diverſify'd by *Cuſtom*: and they only move the *Hearers*, by giving a lively Repreſentation of the Paſſions of the *Speaker*; which are communicated to the *Hearers*, as we * obſerv'd above of one Paſſion, *viz. Pity*.

The Power of Oratory founded on it.

Now the Paſſions which the *Orator* attemps to raiſe, are all founded on *moral Qua-*

* See *Sect.* v. *Art.* 8. *Par.* 2.

lities.

Sect. 6. *lities.* All the bold *Metaphors*, or *Deſcriptions*, all the artificial Manners of *Expoſtulation*, *Arguing*, and *Addreſſing* the *Audience*, all the *Appeals* to *Mankind*, are but more lively Methods of giving the *Audience* a ſtronger Impreſſion of the *moral Qualities* of the Perſon *accus'd* or *defended*; of the Action *advis'd*, or *diſſuaded:* And all the *Antitheſes*, or *Witticiſms*; all the *Cadences* of ſonorous Periods, whatever inferior kind of Beauty they may have ſeparately, are of no Conſequence to perſuade, if we neglect moving the Paſſions by ſome Species of *Morality*. They may perhaps raiſe a little Admiration of the *Speaker*, among thoſe who already favour his Party, but they oftener raiſe Contempt in his *Adverſaries*. But when you diſplay the *Beneficence* of any Action, the *good Effect* it ſhall have on the *Public* in promoting the Welfare of the *Innocent*, and relieving the *unjuſtly Diſtreſſed*; if you prove your Allegations, you make every Mortal approve the undertaking it. When any Perſon is to be *recommended*, diſplay his *Humanity*, *Generoſity*, *Study* of the *publick Good*, and *Capacity* to promote it, his *Contempt* of Dangers, and private Pleaſures; and you are ſure to procure him *Love* and *Eſteem*. If at the ſame time you ſhew his *Diſtreſs*, or the *Injuries* he has ſuffer'd, you raiſe *Pity*, and every *tender* Affection.

On the contrary, repreſent the *Barbarity*, or *Cuelty* of any Action, the *Miſery* it ſhall procure

procure to the *Kind*, the *Faithful*, the *Generous*, or only to the *Innocent*; and you raiſe an Abhorrence of it in the Breaſts of the *Audience*, tho' they were not the Perſons who would have ſuffer'd by it. The ſame way, would you make a Perſon *infamous*, and *deſpis'd* and *hated*, repreſent him as *cruel*, *inhuman*, or *treacherous* toward the moſt diſtant rational Agents; or ſhew him only to be *Selfiſh*, and given to *ſolitary Luxury*, without regard to any *Friend*, or the *Intereſt* of others; and you have gain'd your Point, as ſoon as you prove what you alledge. Nay, how does it ſtop our Admiration of any *celebrated* Action, to ſuggeſt, "That the *Author* " of it was no Fool; he knew it would turn " to his own *Advantage!* " Sect. 6.

Now, are the *Learned* and *Polite* the only Perſons who are mov'd by ſuch Speeches? Muſt Men know the Schemes of the *Moraliſts* and *Politicians*, or the *Art* of *Rhetoric*, to be capable of being perſuaded? Muſt they be nicely converſant in all the Methods of promoting *Self-Intereſt?* Nay, do we not ſee on the contrary, the *rude undiſciplin'd Multitude* moſt affected? Where had *Oratory* ſo much Power as in *popular States*, and that too before the Perfection of the Sciences? *Reflection* and *Study* may raiſe in Men a Suſpicion of Deſign, and Caution of Aſſent, when they have ſome Knowledge of the various Topicks of Argument, and find them

Sect. 6. employ'd upon themſelves: but *rude Nature* is ſtill open to every *moral* Impreſſion, and carry'd furiouſly along without Caution, or Suſpenſe. It was not the *Groves* of the *Academy*, or the *poliſh'd Stones* of the *Portico*, or the *manag'd Horſes* of GREECE, which liſten'd to the Harp of an AMPHION, or an ORPHEUS; but the *Trees*, and *Rocks*, and *Tygers* of the *Foreſt*: which may ſhew us, "That there is ſome *Senſe* of *Morality* ante- "cedent to Inſtruction, or metaphyſical Ar- "guments proving the *private Intereſt* of the "Perſon who is perſuaded, to be connected "with the *publick Good*."

Poetry pleaſes from this Moral Senſe.

VII. WE ſhall find this *Senſe* to be the Foundation alſo of the chief Pleaſures of POETRY. We hinted, in the former Treatiſe, at the Foundation of Delight in the *Numbers*, *Meaſures*, *Metaphors*, *Similitudes* *. But as the Contemplation of *moral Objects*, either of *Vice* or *Virtue*, affects us more ſtrongly, and moves our Paſſions in a quite different and a more powerful manner, than *natural Beauty*, or (what we commonly call) *Deformity*; ſo the moſt moving Beauties bear a Relation to our *moral Senſe*, and affect us more vehemently, than the Repreſentations of *natural Objects* in the livelieſt Deſcriptions. *Dramatic* and *Epic* Poetry are intirely ad-

* See *Treatiſe* I. *Sect.* ii. *Art.* 13. *Sect.* iv. *Art.* 3.

dreſs'd to this *Senſe*, and raiſe our Paſſions by the Fortunes of *Characters*, diſtinctly repreſented as *morally good* or *evil*; as might be ſeen more fully, were we to conſider the Paſſions ſeparately. Sect. 6.

WHERE we are ſtudying to raiſe any *Deſire*, or *Admiration* of an Object *really beautiful*, we are not content with a *bare Narration*, but endeavour, if we can, to preſent the *Object* itſelf, or the moſt *lively Image* of it. And hence the *Epic Poem*, or *Tragedy*, gives a far greater Pleaſure than the Writings of *Philoſophers*, tho' both aim at recommending *Virtue*. The repreſenting the Actions themſelves, if the Repreſentation be *judicious*, *natural*, and *lively*, will make us admire the *Good*, and deteſt the *Vicious*, the *Inhuman*, the *Treacherous* and *Cruel*, by means of our *moral Senſe*, without any Reflections of the *Poet* to guide our Sentiments. It is for this Reaſon that HORACE has juſtly made Knowledge in *Morals* ſo neceſſary to a *good Poet*:

Scribendi recte SAPERE *eſt & principium & fons* *.

And again:

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* Hor. de Arte Poet. ver. 309.

Sect. 6.

Qui didicit Patriæ quid debeat, & quid Amicis,
Quo ſit amore Parens, quo Frater amandus, & Hoſpes,
Quod ſit Conſcripti, quod Judicis officium, quæ
Partes in bellum miſſi Ducis; ille profecto
Reddere Perſonæ ſcit convenientia cuique *.

Imagery in Poetry founded on the Moral Senſe.

UPON this ſame *Senſe* is founded the Power of that *great Beauty* in Poetry, the PROSOPOPOEIA, by which *every Affection* is made a *Perſon*; every *natural Event*, *Cauſe*, *Object*, is animated by *moral Epithets*. For we join the Contemplation of *moral Circumſtances* and *Qualities*, along with *natural Objects*, to increaſe their *Beauty* or *Deformity*; and we affect the *Hearer* in a more lively manner with the Affections deſcrib'd, by repreſenting them as *Perſons*. Thus a ſhady Wood muſt have its *ſolemn venerable Genius*, and proper *rural Gods*; every clear Fountain, its *ſacred chaſte Nymph*; and River, its *bountiful God*, with his *Urn*, and perhaps a *Cornucopiæ* diffuſing *Plenty* and *Fruitfulneſs* along its Banks. The *Day-light* is *holy*, *beneign*, and *powerful* to baniſh the pernicious Spirits of the *Night*. The Morning is a *kind officious Goddeſs*, *tripping* over the dewy Mountains, and *uſhering* in Light to *Gods*

* Hor. de Arte Poet. ver. 312, &c.

and

and *Men*. War is an *impetuous, cruel, undiſtinguiſhing Monſter*, whom no *Virtue*, no Circumſtance of *Compaſſion*, can move from his bloody Purpoſes. The Steel is *unrelenting*; the Arrow and Spear are *impatient* to deſtroy, and carry *Death* on their Points. Our modern Engines of War are alſo *frightful Perſonages*, counterfeiting with their rude Throats the Thunder of JOVE. The *moral Imagery* of *Death* is every where known, *viz.* his *Inſenſibility* to *Pity*, his *Inflexibility*, and *univerſal impartial Empire*. FORTUNE is inimitably drawn by HORACE *, with all her *Retinue* and *Votaries*, and with her *rigid ſevere* Miniſter, *Neceſſity*. The Qualities of *Mind* too become *Perſons*. *Love* becomes a VENUS, or a CUPID; *Courage*, or *Conduct*, a MARS, or a PALLAS, *protecting* and *aſſiſting* the Hero; before them march *Terror* and *Dread*, *Flight* and *Purſuit*, *Shouts* and *Amazement*. Nay, the *moſt ſacred Poets* are often led into this *Imagery*, and repreſent *Juſtice* and *Judgment*, as *ſupporting* the ALMIGHTY's Throne, and *Mercy* and *Truth going* before his Face: They ſhew us *Peace* as *ſpringing* up from the Earth, and *Mercy looking* down from Heaven. Sect. 6.

EVERY one perceives a greater Beauty in this manner of Repreſentation, this Imagery, this Conjunction of *moral Ideas*, than in the

* See *Lib.* i. *Od.* 35.

Sect. 6. fulleſt Narration, or the moſt lively natural Deſcription. When one reads the fourth Book of HOMER, and is prepar'd, from the Council of the *Gods*, to imagine the bloody Sequel, and amidſt the moſt beautiful Deſcription which ever was imagin'd of *ſhooting* an Arrow, meets with its *moral Epithet*,

——μελαινάων ἔρμ' ὀδυνάων *,
——*The Source of blackeſt Woes*;

he will find himſelf more mov'd by this Circumſtance, than by all the Profuſion of natural Deſcription which Man could imapine.

Hiſtory. VIII. HISTORY derives its chief Excellence from the repreſenting the *Manners* and *Characters*; the Contemplation of which in *Nature* being very affecting, they muſt neceſſarily give Pleaſure, when well related.

Painting. IX. IT is well known too, that a Collection of the beſt Pieces of *Face-painting* is but a poor Entertainment, when compar'd with thoſe Pieces which repreſent *moral Actions*, *Paſſions*, and *Characters*.

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* See *Homer*, *Iliad* iv. *ver.* 117.

SECT.

SECT. VII.

A Deduction of ſome Complex moral Ideas; *viz. of* Obligation, *and* Right, Perfect, Imperfect, *and* External, Alienable, *and* Unalienable, *from this* moral Senſe.

I. TO conclude this Subject, we may, from what has been ſaid, ſee the *true Original of moral Ideas, viz. This moral Senſe of Excellence in every Appearance, or Evidence of Benevolence.* It remains to be explain'd, how we acquire more particular Ideas of *Virtue* and *Vice*, abſtracting from any *Law*, *Human*, or *Divine*.

Obligation.

IF any one aſk, Can we have any Senſe of OBLIGATION, abſtracting from the *Laws* of a *Superior?* We muſt anſwer according to the various Senſes of the Word *Obligation.* If by *Obligation* we underſtand *a Determination, without Regard to our own Intereſt, to approve Actions, and to perform them; which Determination ſhall alſo make us diſpleas'd with ourſelves, and uneaſy upon having acted contrary to it:* in this Meaning of the word *Obligation*, there is *naturally* an *Obligation* upon all Men to *Benevolence*; and they are ſtill

Sect. 7. under its Influence, even when by falſe, or partial Opinions of the natural Tendency of their Actions, this *moral Senſe* leads them to *Evil*; unleſs by long inveterate Habits it be exceedingly weaken'd; for it ſcarce ſeems poſſible wholly to extinguiſh it. Or, which is to the ſame Purpoſe, this *internal Senſe*, and *Inſtinct* of *Benevolence*, will either influence our Actions, or make us very uneaſy and diſſatisfy'd; and we ſhall be conſcious, that we are in a baſe unhappy State, even without conſidering any *Law* whatſoever, or any external Advantages loſt, or Diſadvantages impedding from its Sanctions. And farther, there are ſtill ſuch Indications given us of what is in the whole *beneficent*, and what not, as may probably diſcover to us the true Tendency of every Action; and let us ſee, ſome time or other, the evil Tendency of what upon a partial View appear'd *good*: or if we have no Friends ſo faithful as to admoniſh us, the Perſons injur'd will not fail to upbraid us. So that no Mortal can ſecure to himſelf a perpetual Serenity, Satisfaction, and Self-approbation, but by a *ſerious Inquiry* into the Tendency of his Actions, and a *perpetual Study* of *univerſal Good*, according to the juſteſt Notions of it.

But if, by *Obligation*, we underſtand *a Motive from Self-Intereſt, ſufficient to determine all thoſe who duly conſider it, and purſue their own Advantage wiſely, to a certain Courſe*

Courſe of Actions; we may have a Senſe of ſuch an *Obligation*, by reflecting on this *Determination* of our *Nature* to approve *Virtue*, to be pleas'd and happy when we reflect upon our having done *virtuous Actions*, and to be uneaſy when we are conſcious of having acted otherwiſe; and alſo by conſidering how much ſuperior we eſteem the Happineſs of *Virtue* to any other Enjoyment *. We may likewiſe have a Senſe of this Sort of *Obligation*, by conſidering thoſe Reaſons which prove a conſtant Courſe of *benevolent* and *ſocial Actions*, to be the moſt probable Means of promoting the *natural Good* of every *Individual*; as CUMBERLAND and PUFENDORF have prov'd: And all this without Relation to a *Law*. Sect. 7.

BUT farther, if our *moral Senſe* be ſuppos'd exceedingly weakened, and the *ſelfiſh Paſſions* grown ſtrong, either thro' ſome general Corruption of Nature, or inveterate Habits; if our *Underſtanding* be weak, and we be often in Danger of being hurry'd by our *Paſſions* into precipitate and raſh Judgments, that *malicious Actions* ſhall promote our Advantage more than *Beneficence*; in ſuch a Caſe, if it be inquir'd what is neceſſary to engage Men to *beneficent Actions*, or induce a ſteady Senſe of an *Obligation* to act for the

* See above, *Sect.* vi. *Art.* 1, 2.

public

Sect. 7. *public Good*; then, no doubt, "A *Law* "with Sanctions, given by a *ſuperior Being*, "of ſufficient Power to make us happy or "miſerable, muſt be neceſſary to counter-"balance thoſe apparent Motives of *Intereſt*, "to calm our *Paſſions*, and give room for "the Recovery of our *moral Senſe*, or at "leaſt for a juſt View of our *Intereſt*."

How far Virtue can be taught.

II. Now the principal Buſineſs of the *moral Philoſopher* is to ſhew, from ſolid Reaſons, "That *univerſal Benevolence* tends to "the Happineſs of the *Benevolent*, either "from the Pleaſures of *Reflection*, *Honour*, "*natural Tendency* to engage the good Of-"fices of Men, upon whoſe Aid we muſt "depend for our Happineſs in this World; "or from the Sanctions of *divine Laws* diſ-"cover'd to us by the Conſtitution of the "*Univerſe*;" that ſo no apparent Views of *Intereſt* may counteract this *natural Inclination*: but not to attempt proving, "That "Proſpects of our *own Advantage* of any "kind can raiſe in us the *virtuous Benevo-"lence* toward others." Let the Obſtacles from *Self-Love* be only remov'd, and NATURE itſelf will incline us to *Benevolence*. Let the Miſery of *exceſſive Selfiſhneſs*, and all its Paſſions, be but once explain'd, that ſo *Self-Love* may ceaſe to counteract our *natural Propenſity* to *Benevolence*; and when this *noble* Diſpoſition gets looſe from theſe Bonds of *Ignorance*, and falſe Views of *Intereſt*, it ſhall be

be aſſiſted even by *Self-Love*, and grow ſtrong enough to make a *noble virtuous Character*. Then he is to inquire, by *Reflection* upon human Affairs, what Courſe of Action does moſt effectually promote the *univerſal Good*, what univerſal Rules or Maxims are to be obſerv'd, and in what Circumſtances the Reaſon of them alters, ſo as to admit Exceptions; that ſo our *good Inclinations* may be directed by *Reaſon*, and a *juſt Knowledge* of the *Intereſts* of *Mankind*. But *Virtue* itſelf, or *good Diſpoſitions* of *Mind*, are not directly taught, or produc'd by *Inſtruction*; they muſt be originally implanted in our Nature by its *great* AUTHOR, and afterwards ſtrengthen'd and confirm'd by our own Cultivation. Sect. 7.

III. WE are often told, "That there is "no Need of ſuppoſing ſuch a *Senſe* of *Mo*- "*rality* given to Men, ſince *Reflection* and "*Inſtruction* would recommend the ſame "Actions from Arguments of *Self-Intereſt*, "and engage us, from the acknowledg'd "Principle of *Self-Love*, to the Practice of "them, without this *unintelligible Determi*- "*nation* to *Benevolence*, or the *occult Qua*- "*lity* of a *moral Senſe*." *Objection.*

IT is perhaps true, that *Reflection*, and *Reaſon* might lead us to approve the ſame Actions as *advantageous*. But would not the *ſame* Reflection and Reaſon likewiſe generally recommend the ſame *Meats* to us, which our *Moral Senſe, not from Reflection.*

Sect. 7. our *Taſte* repreſents as pleaſant? And ſhal' we thence conclude, that we have no *Senſe* of *Taſting*, or that ſuch a *Senſe* is *uſeleſs?* No: The Uſe is plain in both Caſes. Notwithſtanding the mighty *Reaſon* we boaſt of above other Animals, its Proceſſes are too ſlow, too full of Doubt and Heſitation, to ſerve us in every Exigency, either for our own Preſervation, without the *external Senſes*, or to influence our Actions for the *Good* of the *Whole*, without this *moral Senſe*. Nor could we be ſo ſtrongly determin'd at all times to what is moſt conducive to either of theſe Ends, without theſe *expeditious Monitors*, and *importunate Solicitors*; nor ſo nobly rewarded, when we act vigorouſly in Purſuit of theſe Ends, by the calm dull Reflections of *Self-Intereſt*, as by thoſe delightful Senſations.

THIS *natural Determination* to approve and admire, or hate and diſlike Actions, is, no doubt, an *occult Quality*. But is it any way more myſterious, that the Idea of an Action ſhould raiſe *Eſteem* or *Contempt*, than that the Motion of tearing of Fleſh ſhould give *Pleaſure* or *Pain*; or the Act of Volition ſhould move *Fleſh* and *Bones?* In the latter Caſe, we have got the Brain, and elaſtic Fibres, and animal Spirits, and elaſtic Fluids, like the *Indian*'s Elephant, and Tortoiſe, to bear the Burden of the Difficulty: but go one Step farther, and you find the whole

whole as difficult as at firſt, and equally a Myſtery with *this Determination* to love and approve, or condemn and deſpiſe *Actions* and *Agents*, without any Views of *Intereſt*, as they appear *benevolent*, or the contrary. Some alſo object, That according to this Account, Brutes may be capable of Virtue; and this is thought a great Abſurdity. But 'tis manifeſt, that, 1. Brutes are not capable of that, in which this Scheme places the higheſt Virtue, to wit, the *calm Motions of the Will* toward the Good of others; if our common Accounts of Brutes are true, that they are merely led by particular Paſſions toward preſent Objects of Senſe. Again, 'tis plain there is ſomething in certain Tempers of Brutes*, which engages our Liking, and ſome lower Good-will and Eſteem, tho' we do not uſually call it Virtue, nor do we call the ſweeter Diſpoſitions of Children Virtue; and yet they are ſo very like the lower Kinds of Virtue, that I ſee no harm in calling them Virtues. What if there are low Virtues in Creatures void of Reflection, incapable of knowing the Laws, or of being moved by their Sanctions, or by Example of Rewards or Puniſhments? Such Creatures cannot be brought to a proper Trial or Judgment: Laws, Sect. 7.

* *Cicero* is not aſhamed to ſay of ſome Brutes, *Videmus indicia pietatis, cognitionem, memoriam, deſideria,——ſecreta à voluptate humanarum ſimulacra virtutum.* De Finib. lib. ii. c. 33.

Rewards,

Sect. 7. Rewards, or Puniſhments won't have theſe Effects upon them, which they may have upon rational Agents. Perhaps they are no farther rewarded or puniſhed than by the immediate Pleaſure or Pain of their Actions, or what Men immediately inflict upon them. Where is the Harm of all this, That there are lower Virtues, and lower Vices, the Rewarding or Puniſhing of which, in Creatures void of Reaſon and Reflection, can anſwer no wiſe End of Government?

When they offer it as a Preſumption that there can be no ſuch *Senſe*, antecedent to all Proſpect of *Intereſt*, "That theſe Ac-"tions for the moſt part are really *advan-"tageous*, one way or other, to the *Actor*, "the *Approver*, or *Mankind* in general, by "whoſe Happineſs our own State may be "ſome way made better;" may we not aſk, ſuppoſing the Deity intended to impreſs ſuch a *Senſe* of ſomething *amiable* in Actions, (which is no impoſſible Suppoſition) What ſort of Actions would a *good* God determine to *approve?* Muſt we deny the Poſſibility of ſuch a Determination, if it did not lead us to admire Actions of no *Advantage* to *Mankind*, or to love *Agents* for their being *eminent Triflers?* If then the Actions which a *wiſe* and *good* God muſt determine us to approve, if he give us any ſuch *Senſe* at all, muſt be Actions *uſeful* to the *Public*, this *Advantage* can never be a Reaſon againſt the *Senſe* itſelf. After the ſame manner, we

ſhould

ſhould deny all *Revelation*, which taught us *good Senſe*, *Humanity*, *Juſtice*, and a *rational Worſhip*, becauſe *Reaſon* and *Intereſt* confirm and recommend ſuch *Principles* and *Services*; and ſhould greedily embrace every *Contradiction*, *Foppery*, and *Pageantry*, as a *truly divine Inſtitution*, without any thing *humane*, or *uſeful* to *Mankind*. Sect. 7.

Moral Senſe judges of Laws.

IV. The Writers upon oppoſite Schemes, who deduce all Ideas of *Good* and *Evil* from the *private Advantage* of the *Actor*, or from Relation to a *Law*, and its *Sanctions*, either known from *Reaſon* or *Revelation*, are perpetually recurring to this *moral Senſe* which they deny; not only in calling the *Laws* of the Deity *juſt* and *good*, and alledging *Juſtice* and *Right* in the Deity to govern us; but by uſing a Set of Words which import ſomething different from what they will allow to be their only Meaning. *Obligation*, with them, is only ſuch a *Conſtitution either of Nature, or ſome governing Power, as makes it advantageous for the Agent to act in a certain manner*. Let this Definition be ſubſtituted, wherever we meet with the Words, *ought*, *ſhould*, *muſt*, in a moral Senſe, and many of their Sentences would ſeem very ſtrange; as that the Deity *muſt* act rationally, *muſt* not, or *ought* not to puniſh the Innocent, *muſt* make the State of the *Virtuous* better than that of the *Wicked*, *muſt* obſerve Promiſes; ſubſtituting the Definition of the Words, *muſt*,

Sect. 7. *muſt*, *ought*, *ſhould*, would make theſe Sentences either ridiculous, or very diſputable.

V. BUT that our firſt Ideas of *moral Good* depend not on *Laws*, may plainly appear from our conſtant Inquiries into the *Juſtice* of *Laws themſelves*; and that not only of *human Laws*, but of the *divine*. What elſe can be the Meaning of that univerſal Opinion, "That the *Laws* of GOD are *juſt*, "and *holy*, and *good*?" *Human Laws* may be call'd *good*, becauſe of their Conformity to the *Divine*. But to call the *Laws* of the *ſupreme* DEITY *good*, or *holy*, or *juſt*, if all *Goodneſs*, *Holineſs*, and *Juſtice* be conſtituted by *Laws*, or the *Will* of a *Superior* any way reveal'd, muſt be an inſignificant Tautology, amounting to no more than this, "That "GOD *wills*. Or that his *Will* is conform-"able to his *Will*.

IT muſt then firſt be ſuppos'd, that there is ſomething in Actions which is apprehended *abſolutely good*: and this is *Benevolence*, or Deſire of the *public natural Happineſs* of *rational Agents*; and that our *moral Senſe* perceives this *Excellence*: and then we call the *Laws* of the DEITY *good*, when we imagine that they are contriv'd to promote the *morally Good* in the moſt effectual and impartial manner. And the DEITY is call'd *good*, in a *moral Senſe*, when we apprehend that his *whole Providence* tends to the univer-

ſal Happineſs of his *Creatures*; whence we conclude his *Benevolence*, and *Deſire* in their Happineſs. Sect. 7.

SOME tell us, "That the *Goodneſs* of the "*divine Laws* conſiſts in their Conformity "to ſome *eſſential Rectitude* of his *Nature*." But they muſt excuſe us from aſſenting to this, till they make us underſtand the Meaning of this Metaphor, *eſſential Rectitude*; and till we diſcern whether any thing more is meant by it than a *perfectly wiſe, uniform, impartial Benevolence*.

HENCE we may ſee the Difference between *Conſtraint* and *Obligation*. There is indeed no Difference between *Conſtraint*, and the ſecond Senſe of the Word *Obligation*, viz. *a Conſtitution which makes an Action eligible from Self-Intereſt*, if we only mean *external Intereſt*, diſtinct from the delightful Conſciouſneſs which ariſes from the *moral Senſe*. The Reader need ſcarcely be told, that by *Conſtraint*, we do not underſtand an *external Force* moving our Limbs without our Conſent; for in that Caſe we are not *Agents* at all; but that *Conſtraint* which ariſes from the threatening and preſenting ſome *Evil*, in order to make us act in a certain manner. And yet there ſeems an univerſally acknowledg'd Difference between even this ſort of *Conſtraint* and *Obligation*. We never ſay, *Difference between Conſtraint and Obligation.*

Sect. 7. we are *oblig'd* to do an Action which we count baſe, but we may be *conſtrain'd* to it: we never ſay, that the *divine Laws*, by their Sanctions, *conſtrain* us, but *oblige* us; nor do we call Obedience to the DEITY *Conſtraint*, unleſs by a Metaphor, tho' many own they are influenc'd by Fear of Puniſhments. And yet ſuppoſing an *almighty evil Being* ſhould require, under grievous Penalties, *Treachery*, *Cruelty*, *Ingratitude*, we would call this *Conſtraint*. The Difference is plainly this: When any Sanctions co-operate with our *moral Senſe*, in exciting us to Actions which we count *morally good*, we ſay we are *oblig'd*; but when Sanctions of Rewards or Puniſhments oppoſe our *moral Senſe*, then we ſay we are *brib'd* or *conſtrain'd*. In the former Caſe we call the *Lawgiver good*, as deſigning the *publick Happineſs*; in the latter we call him *evil*, or *unjuſt*, for the ſuppos'd *contrary* Intention. But were all our Ideas of *moral Good* or *Evil* deriv'd ſolely from Opinions of *private Advantage* or *Loſs* in Actions, I ſee no poſſible Difference which could be made in the Meaning of theſe Words.

Rights. VI. FROM this Senſe too we derive our Ideas of RIGHTS. Whenever it appears to us, that *a Faculty of doing, demanding, or poſſeſſing any thing, univerſally allow'd in certain Circumſtances, would in the Whole tend to the general Good*, we ſay, that one in ſuch Circum-

Circumſtances has *a Right to do, poſſeſs, or demand that Thing*. And according as this Tendency to the *publick Good* is *greater* or *leſs*, the *Right* is *greater* or *leſs*. Sect. 7.

THE *Rights* call'd *perfect*, are of *ſuch Neceſſity to the publick Good, that the univerſal Violation of them would make human Life intolerable*; and it actually makes thoſe miſerable, whoſe *Rights* are thus *violated*. On the contrary, to fulfil theſe *Rights* in every Inſtance, tends to the *publick Good*, either *directly*, or by promoting the innocent Advantage of a *Part*. Hence it plainly follows, "That to allow a violent Defence, or Pro- "ſecution of ſuch *Rights*, before Civil Go- "vernment be conſtituted, cannot in any "particular Caſe be more detrimental to the "*Public*, than the Violation of them with "Impunity." And as to the general Conſequences, the univerſal Uſe of Force in *a State of Nature*, in purſuance of *perfect Rights*, ſeems exceedingly *advantageous* to the *Whole*, by making every one dread any Attempts againſt the *perfect Rights* of others. *Perfect Rights.*

THIS is the *moral Effect* which attends *proper Injury*, or a *Violation of the perfect Rights of others*, *viz.* A *Right* to *War*, and all *Violence* which is neceſſary to oblige the *Injurious* to repair the Damage, and give Security againſt ſuch Offences for the future. *Right of War, and Puniſhment.*

Sect. 7. This is the ſole Foundation of the Rights of *puniſhing* Criminals, and of *violent Proſecutions* of our Rights, in a *State of Nature*. And theſe Rights, naturally reſiding in the Perſons injur'd, or their *voluntary*, or *invited* Aſſiſtants, to uſe Force according to the Judgment of indifferent Arbitrators, being by the Conſent of the *Perſons injur'd*, transferr'd to the *Magiſtrate* in a *Civil State*, are the true Foundation of his Right of Puniſhment. Inſtances of *perfect Rights* are thoſe to our *Lives*; to the *Fruits* of our Labours; to demand Performance of *Contracts* upon valuable Conſiderations, from Men capable of performing them; to *direct* our own Actions either for *publick*, or *innocent private Good*, before we have ſubmitted them to the Direction of others in any meaſure: and many others of like Nature.

Imperfect Rights.

IMPERFECT *Rights* are *ſuch as, when univerſally violated, would not neceſſarily make Men miſerable.* Theſe *Rights* tend to the Improvement and Increaſe of *poſitive Good*, in any Society, but are not *abſolutely* neceſſary to prevent univerſal Miſery. The Violation of them only diſappoints Men of the Happineſs expected from the Humanity or Gratitude of others; but does not deprive Men of any *Good* which they had before. From this Deſcription it appears, "That a violent "Proſecution of ſuch *Rights* would gene-

"rally

" rally occaſion greater *Evil* than the Vio- Sect. 7.
" lation of them." Beſides, the allowing of Force in ſuch Caſes would deprive Men of the greateſt Pleaſure in Actions of *Kindneſs*, *Humanity*, *Gratitude*; which would ceaſe to appear amiable, when Men could be conſtrain'd to perform them. Inſtances of *imperfect Rights* are thoſe which the *Poor* have to the Charity of the Wealthy; which *all Men* have to Offices of no Trouble or Expence to the Performer; which *Benefactors* have to Returns of Gratitude, and ſuch-like.

THE Violation of *imperfect Rights* only argues a Man to have ſuch weak *Benevolence*, as not to ſtudy advancing the *poſitive Good* of others, when in the leaſt oppoſite to his own: but the Violation of *perfect Rights* argues the *injurious Perſon* to be *poſitively evil* or *cruel*; or at leaſt ſo *immoderately ſelfiſh*, as to be indifferent about the *poſitive Miſery* and *Ruin* of others, when he imagines he can find his *Intereſt* in it. In violating the *former*, we ſhew a weak Deſire of *publick Happineſs*, which every ſmall View of *private Intereſt* overbalances; but in violating the *latter*, we ſhew ourſelves ſo intirely negligent of the *Miſery* of others, that Views of increaſing our own *Good* overcome all our Compaſſion toward their Sufferings. Now as the Abſence of *Good* is more eaſily borne than the Preſence of *Miſery*; ſo our *good*

Sect. 7. *Wiſhes* toward the *poſitive Good* of others, are weaker than our *Compaſſion* toward their *Miſery*. He then who violates *imperfect Rights*, ſhews that his *Self-Love* overcomes only the Deſire of *poſitive Good* to others; but he who violates *perfect Rights*, betrays ſuch a *ſelfiſh* Deſire of advancing his own *poſitive Good*, as overcomes all *Compaſſion* toward the *Miſery* of others.

External Rights. BESIDE theſe two ſorts of *Rights*, there is a third call'd *External*; as when *the doing, poſſeſſing, or demanding of any Thing, is really detrimental to the Publick in any particular Inſtance, as being contrary to the imperfect Right of another; but yet the univerſally denying Men this Faculty of doing, poſſeſſing, or demanding that Thing, or of uſing Force in Purſuance of it, would do more Miſchief than all the Evils to be fear'd from the Uſe of this Faculty.* And hence it appears, "That there "can be no Right to uſe Force in Oppo-"ſition even to *external Rights*, ſince it "tends to the *univerſal Good* to allow Force "in Purſuance of them."

CIVIL Societies ſubſtitute *Actions in Law*, inſtead of the Force allow'd in *the State of Nature*.

INSTANCES of *external Rights* are theſe; that of a *wealthy Miſer* to recal his Loan from

from the moſt induſtrious poor Tradeſman at any time; that of demanding the Performance of a *Covenant* too burdenſome on one Side; the Right of a *wealthy Heir* to refuſe Payment of any Debts which were contracted by him under Age, without Fraud in the Lender; the Right of taking Advantage of a *poſitive Law*, contrary to what was *Equity* antecedent to that Law; as when a *regiſter'd Deed* takes Place of one not regiſter'd, altho' prior to it, and known to be ſo before the ſecond Contract. Sect. 7.

What Rights can be oppoſite.

Now, whereas no *Action*, *Demand*, or *Poſſeſſion*, can at once be either neceſſary to the *publick Good*, or conducive to it, and at the ſame time its *contrary* be either neceſſary or conducive to the ſame End; it follows, "That there can be no Oppoſition of *per-* "*fect Rights* among themſelves, of *imper-* "*fect* among themſelves, or between *per-* "*fect* and *imperfect Rights.*" But it may often tend to the *publick Good*, to allow a *Right* of *doing*, *poſſeſſing*, or *demanding*, and of uſing *Force* in Purſuance of it, while perhaps it would have been more *humane* and *kind* in any Perſon to have acted otherwiſe, and not have claimed his *Right*. But yet a violent Oppoſition to *theſe Rights* would have been vaſtly more *pernicious* than all the Inhumanity in the Uſe of them. And therefore, tho' *external Rights* cannot be oppoſite a-

Sect. 7. mong themſelves; yet they may be oppoſite to *imperfect Rights*; but *imperfect Rights*, tho' violated, give no *Right* to *Force*. Hence it appears, "That there can never be a "*Right* to *Force* on both Sides, or a *juſt* "*War* on both Sides at the ſame time."

Rights alienable and unalienable.

VII. THERE is another important Difference of *Rights*, according as they are *Alienable*, or *Unalienable*. To determine what *Rights* are *alienable*, and what not, we muſt take theſe two Marks:

1*ſt*, IF the Alienation be within our natural Power, ſo that it be poſſible for us in Fact to transfer our *Right*; and if it be ſo, then,

2*dly*, IT muſt appear, that the Power of transferring ſuch *Rights* may ſerve ſome valuable Purpoſe.

BY the *firſt* Mark it appears, "That the "*Right of private Judgment*, or of our *in*-"*ward Sentiments*, is *unalienable*;" ſince we cannot command ourſelves to think what either we ourſelves, or any other Perſon pleaſes. So are alſo our *Internal Affections*, which neceſſarily ariſe according to our Opinions of their Objects. By the *ſecond* Mark it appears, "That our *Right* of *ſerving* "GOD, in the manner which we think ac-

"ceptable,

" ceptable, is not *alienable*;" becauſe it can never ſerve any valuable Purpoſe, to make Men worſhip him in a way which ſeems to them diſpleaſing to him. The ſame way, a *direct Right* over our *Lives* or *Limbs* is not *alienable* to any Perſon; ſo that he might at Pleaſure put us to Death, or maim us. We have indeed a *Right* to hazard our Lives in any good Action which is of Importance to the *Publick*; and it may often ſerve a moſt valuable End, to ſubject the Direction of ſuch perilous Actions to the Prudence of others in purſuing a *publick Good*; as *Soldiers* do to their *General*, or to a *Council* of *War*: and ſo far this *Right* is *alienable*. Theſe may ſerve as Inſtances to ſhew the Uſe of the two Marks of *alienable Rights*, which muſt both concur to make them ſo, and will explain the manner of applying them in other Caſes. Sect. 7.

VIII. THAT we may ſee the Foundation of ſome of the more *important Rights* of *Mankind*, let us obſerve, that probably nine Tenths, at leaſt, of the things which are uſeful to Mankind, are owing to their *Labour* and *Induſtry*; and conſequently, when once Men become ſo numerous, that the *natural Product* of the Earth is not ſufficient for their Support, or Eaſe, or innocent Pleaſure; a Neceſſity ariſes, for the Support of the increaſing *Syſtem*, that ſuch a *Tenour* of Con- *The Foundation of Property.*

Sect. 7. Conduct be obſerv'd, as ſhall moſt effectually promote *Induſtry*; and that Men abſtain from all Actions which would have the contrary Effect. It is well known, that *general Benevolence* alone, is not a Motive ſtrong enough to *Induſtry*, to bear *Labour* and *Toil*, and many other Difficulties which we are averſe to from *Self-Love*. For the ſtrengthening therefore our Motives to *Induſtry*, we have the ſtrongeſt Attractions of *Blood*, of *Friendſhip*, of *Gratitude*, and the additional Motives of *Honour*, and even of *external Intereſt*. *Self-Love* is really as neceſſary to the *Good* of the *Whole*, as *Benevolence*; as that *Attraction* which cauſes the Coheſion of the Parts, is as neceſſary to the *regular State* of the *Whole*, as *Gravitation*. Without theſe additional Motives, *Self-Love* would generally oppoſe the Motions of *Benevolence*, and concur with *Malice*, or influence us to the ſame Actions which *Malice* would. "That "Tenour of Action then, which would take "away the ſtronger Ties of *Benevolence*, or "the additional Motives of *Honour* and *Advantage*, from our *Minds*, and ſo hinder "us from purſuing *induſtriouſly* that Courſe "which really increaſes the *Good* of the "*Whole*, is *evil*; and we are oblig'd to ſhun "it."

First then, the depriving any Perſon of the Fruits of his own innocent Labour, takes away

away all Motives to *Induſtry* from *Self-Love*, or the nearer *Ties*; and leaves us no other Motive than *general Benevolence:* nay, it expoſes the *Induſtrious* as a conſtant Prey to the *Slothful*, and ſets *Self-Love* againſt *Induſtry*. This is the Ground of our *Right* of *Dominion* and *Property* in the *Fruits* of our *Labours*; without which *Right*, we could ſcarce hope for any *Induſtry*, or any thing beyond the Product of uncultivated Nature. *Induſtry* will be confin'd to our preſent Neceſſities, and ceaſe when they are provided for; at leaſt it will only continue from the weak Motive of *general Benevolence*, if we are not allow'd to ſtore up beyond preſent Neceſſity, and to diſpoſe of what is above our Neceſſities, either in Barter for other kinds of Neceſſaries, or for the Service of our Friends or Families. And hence appears the *Right* which Men have to lay up for the *future*, the Goods which will not be ſpoil'd by it; of alienating them in *Trade*; of Donation to *Friends*, *Children*, *Relations:* otherwiſe we deprive *Induſtry* of all the Motives of *Self-Love*, *Friendſhip*, *Gratitude*, and *natural Affection*. The ſame Foundation there is for the *Right* of Diſpoſition by *Teſtament*. The *Preſumption* of Diſpoſition is the Ground of the *Right* of Succeſſion to the *Inteſtate*. Sect. 7.

THE *external Right* of the *Miſer* to his uſeleſs Hoards is founded alſo on this, That allowing

Sect. 7. allowing Perſons by Violence, or without Conſent of the Acquirer, to take the Uſe of his Acquiſitions, would diſcourage *Induſtry*, and take away all the Pleaſures of *Generoſity*, *Honour*, *Charity*, which ceaſe when Men can be forc'd to theſe Actions. Beſides, there is no determining in many Caſes, who is a *Miſer*, and who is not.

Right of Marriage. MARRIAGE muſt be ſo conſtituted as to aſcertain the Offspring; otherwiſe we take away from the *Males* one of the ſtrongeſt Motives to *publick Good*, viz. *natural Affection*; and diſcourage *Induſtry*, as has been ſhewn above.

Commerce. THE *Labour* of each Man cannot furniſh him with all Neceſſaries, tho' it may furniſh him with a needleſs Plenty of one Sort: Hence the *Right* of *Commerce*, and *alienating* our Goods; and alſo the *Rights* from *Contracts* and *Promiſes*, either to the *Goods* acquir'd by others, or to their *Labours*.

Right of Civil Government. THE great Advantages which accrue to Mankind from unprejudiced *Arbitrators*, impower'd to decide the *Controverſies* which ordinarily ariſe, thro' the Partiality of *Self-love*, among Neighbours; as alſo from prudent Directors, who ſhould not only inſtruct the Multitude in the beſt Methods of promoting the *publick Good*, and of defending themſelves againſt

againſt mutual or foreign *Injuries*; but alſo be arm'd with Force ſufficient to make their Decrees or Orders effectual at home, and the Society formidable abroad: Theſe Advantages, I ſay, ſufficiently ſhew the *Right* Men have to conſtitute *Civil Government*, and to ſubject their *alienable Rights* to the Diſpoſal of their Governors, under ſuch *Limitations* as their Prudence ſuggeſts. And as far as the People have ſubjected their *Rights*, ſo far their Governors have an *external Right*, at leaſt, to diſpoſe of them, as their Prudence ſhall direct, for attaining the Ends of their Inſtitution; and no farther. Sect. 7.

IX. THESE Inſtances may ſhew how our *moral Senſe*, by a little Reflection upon the Tendencies of Actions, may adjuſt the *Rights* of *Mankind*. Let us now apply the general Rules laid down above *, for comparing the Degrees of *Virtue* and *Vice* in Actions in a few Corollaries beſides that one already deduc'd †. *Corollaries for comparing the Degrees of Virtue and Vice in Actions.*

1. THE Diſappointment, in whole, or in part, of any Attempt, *Good* or *Evil*, if it be occaſion'd only by external Force, or any unforeſeen Accident, does not vary the *moral Good* or *Evil*; for as in *good* Attempts, the *From Ability.*

* See *Sect.* iii. *Art.* 11, 12.
† See *Sect.* iii. *Art.* 15. *Par.* 3.

Moment

Sect. 7. *Moment* of *Good* is diminiſh'd or vaniſhes in ſuch a Caſe, ſo does the *Ability* likewiſe: The *Quotient* then may ſtill be the ſame. This holds equally in *evil* Attempts. So that Actions are not to be judg'd *good* or *evil* by the Events, any farther than they might have been foreſeen by the *Agent* in *evil* Attempts; or were actually intended, if they were *good*, in *good* Actions; for then only they argue either *Love* or *Hatred* in the *Agent*.

Intereſt. 2. SECULAR *Rewards* annex'd to *Virtue*, and actually influencing the *Agent* farther than his *Benevolence* would, diminiſh the *moral Good* as far as they were neceſſary to move the *Agent* to the Action, or to make him do more *Good* than otherwiſe he would have done; for by increaſing the *Intereſt*, to be ſubtracted, they diminiſh the *Benevolence*. But *additional Intereſts*, which were not neceſſary to have mov'd the *Agent*, ſuch as the *Rewards* of a *good Being* for Actions which he would have undertaken without a Reward, do not diminiſh the *Virtue*. In this, however, no Mortal is capable of judging another: Nor do the Proſpects of grateful Returns for Benefits which we would have confer'd gratuitouſly, diminiſh the *Generoſity*. This Corollary may be apply'd to the *Rewards* of a *future State*, if any Perſon conceives them diſtinct from the Pleaſures of *Virtue* itſelf: If they be not conceiv'd as ſome-

ſomething diſtinct from thoſe Pleaſures, then the very Deſire of them is a ſtrong Evidence of a *virtuous Diſpoſition*. Sect. 7.

3. EXTERNAL *Advantage* exciting us to Actions of *evil* Tendency to others, if without this Proſpect of *Advantage* we would not have undertaken them, diminiſhes the *Evil* of the Action; ſuch as the Proſpects of *great Rewards*, of avoiding *Tortures*, or even the *uneaſy Solicitations* of violent *ſelfiſh Paſſions*. This is commonly called the *Greatneſs of Temptation*. The Reaſon of this is the ſame with that in the former Caſe. We may here alſo remember again, that we are more uneaſy upon the Preſence of *Pain*, than upon the Abſence of *Good*; and hence *Torture* is a more extenuating Circumſtance than *Bribes*, engaging us to *Evil*, becauſe the Motives of private Intereſt are greater.

4. THE ſurmounting the uneaſy Solicitations of the *ſelfiſh Paſſions* increaſes the *Virtue* of a *benevolent* Action, and much more worldly Loſſes, Toil, *&c.* For now the *Intereſt* becomes *negative*; the Subtraction of which increaſes the *Quantity*. *Detrimeut.*

5. A MALICIOUS Action is made the more odious by all its foreſeen *Diſadvantages* to the *Agent*, for the ſame Reaſon: particularly,

6. THE

Sect. 7.

Knowledge of Laws, how it affects Actions.

6. THE Knowledge of a *Law*, prohibiting an *evil* Action, increaſes the *Evil* by increaſing the *negative Intereſt* to be ſubtracted; for then the *ill-natur'd* Inclination muſt be ſo ſtrong as to ſurmount all the ſelfiſh Motives from the Penalties, and all the Motives of *Gratitude* toward the *Law-giver*. This is commonly call'd *ſinning againſt Conſcience*.

7. OFFICES of no *Toil* or *Expence* have little *Virtue* generally, becauſe the *Ability* is very great, and there is no *contrary Intereſt* ſurmounted.

8. BUT the refuſing of them may be very *vicious*, as it argues an Abſence of *good Affection*, and often produces a great enough Moment of *natural Evil*. And,

Degree of Right.

9. IN general, the fulfilling the *perfect Rights* of others has little *Virtue* in it: For thereby no new *Moment* of *Good* is produc'd; and the *Intereſt* engaging to the Action is very great, even the avoiding all the Evils of *War* in a *State of natural* Liberty, or the Penalties of Law in Civil Society.

10. BUT the *violating perfect*, or even *external Rights*, is always *exceedingly evil*, either in the immediate, or more remote Conſequences of the Action; and the *ſelfiſh* Motives,

Motives, ſurmounted by this *vicious* Inclination, are the ſame with thoſe in the former Caſe. Sect. 7.

11. The trueſt Matter of Praiſe are thoſe Actions or Offices, which others claim from us by an *imperfect Right*; and generally, the ſtronger their *Right* is, there is the leſs *Virtue* in fulfilling it, but the greater *Vice* in violating it.

A STRONGER and leſs extenſive Tie of *Benevolence*, in *equal Abilities*, muſt produce a greater *Moment* of *Good* to the Object of it, in *equally good Characters*, than the weaker Ties. Thus, *natural Affection*, *Gratitude*, *Friendſhip*, have greater Effects than *general Benevolence*: Or, we do more Good to Friends, Children, Benefactors, than to Perſons under no ſpecial Relation. *Strength of Ties.*

12. IN *equal Moments* of *Good* produc'd by two *Agents*, when one acts from *general Benevolence* alone, and the other from a *nearer Tie*; there is greater *Virtue* in the *Agent*, who produces *equal Good* from the more extenſive, but leſs paſſionate Attachment; and leſs *Virtue*, where there is the more violent, or paſſionate Attachment, which yet produces no more. The general Benevolence appears of itſelf a more amiable Principle, according

Sect. 7. cording to the Conſtitution of our moral Senſe *, than any particular Paſſion.

13. But the Omiſſion of the *good Offices* of the ſtronger Ties, or Actions *contrary* to them, have greater *Vice* in them, than the like Omiſſions, or Actions contrary to the weaker Ties; ſince our *Selfiſhneſs* or *Malice* muſt appear the greater, by the Strength of the contrary Attachment which it ſurmounts. Thus, in co-operating with *Gratitude*, *natural Affection*, or *Friendſhip*, we evidence leſs *Virtue* in any *given Moment* of *Good* produc'd, than in equally important Actions of *general Benevolence*: But *Ingratitude* to a *Benefactor*, *Negligence* of the *Intereſts* of a *Friend* or *Relation*, or Returns of *evil Offices*, are vaſtly more *odious*, than *equal Negligence*, or *evil Offices* toward *Strangers*.

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* See *Sect* 3. *Art.* ix. *The Author all along ſuppoſes, that no Man acts without ſome* Deſire, *or* Inſtinct, *or* Affection, *or* Appetite; *that of theſe* Attachments *of the Will, ſome are calm and unpaſſionate, others are paſſionate; ſome are extenſive, and others confined to one, or to a few. The former Sort in each of theſe Diviſions, manifeſtly appears more amiable; and conſequently,* cæteris paribus, *the Virtue is leſs, in any given Quantity, of Good done from the violent, paſſionate, and narrow Attachment. A certain* Remarker *thence argues,* "*That then the* "*Virtue is higheſt, when there is no Deſire, Affection, or At-*" *tachment at all; or when we act ſolely from Reaſon, with-*" *out any* Affection *to any Thing.*" *One may retort this Reaſoning in a like Caſe. In any given* Momentum *of Bodies, there the* Velocity *is greater, where there is leaſt* Matter; *conſequently, it is there greateſt, where there is no* Matter *at all.*

14. When

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What Offices to be prefer'd, when there appears any Oppoſition.

14. WHEN we cannot at once follow two different Inclinations of *Benevolence*, we are to prefer gratifying the ſtronger Inclination; according to the wiſe Order of NATURE, which has conſtituted theſe Attachments. Thus, we are rather to be *grateful* than *liberal*; rather ſerve a *Friend*, or *Kinſman*, than a Stranger of only *equal Virtue*, when we cannot do both.

15. OR, more generally, ſince there can be no *Right*, *Claim*, or *Obligation* to *Impoſſibilities*; when two *Actions* to be done by any Agent, would both tend to the Good of Mankind, but they cannot be perform'd both at once; that which occaſions moſt *Good* is to be done, if the Omiſſion of the other occaſions no prepollent *Evil*. If the Omiſſion of either will occaſion ſome *new natural Evil*, *that* is to be omitted, whoſe Omiſſion will occaſion the leaſt *Evil*. Thus if two Perſons of unequal Dignity be in Danger, we are to relieve the more *valuable*, when we cannot relieve both. *Ingratitude*, as it evidences a worſe Temper than Neglect of *Beneficence*; ſo it raiſes worſe Sentiments in the Benefactor, and greater Diffidence, and Suſpicion of his Fellow-Creatures, than an Omiſſion of an Act of Beneficence: we ought therefore to be *grateful*, rather than *beneficent*, when we cannot (in any particular Caſe)

Sect. 7. evidence both Diſpoſitions. If omitting of one Action will occaſion *new poſitive Evil*, or Continuance in a State of *Pain*, whereas the Omiſſion of another would only prevent ſome *new poſitive Good*; ſince a State of *Pain* is a greater Evil, than the Abſence of Good, we are to follow *Compaſſion*, rather than *Kindneſs*; and relieve the *Diſtreſſed*, rather than increaſe the Pleaſures of the *Eaſy*; when we cannot do both at once, and other Circumſtances of the Objects are equal. In ſuch Caſes, we ſhould not ſuppoſe *contrary Obligations*, or *Duties*; the more important Office is our *preſent Duty*, and the Omiſſion of the leſs important inconſiſtent Office at preſent, is no *moral Evil.*

The Original of Government.

X. From *Art.* vii. it follows, "That all "human *Power*, or *Authority*, muſt conſiſt "in *a Right transferr'd to any Perſon or "Council, to diſpoſe of the alienable Rights "of others*; and that conſequently, there can "be no Government ſo abſolute, as to have "even an *external Right* to do or command "every thing." For wherever any Invaſion is made upon *unalienable Rights*, there muſt ariſe either a *perfect*, or *external Right* to *Reſiſtance*. The only Reſtraints of a moral Kind upon Subjects in ſuch Caſes, are, when they foreſee that, thro' their want of Force, they ſhall probably by Reſiſtance occaſion greater Evils to the Publick, than thoſe they attempt

attempt to remove; or when they find that *Governors*, in the main very uſeful to the Publick, have by ſome unadviſed Paſſion, done an Injury too ſmall to overbalance the Advantages of their Adminiſtration, or the Evils which Reſiſtance would in all likelihood occaſion; eſpecially when the Injury is of a private Nature, and not likely to be made a Precedent to the Ruin of others. *Unalienable Rights* are *eſſential Limitations* in all Governments. Sect. 7.

Abſolute Government.

BUT by *abſolute Government*, either in *Prince* or *Council*, or in *both jointly*, we underſtand *a Right to diſpoſe of the natural Force, and Goods of a whole People, as far as they are naturally alienable, according to the Prudence of the Prince, Council, or of both jointly, for the publick Good of the State, or whole People; without any Reſervation as to the Quantity of the Goods, Manner of Levying, or the Proportion of the Labours of the Subject, which they ſhall demand.* But in all States this *tacit Truſt* is preſuppos'd, "That the Power conferr'd ſhall be em-"ploy'd according to the beſt Judgment "of the Rulers for the publick Good." So that, whenever the Governors openly profeſs a Deſign of deſtroying the State, or act in ſuch a manner as will neceſſarily do it; the *eſſential Truſt*, ſuppos'd in all Convey-

Sect. 7. ance of *Civil Power*, is violated, and the *Grant* thereby made void.

Limited Government.

A PRINCE, or Council, or both jointly, may be variouſly limited; *either when the Conſent of the one may be neceſſary to the Validity of the Acts of the other; or when, in the very Conſtitution of this ſupreme Power, certain Affairs are expreſly exempted from the Juriſdiction of the Prince, or Council, or both jointly:* as when ſeveral independent States uniting, form a general Council, from whoſe Cognizance they expreſly reſerve certain Privileges, in the very Formation of this Council; or when, in the very Conſtitution of any State, a certain Method of *Election* of the Perſon of the Prince, or of the Members of the ſupreme Council, is determin'd and the *Intention* of their Aſſembling declar'd. In all ſuch Caſes, it is not in the Power of ſuch Prince, Council, or both jointly, to alter the very *Form of Government*, or to take away that Right which the People have to be govern'd in ſuch a manner, by a Prince or Council thus elected, without the univerſal Conſent of the very People who have ſubjected themſelves to this Form of Government. So that there may be a very *regular State*, where there is no univerſal abſolute Power lodg'd either in one Perſon, or Council, or in any other Aſſembly beſide that of the whole People aſſociated into

into that State. To ſay, that upon a Change attempted in the very *Form of the Government*, by the *ſupreme Power*, the People have no Remedy according to the Conſtitution itſelf, will not prove that the *ſupreme Power* has ſuch a *Right*; unleſs we confound all Ideas of *Right* with thoſe of *external Force*. The only Remedy indeed in that Caſe, is an univerſal Inſurrection againſt ſuch *perfidious Truſtees*. Sect. 7.

DESPOTICK Power, is *that which Perſons injur'd may acquire over thoſe Criminals, whoſe Lives, conſiſtently with the publick Safety, they may prolong, that by their Labours they may repair the Damages they have done; or over thoſe who ſtand oblig'd to a greater Value, than all their Goods and Labours can poſſibly amount to.* This Power itſelf is limited to the Goods and Labours only of the Criminals or Debtors; and includes no Right to *Tortures*, *Proſtitution*, or any Rights of the Governed which are *naturally unalienable*; or to any thing which is not of ſome Moment toward *Repair of Damage*, *Payment of Debt*, or *Security againſt future Offences*. The Characteriſtick of *Deſpotick Power*, is this, "That it is "ſolely intended for the Good of the Go- "vernors, without any *tacit Truſt* of con- "ſulting the Good of the *Governed*." Deſpotick Government, in this Senſe, is direct- *The Nature of Deſpotick Power.*

Sect. 7. ly inconsistent with the Notion of Civil Government.

FROM the Idea of *Right*, as above explain'd, we must necessarily conclude, "That there can be no *Right*, or *Limitation of Right*, inconsistent with, or opposite to the greatest publick Good." And therefore in Cases of *extreme Necessity*, when the State cannot otherwise be preserv'd from Ruin, it must certainly be *just* and *good* in limited Governors, or in any other Persons who can do it, to use the Force of the State for its own Preservation, beyond the Limits fix'd by the *Constitution*, in some *transitory Acts*, which are not to be made *Precedents*. And on the other hand, when an *equal Necessity* to avoid Ruin requires it, the Subjects may justly resume the Powers ordinarily lodg'd in their Governors, or may counteract them. This Privilege of *flagrant Necessity* we all allow in Defence of the most perfect *private Rights*: And if *publick Rights* are of more extensive Importance, so are also *publick Necessities*. These Necessities must be very grievous and flagrant, otherwise they can never overbalance the *Evils* of violating a tolerable Constitution, by *an arbitrary Act of Power*, on the one hand; or by an Insurrection, or Civil War, on the other. No Person, or State can be happy, where they do not think their *important*

tant Rights are ſecure from the *Cruelty*, *Avarice*, *Ambition*, or *Caprice* of their Governors. Nor can any *Magiſtracy* be ſafe, or effectual for the Ends of its Inſtitution, where there are frequent Terrors of *Inſurrections*. Whatever *temporary Acts* therefore may be allow'd in extraordinary Caſes; whatever may be lawful in the *tranſitory Act* of a bold Legiſlator, who without previous Conſent ſhould reſcue a ſlaviſh Nation, and place their Affairs ſo in the Hands of a *Perſon* or *Council*, *elected* or *limited* by themſelves, that they ſhould ſoon have Confidence in their own Safety, and in the Wiſdom of the Adminiſtration; yet, as to the fixed State which ſhould ordinarily obtain in all Communities, ſince no *violent Uſurper* of Government can ſo demonſtrate his ſuperior Wiſdom or Goodneſs to the Satisfaction and Security of the Governed, as is neceſſary to their Happineſs; this muſt follow, "That "except when Men, for their *own Intereſt*, "or out of *regard to a publick Good*, have by "*Conſent* ſubjected their Actions, or their "Goods, within certain Limits to the Diſpoſal of others; no Mortal can have a "*Right* from his *ſuperior Wiſdom*, or *Goodneſs*, or any other *Quality*, to give Laws "to others without their *Conſent*, *expreſs* or "*tacit*; or to diſpoſe of the *Fruits* of their "Labours, or of any other *Right* whatſoever." And therefore *ſuperior Wiſdom*, Sect. 7.

Sect. 7. or *Goodneſs*, give no *Right* to Men to govern others.

Divine Government founded on Wiſdom and Goodneſs.

BUT then with relation to the DEITY, ſuppos'd *omniſcient* and *benevolent*, and ſecure from *Indigence*, the ordinary Cauſe of Injuries toward others; it muſt be *amiable* in ſuch a *Being*, to aſſume the Government of *weak, inconſtant Creatures*, often miſled by *Selfiſhneſs*; and to give them Laws. To theſe Laws every Mortal ſhould ſubmit from *publick Love*, as being contriv'd for the *Good* of *the Whole*, and for the *greateſt private Good* conſiſtent with it; and every one may be ſure, that he ſhall be better directed how to attain theſe Ends by the *Divine Laws*, than by his own greateſt Prudence and Circumſpection. Hence we imagine, "That a *good* and *wiſe* GOD muſt have a "*perfect Right* to govern the *Univerſe*; and "that all Mortals are oblig'd to *univerſal* "*Obedience*."

Divine Juſtice what.

THE *Juſtice* of the DEITY is only a Conception of his *univerſal impartial Benevolence*, as it ſhall influence him, if he gives any Laws, to attemper them to the *univerſal Good*, and enforce them with the moſt effectual Sanctions of *Rewards* and *Puniſhments*.

XI. SOME

Sect. 7.

Creation not the Ground of God's Dominion.

XI. Some imagine that the *Property* the *Creator* has in all his Works, muſt be the *true* Foundation of his *Right* to govern. Among Men indeed, we find it neceſſary for the *publick Good*, that none ſhould arbitrarily diſpoſe of the Goods acquir'd by the Labour of another, which we call his *Property*; and hence we imagine that *Creation* is the *only* Foundation of God's *Dominion*. But if the Reaſon * of eſtabliſhing the *Rights* of *Property* does not hold againſt a *perfectly wiſe* and *benevolent Being*, I ſee no Reaſon why *Property* ſhould be neceſſary to his *Dominion*. Now the Reaſon does not hold: For an *infinitely wiſe* and *good Being* could never employ his aſſumed Authority to counteract the *univerſal Good*. The Tie of *Gratitude* is ſtronger indeed than bare *Benevolence*; and therefore ſuppoſing two *equally wiſe* and *good Beings*, the one our *Creator*, and the other not, we ſhould think ourſelves more oblig'd to obey our *Creator*. But ſuppoſing our *Creator malicious*, as ſome antient *Hereticks* did, and a *good Being* condeſcending to reſcue us, or govern us better, with ſufficient Power to accompliſh his kind Intentions; his *Right* to govern would be perfectly good. But this is rather Matter of cu-

* See *Art.* 10. *Par.* 6. *of this Section.*

rious

Sect. 7. rious Speculation than Uſe; ſince both Titles of *Benevolence* and *Property* concur in the *one only true* DEITY, as far as we can know, join'd with *infinite Wiſdom* and *Power*.

Our Moral Senſe the Effect of the Divine Goodneſs.

XII. IF it be here inquir'd, "Could "not the DEITY have given us a *differ-* "*rent* or *contrary Determination* of *Mind*, "*viz.* to *approve* Actions upon another Foun- "dation than *Benevolence*?" There ſeems nothing in this ſurpaſſing the natural Power of the DEITY. But, as in the firſt Treatiſe*, we reſolv'd the Conſtitution of our preſent *Senſe* of *Beauty* into the *divine Goodneſs*, ſo with much more obvious Reaſon may we aſcribe the preſent Conſtitution of our *moral Senſe* to his *Goodneſs*. For if the DEITY be really *benevolent*, and deſires the Happineſs of others, he could not *rationally* act otherwiſe, or give us a *moral Senſe* upon another Foundation, without counteracting his own *benevolent Intentions*. For even upon the Suppoſition of a *contrary Senſe*, every *rational Being* muſt ſtill have been ſolicitous in ſome degree about his own external Happineſs: Reflection on the Circumſtances of Mankind in this World would have ſuggeſted, that *univerſal Benevolence*, and a *ſocial*

* *Sect.* viii. *Art.* 2. *Prop.* 5.

Temper,

Temper, with a *ſuitable Courſe* of *Actions*, or a *certain Courſe* of external Actions, would moſt effectually promote the *external Good* of every one, according to the Reaſonings of CUMBERLAND and PUFFENDORF; while at the ſame time this *perverted Senſe* of *Morality* would have made us uneaſy in ſuch a Courſe, and inclin'd us to the quite contrary, *viz. Barbarity*, *Cruelty*, and *Fraud*; and *univerſal War*, according to Mr. HOBBES, would really have been our *natural State*; ſo that in every Action we muſt have been diſtracted by two contrary Principles, and perpetually miſerable, and diſſatisfy'd, when we follow'd the Directions of either. Sect. 7.

XIII. IT has often been taken for granted in *theſe Papers*, "That the DEITY is *morally good*;" tho' the Reaſoning is not at all built upon this Suppoſition. If we inquire into the Reaſon of the great Agreement of Mankind in this Opinion, we ſhall perhaps find no demonſtrative Arguments *à priori*, from the Idea of an *Independent Being*, to prove his *Goodneſs*. But there is abundant Probability, deduc'd from the whole *Frame* of *Nature*, which ſeems, as far as we know, plainly contriv'd for the *Good* of the *Whole*; and the caſual Evils ſeem the neceſſary Concomitants of ſome Mechaniſm deſign'd for prepollent *Good*. Nay, this very *moral Senſe*, implanted in *rational Agents*, to approve

Whence this univerſal Opinion of the Divine Goodneſs.

Sect. 7. approve and admire whatever Actions flow from a Study of the *Good* of *others*, is one of the ſtrongeſt Evidences of *Goodneſs* in the AUTHOR of *Nature*.

BUT theſe Reflections are not ſo univerſal as the Opinion, nor are they often inculcated. What then more probably leads *Mankind* into that Opinion, is this: The obvious *Frame* of the *World* gives us Ideas of *boundleſs Wiſdom* and *Power* in its AUTHOR. Such a *Being* we cannot conceive *indigent*, and muſt conclude *happy*, and in the *beſt State* poſſible, ſince he can ſtill gratify himſelf. The *beſt State* of *rational Agents*, and their *greateſt* and moſt *worthy Happineſs*, we are neceſſarily led to imagine muſt conſiſt in *univerſal efficacious Benevolence:* and hence we conclude the DEITY *benevolent* in the moſt *univerſal impartial manner*. Nor can we well imagine what elſe deſerves the Name of *Perfection* more than *Benevolence*, and thoſe *Capacities* or *Abilities* which are neceſſary to make it *effectual*; ſuch as *Wiſdom* and *Power:* at leaſt we can have no more lovely Conception of it.

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